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1. INTRODUCTION 
 
 
Imagine you are five years old and you are with your parents at a fair in a foreign country 
and for whatever reason you have a desire for bubblegum. By happy coincidence, you walk by a 
bubblegum vending machine. The machine looks a little different from those you are used to. It 
has the familiar slot to insert coins and a wheel you have to turn to get bubblegum, but also a lever 
on top, which you have never seen before. You are not completely sure if this machine needs to 
be operated differently to the ones you know from home. You ask your parents for coins and get 
some. Another person seems to share the same cravings and steps up to the machine in front of 
you. She taps three times on top of vending machine. She pushes the lever back and forth. Then, 
she inserts a coin. Afterwards she taps on the top three times again. Finally, she turns the wheel 
and gets her bubblegum. You see her happily stick the gum into her mouth as she leaves. You are 
the next in line. How will you operate the bubblegum machine? To answer that question, I would 
like to go back in time and have a look on that question from an evolutionary perspective.  
Humans are an incredible successful species. They are able to adapt to the cold 
environment of the Antarctic, to humid environment of the tropical forest, but also to the hot and 
dry environment of the African savannah. What is it that makes humans the probably most 
adaptive of all species? You might think it is our biological superiority. However, there are many 
species that by far overtrump us regarding their biological adaption. An arctic fox can live in the 
cold without needing a warm coat, and a camel can survive in the desert without water up to two 
weeks. The key to our adaptability seems to be our culture (e.g., Henrich, 2016; Tomasello, 1999); 
that we dispose over knowledge and skills that we learned from others. For example, humans were 
able to survive in the artic because we learned for example to sew warm cloth, to build igloos and 
to hunt polar bears and seals, and we were able to survive in the savannah because we learned for 
example how to use roots as a source for water. It was not necessary for each individual to invent 
these survival tricks from scratch, we could learn from others. Our adaptability seems to be a 
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product of gene–culture coevolution (e.g., Henrich, 2016). We know quite well, how genetic 
information is transmitted from one generation to another, but how is cultural knowledge 
transmitted? An essential mechanism for cultural transmission is social learning. Without social 
learning the species human would probably not have been able to survive (Boyd, Richerson, & 
Henrich, 2011). Therefore, it is likely that we developed special and pronounced forms of social 
learning. One form of social learning that received a lot of attention in the last decade is the 
imitation of causally irrelevant actions.  
The imitation of actions that are perceivably irrelevant to reach a certain goal, has been 
termed ‘overimitation’ (Lyons, Damrosch, Lin, Macris, & Keil, 2011; Lyons, Young, & Keil, 2007). 
In general, imitation is a particularly pronounced social learning strategy in humans. It enables us 
to quickly acquire novel actions and new problem-solving strategies, without putting much effort 
into working out a solution on our own. However, humans do not only copy actions with a clear 
purpose, we also have a pervasive tendency to copy behaviors whose purpose is unclear. Sometimes 
such actions are subject to a purpose that is not discernible at the time; however, sometime such 
actions are completely unrelated to a set goal. In these instances, copying goal-irrelevant actions 
seems to be an inefficient learning strategy. Therefore, the legitimate question arises: Why do we 
do so?  
Coming back to the bubble gum example. According to recent scientific findings, it is quite 
likely that you would tap on the machine three times, insert your coin, tap again and then turn the 
wheel to get your bubblegum. But why would you do so? You might think that the tapping is 
necessary to make the machine work. You might be reasoning that, since the tapping worked for 
the other person and you are not certain how this machine works, you would rather just trust in a 
strategy that has already been proven successful. You might think that you are supposed to tap and 
it might be rude not to do it. Or you might just think that the tapping looked like a fun thing to 
do, so you thought ‘Why not?’. 
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In my dissertation I will present work aimed to investigate the underlying motivations of 
overimitation. I will commence with giving a short introduction on what overimitation is and how 
it is typically operationalized. I will then outline recent explanatory models for the phenomenon. 
Then, I will summarize three empirical studies conducted to test the validity of these explanatory 
models. On the basis of the results of these studies, I will finish by introducing a new integrative 
explanatory model for overimitation.  
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2. WHAT IS OVERIMITATION?  
 
 
Imitation of causally irrelevant actions was first systematically tested and reported in 2005 
in a groundbreaking study by Horner and Whiten (2005). Three- to 4-year-old children and young 
chimpanzees observed an experimenter who retrieved a reward from a puzzle box with a series of 
actions that were either causally necessary or unnecessary. When the box was opaque, both 
chimpanzees and children tended to copy both the necessary as well as the unnecessary actions 
when retrieving the reward. This was unsurprising since the mechanisms of the box were hidden 
from view, leaving it unclear to an observer whether the actions might in fact be causally necessary. 
However, when the opaque box was replaced with a transparent box a striking difference emerged 
between the two species. With the box’s inner mechanisms transparent, it was visible that some of 
the demonstrated actions had no effect on the reward. Whereas chimpanzees omitted unnecessary 
actions, human children continued to imitate the causally irrelevant actions. Two years after the 
this first report, Lyons, Young, and Keil (2007) labeled this phenomenon “overimitation”.  
Since the first report of overimitation, a rapidly growing number of studies has addressed 
imitation of unnecessary actions, especially in children (Brugger, Lariviere, Mumme, & Bushnell, 
2007; Kenward, Karlsson, & Persson, 2011; Lyons et al., 2007; McGuigan, Whiten, Flynn, & 
Horner, 2007; Nielsen & Blank, 2011). Children need to learn to find their way around in a complex 
world. The amount of knowledge and skills they need to learn is incredibly large. Therefore, it is 
especially interesting to investigate overimitation in children.  
Many studies on overimitation shared the same paradigm, build on the original design by 
Horner and Whiten (2005). In this widespread paradigm (e.g., McGuigan, Makinson, & Whiten, 
2011; Wood, Kendal, & Flynn, 2012), participants first see how a demonstrator retrieves an object 
from a puzzle box using a combination of necessary and unnecessary actions. After observing the 
demonstrator, it is the participants turn to either extract a reward (e.g., Horner & Whiten, 2005) or 
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to extract objects which are needed to fulfill another task (Kenward, 2012; Keupp, Behne, Zachow, 
Kasbohm, & Rakoczy, 2015).  
Most researchers restrict the term overimitation to events in which it is possible for the 
participants to perceive the causal irrelevance of additional actions, as when a necessary physical 
connection between a tool and its target is visibly lacking. This perceptibility is either ensured by 
using a transparent puzzle box (e.g., Horner & Whiten, 2005), by demonstrating actions on a 
disconnected object (Lyons et al., 2011; Taniguchi & Sanefuji, 2017) or by performing superficial 
touching or tapping actions (Nielsen, Simcock, & Jenkins, 2008). However, occasionally the term 
has been used in a broader sense, for example in experiments in which causal irrelevance of the 
modeled actions is not perceptible (Flynn & Smith, 2012) or in experiments that investigate the 
imitation of actions that are causally relevant but executed in an inefficient and unusual manner, 
such as turning on a light with the forehead (Buttelmann, Carpenter, Call, & Tomasello, 2007; 
Corriveau et al., 2017; Nagell, Olguin, & Tomasello, 1993; Nielsen & Hudry, 2010). Recently, 
Hoehl et al. (2018) have suggested to define “overimitation as the imitation of perceivably causally 
unnecessary actions” that are performed in addition to causally necessary actions in relation to a 
goal. This helps to emphasize that “the term “over”-imitation neither implies that actions are 
performed that go beyond the actions performed by a demonstrator, nor that the behavior is 
necessarily maladaptive or dysfunctional in children’s everyday lives” (Hoehl et al., 2018). I will use 
this narrower definition of overimitation in terms of imitating perceivably causally unnecessary 
actions. 
After having introduced the phenomenon, I will next give a brief overview of recent 
explanatory models of overimitation. 
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3. RECENT EXPLANATORY MODELS FOR OVERIMITATION  
 
 
In over 10 years of research on overimitation, several explanatory models for the 
phenomenon have been proposed. Some of them focus on children’s need to learn about objects 
whose causal properties are not immediately obvious. For example, Whiten and colleagues (Whiten, 
McGuigan, Marshall-Pescini, & Hopper, 2009) argue that on average, it is profitable for children 
to copy much of the behavioral repertoire they observe in everyday life. This may be specific for 
the culturally enriched environment of humans. The majority of copied actions will be 
advantageous; and if a small percentage of these actions turn out not to be advantageous or even 
costly, these wrongly assimilated aspects of imitated actions can be omitted later on. This is termed 
the “copy first – refine later” approach (Whiten et al., 2009). In this sense, overimitation is 
proposed to serve a crucial function in the transmission of cultural knowledge (Nielsen & 
Tomaselli, 2010). Overimitation is an adaptive learning strategy supporting humans’ ability to learn 
not only conventional knowledge and rituals, but also instrumental skills (Legare, 2017) much faster 
than would be possible if copying required a full causal understanding of each action. Relatedly, 
Lyons and colleagues (Lyons et al., 2007; 2011) have argued that children automatically encode 
observed actions as causally relevant and therefore reproduce them (automatic causal encoding 
hypothesis). According to this theory, overimitation is an automatic and therefore “unavoidable” 
behavior.  These theories imply that children do not understand or at least do not question if the 
performed actions are causally relevant or irrelevant.  
Other authors focus more on the social motivations underlying overimitation. Some argue 
that overimitation is driven by children’s desire to affiliate with the demonstrator or to 
communicate their similarity (Nielsen & Blank, 2011). Conclusions of older studies, that infants 
(Hanna & Meltzoff, 1993) as well as children (Roberts, Wurtele, Boone, Metts, & Smith, 1981) 
imitate with the hope to benefit or gain attention from others, and that teachers and peers show 
greater affinity for children who are more imitative (Thelen, Frautschi, Roberts, Kirkland, & 
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Dollinger, 1981), support these affiliative accounts. Another subcategory of social explanatory 
models for overimitation, focuses on the urge or pressure to follow norms, conventions or rituals 
(Kenward, 2012; Kenward et al., 2011; Keupp, Behne, & Rakoczy, 2013; Legare & Nielsen, 2015).  
In line with these social accounts, a more recent model tries to combine explanations for 
overimitation focusing on social motivations and explanations for selective imitation focusing on 
goal-directed motivations. Over and Carpenter (2012a; 2012b) suggested that children’s tendency 
to copy observed actions depend on their goals in specific situations. These goals could either be 
learning goals (i.e., learning about the function of an apparatus), social goals (i.e., establishing a 
good relationship with somebody), or a combination of both (i.e., following the rules of a game). 
Accordingly, if children have learning goals, they tend to behave more efficiently; if children have 
(additional) social goals, they are poised to faithfully imitate even actions that are not goal-directed.  
Related to this integrative theory, Legare and colleges (e.g., Legare & Herrmann, 2013) 
proposed that cultural learning in humans involves a ritual/conventional stance (i.e., trying to find 
a rationale for actions based on social convention) as well as an instrumental stance (i.e., trying to 
find a rationale for actions based on physical causation). Whereas the ritual stance is associated 
with high fidelity imitation and overimitation, the instrumental stance is associated with selective 
imitation or emulation (copying of action outcomes). The ritual stance or an orientation towards 
social goals seems to be triggered by different cues, such as the missing perceptibility of an action’s 
causal purpose (Kapitány & Nielsen, 2015), start- and end- state equivalence (Watson-Jones, 
Legare, Whitehouse, & Clegg, 2014), normative language (Legare, Wen, Herrmann, & Whitehouse, 
2015), the presence of the person who demonstrated the causally irrelevant actions (Nielsen & 
Blank, 2011) or by ritual-like action characteristics such as repetition, redundancy, or formality 
(Boyer & Liénard, 2007; Bulbulia & Sosis, 2011; Eilam, Zor, Szechtman, & Hermesh, 2006; 
Kapitány & Nielsen, 2016; Legare & Souza, 2012; Rossano, 2012). These social explanatory models 
imply that children may have an understanding of causal irrelevancy of demonstrated actions, but 
copy them anyways, especially in socially encouraging situations. 
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It is still unclear which of these models best explains overimitation. The following three 
empirical studies were designed to contrast the predictions of explanatory models focusing on 
social motivations and explanatory models focusing on erroneous causal reasoning.  
 20 
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4.     CONTRASTING SOCIAL AND CAUSAL EXPLANATORY MODELS  
          – THREE EMPIRICAL STUDIES 
 
 
As reviewed in the previous section, existing theories still present a somewhat ambiguous 
picture about the underlying motivations of overimitation. The aim of this dissertation is to shed 
further light on when and why children overimitate. In three studies, we contrasted social and 
causal explanatory models by increasing children’s social motivations to overimitate on one hand 
and presenting them with a more efficient strategy to solve the problem on the other hand. To 
create this contrast, we used a paradigm with two phases and two demonstrators. In the following, 
I will describe the general paradigm, which was used in all three studies that are part of this 
dissertation. Then, I will summarize methods and results of the studies. In the next chapter, I will 
discuss the combined findings of these studies and propose a new integrative explanatory model 
of overimitation. 
In all three studies we used a paradigm with two successive phases. In one phase of the 
paradigm one demonstrator showed an inefficient strategy including causally irrelevant actions to 
extract a token from a puzzle box. In the other phase a different demonstrator performed an 
efficient strategy to extract a token without any irrelevant actions. After each demonstration, the 
child was asked to extract a token him- or herself. Therefore, there were two testing phases, one 
after the inefficient and one after the efficient demonstration. Including two phases allowed us to 
investigate the consistency of overimitation and to identify what conditions lead to behavioral 
change (i.e., whether a child would switch from an inefficient to an efficient strategy, or vice versa). 
In all three studies presented in this dissertation, the child was left alone during each testing phase.  
The overimitation task used in these studies involved a transparent puzzle box with a non-
functional button on the side and a non-functional lever on top (see Figure 1). The only relevant 
action was opening a flap and inserting a magnetic rod (Figure 1E). This rod allowed participants 
to remove a magnetic marble that could subsequently be exchanged for stickers. For the inefficient 
 22 
strategy, the demonstrator performed four irrelevant actions that varied systematically regarding 
their relation to the puzzle box and the rod; clapping (Figure 1A) involved no direct contact with 
either of the instruments, pushing the non-functional lever (Figure 1B) involved contact only with 
the puzzle box, tapping the rod on the palm of the hand (Figure 1C) involved contact only with 
the rod, and pushing the non-functional button (Figure 1D) involved contact with both the puzzle 
box and the rod. Therefore, children saw two irrelevant actions that involved physical contact with 
the puzzle box and two irrelevant actions that did not involve contact with the puzzle box.  
 
 
Figure 1. The puzzle box and actions performed by the demonstrators. Tokens were placed in the 
tube within the transparent puzzle box. The tube was opaque in Study 1 and transparent in Study 
2 and 3. The inefficient demonstration consisted of four irrelevant actions (A–D) and one relevant 
action (E). The efficient demonstration consisted of only the relevant action (E).  
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The two-phased paradigm with two demonstrators allowed to socially emphasize the 
inefficient or the efficient strategy independently. In Study 1 and 2, we increased children’s social 
motivation by manipulating whether the demonstrator that performed either the efficient or the 
inefficient strategy was communicative or not. In Study 3 we increased children’s social motivation 
by manipulating whether the demonstrator that performed one strategy or the other was an in-
group or out-group member. Whereas in Study 1, Study 2 (Experiment 1) and Study 3 children 
learned the inefficient strategy first (Phase 1) and the efficient strategy second (Phase 2), in Study 
2 (Experiment 2a and 2b) demonstration order war reversed, therefore they learned the efficient 
strategy first (Phase 1) and the inefficient strategy second (Phase 2). With the demonstration of the 
efficient strategy to extract a token in the first phase, we could ensure that children know that some 
of the demonstrated actions were irrelevant when they observed them in the second phase. With 
the demonstration of the efficient strategy to extract a token in the second phase, it was possible 
that children did not recognize the irrelevancy of the demonstrated actions when they observed 
them. This way we could test if overimitation is a result of causal distortion. 
This paradigm allowed to contrast social and causal explanatory models. Whereas 
explanatory models focusing on social motivations predicted that children overimitate even after 
discovering that some of the demonstrated actions are irrelevant (especially when irrelevant actions 
are emphasized through social interaction), explanatory models focusing on children’s causal 
distortion predict that they should stop overimitating as soon as the irrelevancy of demonstrated 
actions is revealed.  
Given the relatively restricted range of the dependent variable (Overimitation-Score with a 
minimum of 0 and a maximum of 4) in the reported studies, we conducted also non-parametric 
tests respectively to all reported t-tests. As these yielded the same outcomes, only parametric 
statistics are reported in the attached publications and manuscripts.  
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4.1       STUDY 1 - THE INFLUENCE OF COMMUNICATION ON OVERIMITATION  
 
In most studies on overimitation, a demonstrator communicatively shows children an 
inefficient strategy to retrieve a reward from a puzzle box. Communication or more specifically 
ostensive cues such as eye contact, speaking the child’s name, and speaking in a child-directed 
manner seem to be some of the most important signals for transmitting generic knowledge (Csibra 
& Gergely, 2011). Generic knowledge is supposed to be shared by all members of a social group 
and may entail, for instance, knowledge about the functions of tools as well as cultural norms and 
rituals that are often cognitively opaque (Király, Csibra, & Gergely, 2013). According to the theory 
of natural pedagogy, ostensive signals prompt the expectation in learners that they are about to be 
taught relevant information that can be generalized across situations and other individuals 
Therefore, it is likely that a demonstrator’s communicativeness is a main cause why children 
overimitate. Some empirical findings show  that social interaction and communicative cues increase 
imitative behavior in infants (Brugger et al., 2007; Király et al., 2013; Nielsen, 2006). Yet, the role 
of the demonstrator’s communicative behavior in overimitation studies with preschoolers has been 
unclear. To my knowledge, no study has yet directly compared children’s imitation of irrelevant 
actions performed by a communicative demonstrator compared to a completely non-
communicative demonstrator. Study 1 was designed to fill this gap.  
In Study 1 we tested (a) whether the communicativeness of a demonstrator performing 
irrelevant actions is necessary to elicit overimitation in preschoolers or whether preschoolers also 
overimitate when the demonstrator is completely unfamiliar and non-communicative (Phase 1) and 
(b) whether children’s omission of previously learned irrelevant actions and their adoption of a 
more efficient strategy is dependent on the communicativeness of the demonstrator (Phase 2). In 
Phase 1, 5-year-olds observed either a communicative experimenter who interacted with them and 
talked to them, or an unfamiliar experimenter who ignored the children and never engaged with 
them at all demonstrating the inefficient strategy to extract a marble. We then observed to what 
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extent children reenacted the irrelevant actions in comparison with a baseline condition in which 
another group of same-aged children operated the puzzle box without a prior demonstration. In 
Phase 2 of the experimental conditions, the same children were shown the efficient way to retrieve 
the reward either by a communicative experimenter or by a non-communicative experimenter. 
Afterwards, they had the opportunity to get a second token themselves. When it was their turn to 
manipulate the box, children were always alone in the room.  
According to the natural pedagogy account, children should expect pedagogically 
transmitted knowledge to be generalizable. In line with the theory of natural pedagogy and the 
social explanatory models of overimitation, we hypothesized that the demonstration of an 
inefficient strategy would lead to higher overimitation rates when the demonstrator is 
communicative compared to when the demonstrator is non-communicative and that the 
subsequent demonstration of an efficient strategy by a non-communicative demonstrator would 
not lead to a switch in strategies, whereas a communicative and pedagogical second demonstrator 
would be able to teach children the efficient action as a second strategy. In contrast, explanatory 
models focusing on children’s causal distortion would predict that children stop overimitating as 
soon as they know about the irrelevancy of demonstrated actions, independently of the 
demonstrator’s communicativeness. 
Hoehl, S., Zettersten, M., Schleihauf, H., Graetz, S., & Pauen, S. (2014). The role of social 
interaction and pedagogical cues for eliciting and reducing overimitation in preschoolers. 
Journal of experimental child psychology, 122, 122-133. 
Contrary to the predictions based on the natural pedagogy account, children imitated 
causally irrelevant actions (mostly actions that involved contact with the puzzle box) at a similar 
frequency in the first phases of all conditions, irrespective of whether the demonstrator addressed 
them directly or not. This is surprising given the severe difference between the demonstrator’s 
behaviors in the study. Thus, this finding speaks to children’s eagerness to imitate others even 
 26 
when only observing actions that are not necessary to achieve the goal. However, communication 
was found to play a role in the second phase of the experiments. Children continued to perform 
non-functional actions in the second phase after observing a non-communicative demonstrator 
performing the efficient action only. In contrast, when the second demonstrator showed them the 
efficient strategy in a communicative manner, children switched to the efficient strategy irrespective 
of whether the first demonstrator had been communicative or not. Thus, it seems that although 
communication is not necessary for overimitation to occur, it helps children to abandon it for a 
more efficient strategy.  
 
4.2       STUDY 2 - THE ROLE OF CAUSAL TRANSPARENCY AND PRIOR EXPERIENCES  
 
Even if it is in general perceivable that some of the demonstrated actions are irrelevant 
(e.g., because the apparatus is transparent), we cannot be sure that children really recognize these 
actions as being causally unnecessary. However, children’s knowledge about the functionality of an 
apparatus is likely to influence whether they copy irrelevant actions or not. To investigate this 
influence, we conducted two experiments in which we increased the causal and functional 
transparency of the task. In Experiment 1, we increased the visual transparency of the puzzle box. 
In Experiment 2, we increased the functional transparency by teaching children the efficient 
strategy at the beginning of the experiment. 
In Experiment 1, we investigated whether children imitate task irrelevant actions even when 
they see the reward is unaffected by these actions. Most overimitation studies (for an exception see 
Gardiner, 2014) used an opaque reward location so that children could not see the reward before 
retrieving it (Berl & Hewlett, 2015; Horner & Whiten, 2005; McGuigan et al., 2007; Nielsen, 
Tomaselli, Mushin, & Whiten, 2014). In some studies, the puzzle box itself was entirely opaque 
and non-functional actions were performed on the outside (Nielsen & Blank, 2011; Nielsen & 
Tomaselli, 2010). Therefore, children may have inferred that the demonstrated actions affected the 
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reward through some hidden mechanism. In our studies, the tube was the crucial part of the 
apparatus; as long as it was opaque, the relative impact of causal and social information on 
overimitation was hard to discern. Children could not see the crucial event—how the tool that was 
inserted into the tube connected with the reward. Therefore, they could not know for sure that the 
demonstrated irrelevant actions had no bearing on the outcome of the relevant action. To 
investigate how the visibility of the reward affects children’s imitation of non-functional actions, 
we exchanged the reward containing opaque tube in our puzzle box with a transparent tube. 
We adopted the design described in Study 1, in which we found that children continued to 
overimitate even after watching a non-communicative demonstrator perform the efficient strategy 
(but not after watching communicative demonstrations of the efficient strategy). Therefore, we 
communicatively demonstrated the inefficient strategy (Phase 1), whereas the efficient strategy was 
demonstrated non-communicatively (Phase 2). By replicating this procedure, we were able to test 
whether children would both initially overimitate and persist in overimitating despite the 
subsequent demonstration of the efficient strategy, even when the reward location was transparent. 
Furthermore, pairing the efficient demonstration with a non-communicative demonstrator allowed 
the child to merely observe the efficient demonstration, enabling us to evaluate the impact of causal 
and functional information about the task with only minimal social input.   
Theories focusing on children’s causal reasoning (Lyons et al., 2007, 2011; Whiten et al., 
2009) predict that children overimitate less when they can see that the reward is unaffected by non-
functional actions (Phase 1) and that they stop overimitating after having observed the efficient 
strategy, that is, having seen that there is no functional reason for performing these non-functional 
actions in order to achieve the reward (Phase 2). In contrast, social accounts predict that children 
overimitate even when they can see that the reward is unaffected by non-functional actions (Phase 
1) because this should underscore the social-normative value of the demonstrated actions. 
Moreover, according to social accounts, they should continue to overimitate despite having seen 
the efficient strategy performed by a non-communicative demonstrator, since the normative 
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information provided by the communicative demonstrator should outweigh additional information 
provided in the absence of communicative cues (Phase 2).  
Schleihauf, H., Graetz, S., Pauen, S., & Hoehl, S. (2017). Contrasting social and cognitive 
accounts on overimitation: The role of causal transparency and prior experiences, Child 
Development. (Experiment 1) 
After the first demonstration, children imitated non-functional actions (mostly actions that 
involved contact with the puzzle box) with similar frequency to when the reward location was 
opaque. After observing the efficient strategy next, the rate of overimitation decreased slightly, but 
was still above baseline level, that is, children still overimitated. Therefore, we found the same 
pattern of results as in Study 1 and concluded that the transparency of the reward location did not 
affect children’s tendency to overimitate. This means that our results are more in line with social 
accounts than causal accounts of overimitation.  
In Experiments 2a and 2b, we tested whether children would switch from an efficient 
strategy to an inefficient strategy. Would children perform an inefficient strategy, even if they had 
observed and carried out a more efficient strategy beforehand? By switching the order of efficient 
vs. inefficient strategy observations, we could ensure that children knew the inefficient actions had 
no causal function.  In Phase 1, one demonstrator performed the efficient strategy and let the 
children interact with the puzzle box to try out this strategy on their own. In Phase 2, another 
demonstrator presented the inefficient strategy before it was the child’s turn again. We varied 
between Experiment 2a and 2b whether the efficient demonstrator was communicative or not. In 
Experiment 2a, efficient and inefficient strategies (Phase 1 and Phase 2) were demonstrated by a 
communicative demonstrator; in Experiment 2b, the efficient strategy was demonstrated by a non-
communicative demonstrator (Phase 1), whereas the inefficient strategy was presented by a 
communicative demonstrator (Phase 2). Therefore, in Experiment 2b only the inefficient strategy 
was accompanied by social-communicative cues. 
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Causal accounts (Lyons et al., 2007; 2011) predict that children will not imitate irrelevant 
actions when they are aware of a more efficient strategy (i.e., neither in Experiment 2a nor in 
Experiment 2b). In contrast, social accounts (Gergely & Csibra, 2006; Kenward, 2012; Nielsen & 
Blank, 2011) predict that children may also switch from an efficient to an inefficient strategy if the 
latter is demonstrated by a socially engaging partner (Experiments 2a and 2b), and especially if the 
efficient strategy is presented non-communicatively (Experiment 2b).  
Schleihauf, H., Graetz, S., Pauen, S., & Hoehl, S. (2017). Contrasting social and cognitive 
accounts on overimitation: The role of causal transparency and prior experiences, Child 
Development.  (Experiment 2a & 2b) 
Our results were in line with the predictions of theories highlighting causal and functional 
knowledge. In both experiments, children’s performance of irrelevant actions did not rise above 
baseline level following the demonstration of the inefficient strategy. However, a few children did 
switch to an inefficient strategy. Whereas the overall findings of Experiment 2 a and 2b supported 
theories highlighting the role of causal and functional knowledge, it may be interesting to 
investigate in future research how the children who did switch to an inefficient strategy distinguish 
to the children who maintained with the efficient strategy.  
Looking at Experiment 1, 2a and 2b together, it seems like children’s social motivation to 
comply with a communicative demonstrator and the children’s functional experience (e.g., 
demonstrating the efficient strategy first), have an impact on their choice to either imitate irrelevant 
actions or to copy observed actions selectively, in spite of the task’s visual causal transparency (e.g., 
transparent reward location). However, whereas Experiment 1 supported social accounts, 
Experiments 2a and 2b pointed to the relevance of causal accounts highlighting the role of causal 
and functional knowledge. At first glance, these results seem somewhat contradictory. In chapter 
5, I will attempt to discuss in more depth how these results can be reconciled. For now, our interim 
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conclusion for Study 2 is that both social motives and causal understanding should be taken into 
account in explaining overimitation in 5-year-olds.  
 
4.3       STUDY 3 - MINIMAL GROUP AND GENDER INFLUENCES ON OVERIMITATION 
 
High-fidelity imitation, which results in overimitation if irrelevant actions are included in 
the demonstrated action sequence, is proposed to serve a crucial function in the transmission of 
cultural knowledge, including social norms and rituals (Legare, 2017; Nielsen & Tomaselli, 2010). 
It is proposed that social conventions are a means to affiliation with group members and lead to 
in-group cohesion (Legare & Nielsen, 2015). One way to accomplish this goal is to behave similarly 
to in-group members. Therefore, it is unsurprising that transmission of rituals and norms is higher 
within groups than between groups (Zucker, 1977). Belonging to the same group might increase 
children’s social motivations and make them sensitive to culturally relevant knowledge, such as 
rituals and norms if they belong to the same group. If overimitation is one of the driving 
mechanisms in the transmission of cultural knowledge, one of the instruments that enables us to 
transmit social norms and rituals (Kenward, 2012; Keupp et al., 2013; Legare, 2017), it should be 
sensitive to group membership. 
In Study 3, we investigated influences of two different types of groups on 5-year-olds 
tendency to overimitate: (1) an artificially formed group and (2) the enduring societal group gender. 
For artificial group allocation we adopted the classic minimal group paradigm (Dunham, Baron, & 
Carey, 2011; Spielman, 2000; Tajfel & Turner, 1986; Tajfel, Billig, Bundy, & Flament, 1971) with 
members of the same team wearing identical jerseys. To test the relevance of gender group-
membership, we used action demonstrators of different sex and counterbalanced the children’s 
and experimenter’s sex. Again, we used a two-phase paradigm, with the inefficient strategy 
demonstrated first and the efficient demonstrated second. This led to two combinations of in-
group vs. out-group membership of the inefficient and efficient demonstrators: (a) The inefficient 
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demonstrator (Phase 1) was an in-group member and the efficient demonstrator (Phase 2) was an 
out-group member or (b) the inefficient demonstrator (Phase 1) was an out-group member and 
the efficient demonstrator (Phase 2) was an in-group member. 
If we assume that social motivations increase the urge to behave similarly to in-group 
members, theories suggesting a strong role of social motives for overimitation predict increased 
overimitation of in-group members compared to out-group members for both kinds of groups in 
Phase 1. For Phase 2, we predicted that children would maintain high levels of irrelevant actions 
when the efficient strategy was demonstrated by an out-group member, but that they would adopt 
the efficient strategy when it was demonstrated by an in-group member. Causal explanatory models 
(e.g., Lyons et al., 2007, 2011; Whiten et al., 2009) would predict that children stop overimitating 
when they discover the irrelevancy of the actions, regardless of group membership.  
Schleihauf, H., Pauen, S., & Hoehl, S. (2018). Who’s on my team? Minimal group and gender 
influences on overimitation. Manuscript submitted for publication. 
Results of Study 3 show that for the artificially formed groups, it did not matter whether 
an out-group or an in-group demonstrator presented either strategy. Contrary to our expectations, 
children overimitated (mostly irrelevant actions that involved contact with the puzzle box) equally 
often, whether an artificial in- or out-group demonstrator demonstrated the inefficient strategy 
during Phase 1. Moreover, children did not switch to the efficient strategy, even when this strategy 
was demonstrated by an in-group demonstrator during Phase 2. This was quite surprising, since in 
Study 1, when we used the same paradigm without the grouping procedure, children adopted the 
efficient strategy after it was communicatively demonstrated. Neither classical social explanatory 
models nor causal explanatory models are sufficient to explain these results. One possible 
explanation is that an external factor, namely the preceding group formation process, not the actual 
artificial group membership, had an influence on children’s imitation. The team formation process 
included drawing shirts of a certain color, using verbal group labels and euphorically expressing 
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positive emotions about joint group membership. This process is likely to induce high motivation, 
a pro-social playful atmosphere and a game-like context. This might have led children to copy 
irrelevant actions because it made them more sensitive to normative and ritualistic behavior and 
therefore, encouraged them to continue to overimitate. Future research is necessary to investigate 
these ideas further.  
For gender groups, we found a significant interaction between the gender of the child and 
gender of the inefficient demonstrator. In Phase 1, boys and girls overimitated above baseline level 
regardless of whether the irrelevant actions were demonstrated by a male or a female demonstrator. 
In Phase 2, boys continued to overimitate regardless of the efficient demonstration being 
demonstrated by a male or a female demonstrator. However, girls continued to perform irrelevant 
actions if the efficient demonstrator was male, but they switched to the efficient strategy if the 
efficient demonstrator was female. This result is better explained by social explanatory models than 
by causal explanatory models. If social motives are interpreted as behaving similarly to gender in-
group members, especially girls seem to be highly socially motivated to overimitate. However, the 
external factor of a playful setting should also be taken into account when looking at the gender 
group influences.  It is possible that boys continued to overimitate in Phase 2 regardless of the 
model’s gender, because they were more sensitive to this playful context. Boys seem to be more 
competitive than girls (Gneezy & Rustichini, 2004; Sutter & Rützler, 2015). The playful context 
and forming teams might have triggered competition and led to more persistent overimitation in 
boys.  
These findings highlight that contradicting findings in overimitation research could be due 
to varying external factors, such as the gender of the demonstrator, but also the context created by 
experimental settings or manipulations. Such factors should be taken into account when planning 
and interpreting research on overimitation. 
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In the following, I would like to focus on what we can learn about the underlying 
motivations of overimitation when looking at the results of Study 1, 2 and 3 together. 
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5.      WHAT ARE OUR MOTIVATIONS TO COPY UNNECESSARY ACTIONS?  
           – THE DUAL-MODE MODEL FOR OVERIMITATION  
 
 
Recent explanatory models for overimitation can be roughly divided in social accounts and 
causal accounts. Social accounts (Kenward et al., 2011; Nielsen & Blank, 2011) state, that children 
imitate irrelevant actions to follow a social rule or to affiliate with another person and therefore 
have social motivations. In line with this, Over and Carpenter (2012) say that children overimitate 
when they have social motivations and selectively imitate when they have goal-directed 
motivations. Accordingly, children overimitate or do not overimitate, depending on their goals in 
specific situations. By contrast, causal accounts state that children overimitate when they assume 
that a demonstrated action is causally necessary (e.g., Lyons et al., 2007, 2011) or when they do not 
question their necessity (Whiten et al., 2009). On this account, children are consistently 
conceptualized as having goal-directed motivations. Whereas social accounts imply that children 
recognize that the demonstrated actions are irrelevant, the causal models imply that children do 
not understand or do not question the irrelevancy of the actions. 
Why did children overimitate in our studies? First, I would like to focus on Phase 1 of the 
conditions in which the inefficient strategy was presented first (Study 1, Study 2, Experiment 1 of 
Study 3), since this phase is comparable to other overimitation studies in that children only saw a 
single inefficient demonstration. 
In Study 1, 2 and 3, we find that children robustly overimitate after an initial inefficient 
demonstration. Even in an experimental setup that we thought would encourage them to omit 
inefficient actions, e.g. when they were demonstrated by a non-communicative or an out-group 
demonstrator, children overimitated. Boys and girls overimitated in Phase 1 regardless of whether 
the inefficient model was male or female or whether that model was communicative or not. When 
children observed the inefficient strategy in Phase 1, their overimitation seemed to be independent 
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of contextual changes. Possible explanations why other studies found context dependency after an 
initial inefficient demonstration will be discussed in Chapter 5.1.  
Whereas overimitation rates in Phase 1 were consistent across different conditions, 
overimitation rates in Phase 2 varied across different conditions. Phase 2 of these conditions added 
a new component compared to other overimitation studies. In this phase, children observed how 
the reward could be retrieved efficiently and were given a second chance to solve the task. In this 
phase, children’s imitative behavior varied across the different experimental manipulations. 
Children preferentially switched to an efficient strategy when it was demonstrated communicatively 
and continued to overimitate if the efficient strategy was demonstrated non-communicatively. 
Similarly, girls stopped overimitating if the efficient strategy was demonstrated by a female model. 
These results convey the impression that after children learned that there are multiple strategies 
available, likelihood that they will flexibly switch strategy is context-sensitive.  
One explanatory model alone cannot explain these results. Whereas social models and Over 
and Carpenter’s theory (2012a; 2012b) can explain the variations in Phase 2, they are insufficient 
to explain robust overimitation rates in Phase 1. For Phase 1 of our studies, models focusing on 
children’s causal distortion seem to be the best explanation to explain children’s robust 
overimitation. It seems likely that in Phase 1 children overimitate because they do not recognize or 
do not question the irrelevancy of demonstrated actions. However, this explanation cannot hold 
true for Phase 2. Since we found in some conditions that children overimitated even after observing 
the efficient strategy, causal distortion cannot be the reason why they did so. Therefore, children’s 
motivations to overimitate in Phase 1 are likely to differ from their motivations to overimitate in 
Phase 2.  
To explain the findings of Phase 1 and Phase 2 of our experiments, I would like to propose 
a new explanatory model (see Figure 2), that combines Whiten’s “copy first – refine later” approach 
(Whiten et al., 2009) and Over and Carpenter’s approach (Over & Carpenter, 2012a; 2012b) 
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focusing on social and learning goals leading to different copying behavior. My explanatory model 
contains two different modes of copying. One mode I will refer to as blanket copying (see also Whiten 
et al., 2009). In this mode, irrelevant actions are copied independent of contextual differences. 
While copying in a blanket fashion, children copy irrelevant actions without questioning their 
necessity.  However, in contrast to the automatic causal encoding theory by Lyons et al. (2009, 
2011) this does not mean that overimitation is unavoidable. Furthermore, it does not mean that 
children are unable to understand the (missing) causal relations of these actions to the goal. 
Referring to Whiten et al. (2009), from an evolutionary perspective it seems quite useful to copy 
actions that are somehow associated with success (not necessarily causally), without questioning 
them. In most instances, there is not much to lose by copying all actions that could potentially lead 
to success. On the contrary, there might even be beneficial reasons for performing these actions 
which cannot be understood from the point of view accessible at a given time. Therefore, instead 
of asking the question ‘Why do children imitate?’ in the stage of blanket copying, we should rather 
ask ‘Why not?’. 
After the demonstration of the efficient strategy, we found variety in children’s 
overimitation. Therefore, I propose that children’s motivations in this phase were different. If 
disclosing the irrelevancy of the demonstrated actions, children’s focus is directed to an alternate 
efficient option to reach the desired goal. Then, they can actively decide if they would like to copy 
the demonstrated irrelevant actions or not. When children become aware of their choice of action, 
their copying becomes more reflected. That is why I will refer to the second mode as reflective copying. 
In the mode of reflective copying, copying of irrelevant actions seems to be context depended. 
Therefore, the model of Over and Carpenter (2012a; 2012b) applies to the mode of reflective 
copying. As mentioned above, they distinguish between: (a) “learning goals,” that lead to selective 
imitation based on functional considerations; (b) “social goals,” which motivate children to imitate 
faithfully and (c) a combination of both, which focus children’s attention on “how” something is 
typically done. I would like to add another possible goal to the reflective copying mode: an 
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entertainment goal. In a playful context, children could copy irrelevant actions just because it is fun 
to perform these actions. If irrelevant actions are highlighted, for example through communication 
(Study 1), gender group membership (Study 3), a playful (Study 3, Nielsen, Cucchiaro, & 
Mohamedally, 2012a) or a normative context (e.g., Legare et al., 2015), children tend to overimitate 
even after having seen a more efficient solution, whereas they prefer to omit irrelevant actions in a 
more goal-directed context (e.g., Legare et al., 2015). Social, instrumental learning and 
entertainment goals should not be understood as being exclusive. I assume they can be present at 
the same time. For example, children could copy an irrelevant action because they think it is a rule 
to do so and because they enjoy performing them. However, if the actions were less entertaining, 
they might decide not to follow the apparent rule. Furthermore, imitating itself can be entertaining, 
but a playful context can also increase the salience of the social function of over-imitation (see also 
Nielsen et al., 2012a). Whereas I think children are aware of their choice of action, I think they do 
not necessarily have to be aware of the underling motivations of their action choices. Even if 
children copy to strengthen social bonds, they are probably not always able to express such 
motivations.  
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Figure 2. The dual-mode model of (over)imitation. (Questions for instrumental and social goals are 
exemplary and do not necessarily represent conscious decision processes). 
This dual-mode model of (over)imitation is also in line with the dual process theory (e.g., 
Evans, 2003; Kahneman, 2002; Strack & Deutsch, 2004). According to this theory human behavior 
is shaped by two systems. The first is referred to as intuition, heuristic or impulsive system, which 
is driven by immediate feelings, triggered by our environments and elicits automatic behavioral 
decisions. According to the authors, this system requires little or no cognitive engagement. It is 
quite likely that this system is active during blanket copying. Since blanket copying is associated 
with uncertainty about the irrelevancy of demonstrated actions, it is probably less sensitive to 
external influential factors, such as the demonstrator’s characteristics (e.g., communication, group 
membership), which possibly would be considered in situations in which more cognitive 
engagement is encouraged. It is possible that cognitive load, time pressure or other factors that 
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favor a less cognitively demanding strategy trigger blanket copying. The other system of the dual 
process model is referred to as reflective or reasoning system, which is supposed to be driven by 
our knowledge about values and facts and generates goal-directed behavioral decisions. This system 
requires cognitive engagement. I assume that this system is active during the second mode of 
overimitation – reflective copying. Due to the cognitive demand of reflective copying it is likely 
that this imitation mode is highly sensitive to external but also internal influencing factors. For 
example, if blanket copying was triggered by cognitive load and time pressure, copying can become 
more reflected when cognitive load and time pressure decrease.  
I assume that there are many factors that can trigger reflective copying. Demonstrating an 
efficient solution to the problem is one of them. Reflective copying could also be triggered through 
e.g. exploration, innovation, perhaps through a contemplating personality or through a change of 
context (e.g., reduction of cognitive load or time pressure or if the performance of irrelevant actions 
becomes costly). Furthermore, I suggest that whether children copy in a blanket fashion or 
reflectively can be influenced by the type of irrelevant action they observe. In the following section 
I would like to describe different types of irrelevant actions and their possible influence on 
children’s overimitation.  
 
5.1       DIFFERENT IRRELEVANT ACTION TYPES  
 
Even though we did not find contextual differences following the initial demonstration 
phase in our studies, other overimitation studies have found effects of context manipulations on 
overimitation after initial inefficient demonstrations (e.g., Keupp et al., 2013; Legare et al., 2015). 
According to the dual-mode model, it is likely that in these studies such effects were found because 
children copied reflectively (even though they had no efficient demonstration), whereas they copied 
in a blanket fashion in after the initial inefficient demonstration in our experiments. What could be 
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the reason for blanket copying after the initial demonstration in our studies and for reflective 
copying after the initial demonstration in other studies? 
I suggest that these differences are due to different characteristics of the irrelevant actions 
demonstrated in these studies. Since different action characteristics can influence whether actions 
tend to be perceived as instrumental or conventional (Boyer & Liénard, 2007; Bulbulia & Sosis, 
2011; Clay, Over, & Tennie, 2018; Kapitány & Nielsen, 2016; Legare & Souza, 2012; Rossano, 
2012; Taniguchi & Sanefuji, 2017), I assume that different action types are (over-)imitated for 
different reasons. If we have a closer look at the actions that were copied with the highest rates in 
our studies, we find that contact actions (actions that involved contact with the puzzle box) were 
copied much more often than no-contact actions (actions that do not involved contact with the puzzle 
box). This finding is in line with other studies on overimitation. For example, it was found that 
children imitated irrelevant actions that were performed on an object which were physically 
connected to the puzzle box with the reward with much higher rates, especially if these actions 
included a tool, compared to actions that were performed on a physically disconnected object or 
on the own body (Lyons et al., 2007; Taniguchi & Sanefuji, 2017).  
However, it should be mentioned that the experimental settings and instructions in these 
studies created a context which is more instrumental than conventional. This also applies to our 
studies.  Studies in which a more conventional or normative context was created found imitation 
of contact actions as well as no-contact actions (e.g., Clay et al., 2018). Interestingly, the preference 
for contact actions seem to differ between different age groups. Four-year-olds seem to 
preferentially copy contact actions over no-contact actions, whereas six-year-olds copied no-
contact actions as well as contact actions (Clay et al., 2018). Imitation of no-contact actions was 
especially high for the older children if these actions were demonstrated in a normative context. 
Accordingly, it seems that older children are more willing to copy norms, conventions or rituals. It 
was found that actions which are clearly goal-demoted, meaning it is unclear why the demonstrator 
is motivated to perform them, is an important feature of rituals (Nielsen, Kapitány, & Tomaselli, 
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2018). It is probably easier for no-contact actions than for contact actions, to recognize them as 
being goal demoted. If older children are more sensitive to norms and rituals this could be one of 
the reasons why they copy not only contact, but also clearly goal demoted no-contact actions. 
Therefore, I assume that no-contact actions tend to lead to reflective copying. Younger children 
are probably less sensitive to rituals and norms and rather copy actions that potentially have a causal 
effect. The probability that an action has a causal effect is higher for contact than for no-contact 
actions. This could be the reason why younger children preferentially copy contact actions over 
no-contact actions. It could also be that recognizing if a contact action is causally relevant or 
irrelevant might be more challenging for younger children. Therefore, it is possible that we observe 
the same behavior in younger and older children. However, overimitation in younger and older 
children can have different underlying motivations.  
The consistent overimitation rates after the initial inefficient demonstration in our studies 
could be due to the characteristics of the irrelevant contact actions we demonstrated. Whereas 
contact actions in other overimitation studies mostly involve superficial tapping or circling actions 
on the surface of the puzzle box (Nielsen et al. , 2012a; Nielsen, Moore, & Mohamedally, 2012b), 
contact actions in our studies were performed on permanent attachments to the puzzle box 
(pushing the non-functional lever and pushing the non-functional button). Children might be 
familiar with similar actions from everyday life (e.g., pushing a button to a turn on a light) that are 
usually associated with an effect. Even if demonstrated actions do not have an instrumental effect 
on the reward, they are similar to actions that usually have an effect. Therefore, I will refer to them 
as pseudo-instrumental actions. It is likely that it is challenging to recognize pseudo-instrumental as 
being irrelevant (especially for younger children), which could be the reason why such actions lead 
to blanket copying. If we look at the actions that were demonstrated in the original study by Horner 
and Whiten (2005), we see that some of the irrelevant actions they demonstrated can also be 
categorized as being pseudo-instrumental. For example, they demonstrated removing a bolt 
defense and inserting a stick into the manufactured whole. Both actions were performed on 
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permanent attachments or manufactured properties of the reward containing puzzle box. This 
distinguishes them from superficial contact actions.  
Contact actions that involve physical contact with the puzzle box but are only superficial 
and not pseudo-instrumental, might be easily recognized as being irrelevant by older children and 
adults, whereas it might be more challenging for younger children. Accordingly, these age 
differences in overimitation rates should be greater for superficial contact actions and smaller for 
pseudo-instrumental actions. I predict that superficial contact actions are copied more by younger 
children and less by older children and pseudo-instrumental actions are copied to equal rates by 
older and younger children (but maybe less by adults).  
As mentioned above, we found in all our studies that children copied pseudo-instrumental 
actions to a much higher extent than they copied no-contact actions. Even if context was not 
intentionally manipulated in our studies, the context which was created was instrumental: 
Children’s focus was always guided to the goal of the task (i.e. retrieving a reward), and they were 
instructed to “retrieve a reward however they liked”, which was found to lead to lower over-
imitation rates, compared to the instruction “It’s your turn” (Moraru, Gomez, & McGuigan, 2016). 
Given this instrumental context, it is quite surprising that we found consistent overimitation of 
pseudo-instrumental actions. Theories stating that a ritual and conventional context activates 
children’s social goals, whereas an instrumental context activates learning goals (Clegg & Legare, 
2016b; Over & Carpenter, 2012a; 2012b) would have predicted that all types of irrelevant actions 
would be omitted completely, especially if social pressure was minimized (demonstration by a non-
communicative/out-group demonstrator, child alone during test phase). However, we found that 
no-contact actions were omitted, whereas pseudo-instrumental actions were copied. This finding 
supports the idea that children perceive pseudo-instrumental actions differently.  
Taken together, it seems important to distinguish different action types in overimitation 
studies. Whereas children may not question the irrelevancy of pseudo-instrumental actions, they 
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do recognize or at least question the irrelevancy of no-contact actions. Not considering these 
differences may lead to contradicting findings.  
Action type seems to be one of the key triggers for blanket or reflective copying. If an 
action is pseudo-instrumental it tends to be copied in a blanket fashion; if an action does not 
involve physical contact with the puzzle box it tends to be copied reflectively. However, action 
type is not the only factor influencing overimitation. Especially in the mode of reflective copying, 
many external and internal factors play a role when deciding whether to imitate certain actions or 
not. 
 
5.2 FACTORS INFLUENCING BLANKET AND REFLECTIVE COPYING  
 
Blanket and reflective copying differ regarding the degree to which they are malleable to 
external and internal factors. Blanket copying is quite insensitive to external influential factors. If 
children think they have to perform an action to achieve a certain goal, they will perform that action 
if they want to achieve that goal, regardless of most external influences. However, some external 
factors, such as cognitive load, time pressure or other factors that favor a less cognitively 
demanding strategy might even enhance blanket copying.  
The amount of information that can be processed during reflective copying is much higher, 
which increases possible influences of external and internal factors. Going back to the research of 
Albert Bandura (1986; 1999; 2001; 1971), a well-established finding in social psychology is that 
behavior, internal personal factors (e.g., beliefs and personality), and external social and 
environmental factors interact reciprocally. Especially when we are aware of our choices, we match 
our behavior with internal factors, such as our thoughts and values, and also with external factors, 
such as our surroundings, the present context or the behavior of other people. When we copy 
reflectively, we are aware of having different options regarding how to behave. Therefore, it is likely 
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that we match our decision to copy certain actions or to omit them with internal and external 
factors. If we are aware of our choices, what factors influence whether we overimitate or not? 
In recent overimitation literature, influences of a variety of external and internal factors on 
imitation of superficial contact actions have been reported (see Figure 3). External factors that have 
been found to influence our tendency to overimitate (during reflective copying), are the model’s 
characteristics, characteristics of the task itself and characteristics of experimental settings and 
environments. Model characteristics that seem to influence overimitation are for example, whether 
the model acts communicatively (Study 1), whether the model is an adult, a peer or a puppet 
(McGuigan & Robertson, 2015; Wood et al., 2016; Wood, Kendal, & Flynn, 2012), whether the 
model is male or female (Study 3) or whether the model is a person of high status, such as the 
child’s head teacher (McGuigan, 2013). Task characteristics that have been shown to influence 
children’s overimitation are, for example, action type (see Chapter 5.1), whether tools are used to 
perform irrelevant or relevant actions (Taniguchi & Sanefuji, 2017), whether irrelevant actions are 
executed by hand or an unusual body part (Clay et al., 2018), whether start- and end-state of the 
task are equal or different (Watson-Jones et al., 2014), or whether task instructions create a 
conventional or instrumental framing (Clay et al., 2018; Clegg & Legare, 2016a; Keupp et al., 2013; 
Moraru, Gomez, & McGuigan, 2016). Influencing characteristics of the experimental setting are 
for example warm-up-games that are played before the actual experiment starts. Games that prime 
ostracism have been shown to increase children’s imitation (Over & Carpenter, 2009; Watson-
Jones et al., 2014). Similarly, influences of cooperative or competitive warm up games on prosocial 
behavior are reported (Ewoldsen et al., 2012; Greitemeyer & Mügge, 2014). Therefore, it seems 
likely that such warm-up games influence children’s overimitation. Keeping in mind that such 
minor manipulations can affect overimitation, it seems even more likely that the game-like context 
in Study 2, which was a by-product of the group manipulation, influenced children’s tendency to 
overimitate and to continue to overimitate. A factor that has not yet been experimentally 
investigated is the influence of the general environment in which an experiment takes place. Some 
 46 
studies are conducted in university laboratories (our studies), kindergartens (McGuigan & Burgess, 
2017), science museums (e.g., Clay et al., 2018) or schools (McGuigan & Burgess, 2017). It is 
possible that certain environments trigger certain modes, which could influence our tendency to 
overimitate. Taken together, while copying reflectively, many external factors influence whether 
we overimitate or imitate selectively. How complex these decisions are, becomes apparent when 
we consider that these external factors can not only interact with each, but also with internal factors 
and our behavior.  
Compared to the influence of external factors, the influence of internal factors on 
overimitation has been investigated far less frequently. However, it is important to consider that 
external or internal factors do not operate in isolation: they also interact in influencing our behavior. 
How we perceive external influences is dependent on internal factors, such as prior experiences, 
knowledge, values, temperament, character and our goals in specific situations. For example, it is 
likely that children with a greater need for social recognition are more likely to overimitate when a 
communicative model demonstrates irrelevant actions. It has been found that the tendencies to 
imitate (irrelevant) features of goal-directed actions is higher in extraverted children 
(Fenstermacher & Saudino, 2016; Hilbrink, Sakkalou, Ellis-Davies, Fowler, & Gattis, 2013). There 
are also findings that raise the question of whether “imitativeness” – people’s propensity to imitate 
- is itself a personality trait. One finding in support of this idea is that some children are more 
imitative than others, and these individual differences transcend contextual influences (Yu & 
Kushnir, 2015). 
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Figure 3. Application of Bandura’s Social Cognitive Theory (Bandura, 1986; 1999; 2001; 1971) on 
reflective copying. This figure lists internal and external factors that have been investigated in 
overimitation research. Factors considered in the studies of this dissertations are highlighted in 
orange (dark = experimental manipulated, light = counterbalanced). 
 
Now that we have a comprehensive picture on what factors might influence reflective 
copying and increase children’s tendency to overimitate or copy selectively, I would like to discuss 
the results of Experiment 2a and 2b of Study 2. In these experiments, children already learned in 
Phase 1 how to retrieve a reward efficiently. Therefore, in contrast to other studies, they entered 
the mode of reflective copying from the beginning. Especially for Experiment 2b, we expected 
children to switch from an efficient to an inefficient strategy, because only the inefficient strategy 
was demonstrated communicatively. We predicted that, in the mode of reflective copying, social 
emphasis on the inefficient strategy would lead to overimitation. In contrast to our expectations, 
most of the children did not switch to an inefficient strategy. However, even if the mean 
overimitation level did not exceed baseline level, it should be mentioned that 11 out of 28 children 
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chose to perform at least one irrelevant action after the inefficient demonstration (Experiment 2b). 
How can the absence of overimitation despite social emphasis of the inefficient strategy be 
explained?  
As illustrated above, a variety of factors can influence children’s decision to overimitate or 
to copy selectively. Therefore, there are also a variety of potential explanations as to why the 
emphasis of the inefficient strategy through communication was insufficient to elicit higher 
overimitation rates in Experiment 2a and 2b of Study 2. One explanation is that the demonstration 
of the efficient strategy first influenced the general context of the experiment. Since children’s 
focus was directed to the goal, namely getting a reward, from the very beginning, they perceived 
the context of the experiment as instrumental. Another explanation is that children’s past behavior 
influenced their future behavior. If children acted efficiently in the past (Phase 1), there are (at 
least) two good reasons for doing so in the future: (1) They have been successful with this strategy 
before, and (2) it is the most efficient strategy. If children acted inefficiently in the past (Phase 1), 
there is only one good reason for sticking with this strategy and one good reason for switching to 
a more efficient strategy: They have been successful with the inefficient strategy and switching 
strategies could feel like admitting that the first strategy was the worse option on one hand, but on 
the other hand, they could reach the goal more efficiently. A third possible explanation is that, in 
the mode of reflective copying, individual differences between children emerge more strongly. This 
could have split our sample into children with pronounced social needs (children who overimitated) 
and children with a lower need for social attention (children who acted efficiently), for example. 
These many possibilities demonstrate that, during reflective copying, the decision to imitate or not 
is not only dependent on e.g. the communicativeness of the model, but also on a multitude of 
external and internal factors and their interactions.
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6.      CONCLUSION 
 
Let’s return to the bubblegum machine example from the introduction. Imagine you are 
five years old and you are with your parents at a fair in a foreign country, you have a craving for 
bubblegum and find an unfamiliar looking vending machine and your parents give you some coins 
to get some bubblegum. You do not know how to operate the machine, but you are in luck: you 
get to observe another person use the machine in front of you. This person taps on top of the 
machine three times. She pushes the lever on top of the box back and forth. She inserts a coin and 
taps on the top three times again. Finally, she turns the wheel, withdraws her bubblegum from the 
machine, and leaves. How do you operate the machine? 
In this dissertation I proposed a novel dual-mode model of overimitation. According to 
this model it is likely that you would push the lever back and forth, insert the coin and turn the 
wheel. While you may conclude that the tapping did not achieve anything; you might not be 
completely sure about the functionality of the lever. The machines in your home country do not 
have this kind of lever, but there might have been a reason why the other person pushed it, and 
after all, you have little to lose by using the lever. In this situation, even without any social pressure, 
it is quite likely that you would imitate the actions which are similar to actions that are associated 
with an effect in everyday life.  
However, what would have happened if the person who got the bubblegum shortly before 
you had stayed and watched. Or, what would have happened, if your parents told you the night 
before that it is important to respect rituals and traditions of people in this foreign country? Would 
you also have tapped on the machine? According to the dual-modes model, many factors could 
influence whether you copy the actions which seem to have no causal relation to getting the 
bubblegum. Social motivations might be one of the main reasons to copy such actions. 
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The dual-modes model of overimitation, with the mode of blanket and the mode of 
reflective copying, provides a new explanatory framework for answering the puzzling question 
‘Why do we overimitate?’. According to the dual-modes model, children that do not question the 
necessity of the actions copy them in a blanket fashion, while children that do question them copy 
reflectively. This model emphasizes the different context sensitivity of blanket and reflective 
copying. Whereas blanket copying seems to be insensitive to contextual influences, reflective 
copying seems to be sensitive to effects of external and internal factors combined with the effects 
of prior behavior and their interactions. With this model, it becomes clear that there is no single 
explanation for overimitation. Conversely, motivations behind overimitation seem to be various 
and highly complex. It remains the task of future research to unravel this complexity. 
 
Future research should for example, focus on revealing possibly differing motivations for 
overimitation in different age groups. It is important to find out whether children of different age 
groups question which kind of actions do and do not have causal effects on desired outcomes.  
Furthermore, it should be investigated if factors like cognitive load and time pressure trigger 
blanket copying, if copying could become more reflected when cognitive load and time pressure 
decrease and if overimitation then persist in normative but not in instrumental contexts. It would 
also be interesting to investigate if the tendency of apes not to imitate non-functional actions 
changes when they get familiarized with a variety of actions from one type resulting in effects (e.g., 
install differently looking levers in the enclosure that lead to different effects), so that the 
demonstrated irrelevant actions (e.g., pushing a non-functional lever) become pseudo-instrumental 
from the ape’s perspective.  
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Introduction
Imitation is a powerful mechanism that allows humans to learn novel actions from others (Meltz-
off, 1988). In contrast to emulation, which is accomplished by copying the end state of an action with-
out performing the observed action steps, imitation entails copying the action sequence itself (Whiten,
McGuigan, Marshall-Pescini, & Hopper, 2009). Although in many situations imitation is a quick and
efficient learning tool, in other situations copying the exact actions observed in others is quite ineffi-
cient. For instance, in a study by Horner and Whiten (2005), the experimenter performed relevant ac-
tions as well as irrelevant actions while demonstrating how to retrieve a reward from a puzzle box to
wild-born chimpanzees. When the box was opaque, chimpanzees imitated both kinds of actions.
When the box was transparent, thereby revealing that irrelevant actions had no effect, chimpanzees
employed a more efficient strategy of emulation and omitted the irrelevant actions.
In contrast to chimpanzees, human children and adults tend to faithfully imitate actions that are
not the most efficient way to accomplish a certain aim (Flynn & Smith, 2012; Horner & Whiten,
2005; McGuigan, Makinson, & Whiten, 2011). The imitation of causally goal-irrelevant actions has
been termed overimitation (Lyons, Young, & Keil, 2007). The phenomenon is usually studied by show-
ing participants, most often preschoolers, how to retrieve a reward from a novel, causally transparent
container by using one or more irrelevant actions and one relevant action. After observing the model,
participants typically reproduce both the causally relevant and irrelevant actions, thereby adopting an
inefficient strategy. Crucially, this strategy is not spontaneously performed when participants operate
the container without observing a model first (Lyons, Damrosch, Lin, Macris, & Keil, 2011; Lyons et al.,
2007).
There is currently much debate about why overimitation occurs. Lyons et al. (2007) argued that
children automatically encode observed actions as causally relevant and, therefore, reproduce them.
This process has been dubbed automatic causal encoding (ACE). The ACE claim is based on the obser-
vation that children overimitate even if they are explicitly encouraged to omit any unnecessary ac-
tions and even when performing the irrelevant actions ultimately endangers receiving a reward
(Lyons et al., 2011). Others have argued that social norm learning and/or the desire to affiliate with
the experimenter underlie the phenomenon of overimitation (Kenward, Karlsson, & Persson, 2011;
Keupp, Behne, & Rakoczy, 2013; Nielsen & Blank, 2011). Kenward (2012) had 3- and 5-year-olds ob-
serve an experimenter perform relevant actions as well as unnecessary actions in the presence of a
puppet. Most children protested, some of them using normative language, when the puppet subse-
quently performed the task but omitted the unnecessary actions.
Neither norm learning, nor social affiliation, nor the ACE hypothesis can be ruled out at the mo-
ment. Regardless of which of these accounts holds true, some have suggested that overimitation re-
sults from children expecting others to teach them how something is done (Gergely & Csibra,
2006). Because the primary goal of the current study was not to distinguish among norm learning, so-
cial affiliation, and the ACE hypothesis, ‘‘how something is done’’ may henceforth refer to social norms
as well as causal necessities and functional properties of artifacts.
According to the theory of natural pedagogy, humans have evolved mechanisms to transmit gen-
eric knowledge through communication (Csibra & Gergely, 2011). This generic knowledge is supposed
to be shared by all members of a social group and may entail, for instance, knowledge about the func-
tions of tools as well as cultural norms and rituals that are often cognitively opaque (Kiraly, Csibra, &
Gergely, 2013). According to this theory, the (usually adult) teacher addresses the child in pedagogical
interactions using certain ostensive cues such as eye contact, calling the learner’s name, and speaking
in a child-directed manner. These ostensive signals prompt the expectation in learners that they are
about to be taught relevant and generic information that can be generalized across situations and
other individuals. Several studies have demonstrated infants’ and children’s sensitivity to these osten-
sive signals and the effects of communication on early learning (e.g., Gergely, Egyed, & Kiraly, 2007;
Topal, Gergely, Miklosi, Erdohegyi, & Csibra, 2008).
Corroborating the theory of natural pedagogy, some empirical evidence shows that social interac-
tion and communicative cues increase imitative behavior in infants (Brugger, Lariviere, Mumme, &
Bushnell, 2007; Kiraly et al., 2013; Nielsen, 2006). In a study by Kiraly et al. (2013), 14-month-olds
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performed a head touch to turn on a light more frequently after observing a communicative model
demonstrating this novel and relatively inefficient action than after incidentally observing a non-com-
municative model. The authors proposed that direct communication and ostensive signals may sup-
port overimitation in older children as well. However, there is evidence that toddlers (i.e., 24-
month-olds) may actually rely less on communicative cues than slightly younger infants (18-
month-olds) when copying specific actions as opposed to action outcomes (Nielsen, 2006). In that
study, 24-month-olds, but not younger infants, tended to copy specific actions irrespective of whether
the model had interacted with them or not. Shimpi, Akhtar, and Moore (2013) reported that when the
model is unfamiliar, direct interaction can even suppress the imitation of arbitrary object-directed ac-
tions in 18- and 24-month-olds when compared with the observation of a third-party interaction.
It has been suggested that the importance of communicative cues directed at the participant may
decline from infancy to preschool age (Lyons et al., 2011; McGuigan et al., 2011). Yet, the role of the
model’s communicative behavior in overimitation studies with preschoolers is currently unclear be-
cause, to our knowledge, no study so far has directly compared children’s imitation of obviously irrel-
evant actions performed by a pedagogical model compared with a completely non-communicative
model. In a study by Nielsen, Moore, and Mohamedally (2012), the model did not demonstrate the ac-
tions to the child directly but rather demonstrated the actions to another adult (explicitly expressing
his intention to ‘‘show [someone] how to use this’’). Children imitated irrelevant actions even though
some of them had already discovered a more efficient way of achieving the goal. In that study, the
knowledgeable model communicated with the child prior to the demonstration and ostensive signals
were transmitted, although they were directed at another individual. In another study on overimita-
tion in children and adults, participants watched a video-recorded presentation of relevant and irrel-
evant actions, but an experimenter instructed them to watch closely because they were going to ‘‘have
a go in a minute,’’ thereby also establishing a pedagogical context in which participants were sup-
posed to learn from others (McGuigan et al., 2011). The question remains open whether preschoolers
imitate causally irrelevant actions demonstrated by a completely unfamiliar and non-communicative
experimenter in the absence of any instruction to learn how to perform an action or how to use a novel
object.
Furthermore, it is currently unclear whether children’s omission of previously learned irrelevant
actions and their adoption of more efficient strategies depend on the communicative context. Accord-
ing to the natural pedagogy account, children should expect pedagogically transmitted knowledge to
be generalizable and shared among members of a social group. The subsequent presentation of an effi-
cient strategy by a non-communicative model, therefore, should not lead to a switch in strategies. A
communicative and pedagogical second model may, in contrast, be able to teach children the efficient
action as a second strategy. The latter assumption is based on the previous finding that preschoolers
are able to flexibly shift between different strategies of retrieving a reward after social demonstration
(Wood, Kendal, & Flynn, 2013).
In the current study we tested (a) whether communication of a model performing irrelevant ac-
tions is necessary to elicit overimitation in preschoolers and (b) whether communication of another
model performing an efficient action modulates the subsequent reduction of overimitation. In Phase
1 of the current experiment, 5-year-olds observed either a communicative experimenter showing
them causally relevant actions as well as clearly irrelevant actions to retrieve a reward from a trans-
parent container (pedagogical) or an unfamiliar experimenter who never engaged with them at all (no
contact). We then observed to what extent children reenacted the irrelevant actions in comparison
with a baseline condition in which another group of same-aged children operated the container with-
out a prior demonstration. In Phase 2 of the experiment, the same children were shown the efficient
way to retrieve a reward from the container either by a communicative and pedagogical experimenter
(no-contact-then-pedagogical and pedagogical-then-pedagogical conditions) or by an unfamiliar
experimenter who did not communicate with them at all (pedagogical-then-no-contact condition).
Hence, we ran three different conditions (see Table 1).
We predicted that children would imitate irrelevant actions in Phase 1 of the pedagogical-then-no-
contact and pedagogical-then-pedagogical conditions, thereby replicating previous findings of ove-
rimitation following the demonstration of irrelevant actions by a communicative and pedagogical
model. In Phase 1 of the no-contact-then-pedagogical condition, less or no overimitation was expected
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if direct communication indeed supports learning of causally irrelevant actions from others in
children.
In addition, communicative cues may affect whether children continue to use irrelevant actions
after seeing the efficient way to achieve a goal. Therefore, we predicted that children would continue
to perform the irrelevant actions they were taught by a pedagogical experimenter in Phase 2 of the
pedagogical-then-no-contact condition even after seeing a non-communicative experimenter perform
the more efficient action. This would speak to the robustness of pedagogically transmitted informa-
tion. It would also be in accord with the norm learning and social affiliation hypotheses because chil-
dren should be less motivated to conform to a non-communicative model than to the pedagogical
experimenter because they should feel less affiliated with a person who does not establish contact
with them. The ACE account, in contrast, would be more compatible with a switch to the efficient
strategy regardless of the communicative context because any presentation of the efficient strategy
demonstrates the expendability of the irrelevant actions and, thus, should be able to correct distorted
causal beliefs. In Phase 2 of the pedagogical-then-pedagogical condition, however, the second model
was also communicative. We hypothesized that this communicative model would be able to actively
teach children the efficient way to retrieve the reward after they had learned the irrelevant actions
from another communicative and pedagogical model because children have been shown to switch
flexibly between different socially demonstrated strategies (Wood et al., 2013). In Phase 2 of the
no-contact-then-pedagogical condition, children were expected to continue to use the efficient action.
Method
Participants
The study was conducted in a medium-sized German town with participants recruited from a mid-
dle-class socioeconomic background. A total of 99 5-year-old children (M = 62.5 months, SD = 1.69, 49
boys and 50 girls) participated. Participants were recruited from a pool of children who had taken part
in previous studies. Children were assigned to one of four conditions: three experimental conditions
(in each condition: n = 28, 14 boys and 14 girls) and one baseline condition (n = 15, 7 boys and 8 girls).
Further children were excluded from the final sample because of experimenter error (3), unwilling-
ness to participate (2), or interference of the parents (5). Another 4 children who did not manage to
remove a token from the container in Phase 1 of the experiment were not included in the statistical
analyses to ensure that the children’s behavior was not affected by the experience of failure.
Apparatus
Children were presented with a magnetic rod and a clear plastic container revealing the irrelevance
of certain actions performed in the modeling phase of the experiment (see Fig. 1). A non-transparent
tube was located visibly within the container. The tube contained tokens, that is, golden marbles with
small magnets attached to them. The tokens could be removed by inserting the magnetic rod into the
opening of the tube at the front of the container. A black lever was attached to the top of the container,
and a button that could be pushed using the rod was attached on the right side. The lever and the but-
ton had no functions and were obviously not physically connected to the tube containing the marbles.
Table 1
Experimental conditions.
Pedagogical-then-no-
contact
No-contact-then-
pedagogical
Pedagogical-then-
pedagogical
Phase 1: Inefficient
presentation
Pedagogical experimenter No-contact experimenter Pedagogical experimenter 1
Phase 2: Efficient presentation No-contact experimenter Pedagogical experimenter Pedagogical experimenter 2
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Procedure
Children were tested individually in a quiet laboratory room. Experimental conditions are summa-
rized in Table 1. Participants assigned to the pedagogical-then-no-contact and no-contact-then-peda-
gogical conditions interacted with one pedagogical experimenter who communicated with them,
played a warm-up game, and introduced the container. In one of the two phases of the experiment,
these children also observed a no-contact experimenter operating the container who never talked to
them and never made eye contact with them. Participants in the pedagogical-then-pedagogical con-
dition interacted with two pedagogical experimenters. Children assigned to the baseline condition
interacted with one communicative experimenter who never showed them how to operate the
container.
Before entering the testing room, the pedagogical experimenter welcomed the children and told
them that they were going to play some games together. The parents were instructed to watch the
experiment from a separate observation room via video cameras. If children refused to stay alone with
the experimenter (n = 12), the parents were asked to sit in the corner of the testing room behind their
children. The parents were given some magazines and were instructed to avoid any communication
with their children. Children did not meet or see the no-contact experimenter before the experiment.
The gender of the children and the experimenters was balanced across all conditions. Both experi-
menters were always of the opposite sex. Each session was recorded on video.
Fig. 1. The container and actions performed by the experimenters. Tokens were placed in the opaque tube within the
transparent container. The inefficient demonstration consisted of four irrelevant actions (A–D) and one relevant action (E). The
efficient demonstration consisted of only the relevant action.
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Warm-up phase
Each condition started with a warm-up phase. Children played an unrelated competitive game (i.e.,
blowing a cotton ball into a goal) with the pedagogical experimenter, who always ensured that the
children won some tokens. Children were introduced to the concept that the tokens (i.e., golden mar-
bles) could be exchanged for rewards (i.e., stickers). The game was played several times in a row until
the children grew comfortable with the experimental environment.
Introduction of the container
After the warm-up phase, children were introduced to the transparent container by the pedagog-
ical experimenter, who verbally introduced all of the conditions in the following way: ‘‘Now we are
going to play another game. This game is about this special container. There are some more golden
marbles hidden in this container. If you can get a marble out, you can exchange it for stickers.’’
Baseline condition
To establish the baseline production of the irrelevant actions, children in the baseline condition
were prompted to attempt to remove a token without prior instruction or demonstration. The exper-
imenter told the participants that they could retrieve a token however they wanted. Following this
instruction, the experimenter left the room and reentered after (a) the children successfully had re-
trieved one token, (b) the children had stopped interacting with the box for at least 30 s, or (c) 80 s
had elapsed.
Pedagogical-then-no-contact condition
In Phase 1, children observed the pedagogical experimenter retrieve a token from the container in
an inefficient way. After introducing the container, the pedagogical demonstrator started the game
(‘‘Okay, let’s start. It’s my turn first’’). If children were not paying attention, the experimenter said
‘‘Watch!’’ or ‘‘Look!’’ to ensure that the children saw what happened. Then, the pedagogical experi-
menter retrieved a token by using a sequence of causally irrelevant actions (Fig. 1A–D) and a causally
relevant action (Fig. 1E); the experimenter clapped his or her hands (Fig. 1A), then pushed the lever
attached to the top of the container back and forth once (Fig. 1B), then tapped the rod on the palm
of his or her hand three times while simultaneously counting out loud to ‘‘three’’ (Fig. 1C), then pushed
the button attached to the side of the container with the rod (Fig. 1D), and finally lifted the flap cov-
ering the opening to the tube and removed a marble by using the magnetic rod (Fig. 1E). Only the last
step was causally relevant for attaining the goal. The irrelevant actions were varied systematically
regarding their relation to the container and the rod; clapping involved no direct contact with either
of the instruments, pushing the lever involved contact only with the container, tapping involved con-
tact only with the rod, and pushing the button involved contact with both the container and the rod.
The pedagogical experimenter did not exchange his or her token for stickers in order to emphasize his
or her intention to teach. Afterward, the experimenter told participants that they could now retrieve a
token on their own however they wanted. Following this instruction, the experimenter left the room.
After children had successfully retrieved a token, the experimenter returned to the room and offered
to exchange the token for the reward (i.e., stickers). Next, the experimenter sat down at a desk and
pretended to write something down, thereby turning his or her back to the scene and not communi-
cating anymore. This was done to ensure that a person familiar to the children was present when the
unfamiliar no-contact experimenter entered the room.
In Phase 2 of the experiment, children observed the no-contact experimenter retrieve a token from
the container efficiently, that is, without any irrelevant actions. The no-contact experimenter entered
the room shortly after the pedagogical experimenter sat down at the desk. Without establishing con-
tact with the children or with the pedagogical experimenter, the no-contact experimenter expressed
his or her intention to retrieve a token (‘‘I want stickers and am going to get a golden marble now’’).
The no-contact experimenter retrieved a token using only the causally relevant action (Fig. 1E). Then,
the no-contact experimenter exchanged the token for stickers and left the room. Subsequently, the
pedagogical experimenter got up from the desk and approached the children again, saying that it
was the children’s turn to retrieve the next token however they wanted. Following that, the pedagog-
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ical experimenter also left the room, thereby leaving the children on their own. Once children had re-
trieved a token, the pedagogical experimenter returned and exchanged it for stickers.
No-contact-then-pedagogical condition
In Phase 1 of this condition, children also observed the inefficient way of retrieving a token. How-
ever, this time the irrelevant actions were presented by the no-contact experimenter. After the warm-
up, the pedagogical experimenter told the children that he or she would start playing a game with the
container soon but that first he or she needed to write something down. Children were asked to wait
until the experimenter had finished. Following this explanation, the pedagogical experimenter sat
down at a nearby desk and turned his or her back to the scene, pretending to concentrate on writing
something down as in Phase 2 of the pedagogical-then-no-contact condition. The no-contact experi-
menter then entered the room and expressed his or her intention to retrieve a token while ignoring
the children as well as the pedagogical experimenter and without establishing eye contact or commu-
nicating with either of them. Then, the no-contact experimenter performed the sequence of irrelevant
actions (Fig. 1A–D) and relevant action (Fig. 1E) as in the pedagogical-then-no-contact condition
(Phase 1). Afterward, the no-contact experimenter exchanged the token for stickers and left the room.
The pedagogical experimenter then returned to the children and explained that they could now start
playing the game and that they could go first. Again, the participants were told to retrieve a token
however they wanted and were left alone with the container. Once children had retrieved a marble,
the pedagogical experimenter returned to help exchange it for stickers.
In Phase 2, the pedagogical experimenter continued the game by announcing, ‘‘Now it is my turn.’’
In case children were not watching, the experimenter tried to focus the children’s attention on his or
her actions (‘‘Watch!’’ or ‘‘Look!’’). Next, the pedagogical experimenter retrieved a token using only
the causally relevant action (Fig. 1E). Then, the pedagogical experimenter instructed participants to
remove a token however they wanted and left the room. The experimenter reentered the room as soon
as the children had retrieved a token and helped to exchange it for stickers.
Hence, in Phase 1, children in both conditions received a demonstration of the entire action se-
quence (Fig. 1A–E, i.e., the inefficient presentation) before they were allowed to retrieve a token them-
selves. In Phase 2, children received a demonstration of only the causally relevant action (Fig. 1E, i.e.,
the efficient presentation). Whereas children participating in the pedagogical-then-no-contact condi-
tion saw the pedagogical experimenter perform the inefficient presentation and saw the no-contact
experimenter perform the efficient demonstration, children participating in the no-contact-then-ped-
agogical condition saw the reverse combination.
Pedagogical-then-pedagogical condition
As in the other conditions children first observed the inefficient way of retrieving the tokens (Phase
1) and then the efficient way (Phase 2). In the pedagogical-then-pedagogical condition, both experi-
menters were equally familiar to the children and both acted in a ‘‘pedagogical’’ manner; that is, they
engaged with the children while demonstrating their actions and never exchanged their tokens for
stickers. The setup ensured that children spent an equal amount of time with both experimenters dur-
ing warm-up and testing and that both experimenters spent an approximately equal amount of time
talking with the children. When one of the experimenters demonstrated how tokens could be re-
trieved for the children, the other experimenter pretended to be writing something down at a desk
with his or her back turned on the demonstration. When it was the children’s turn to retrieve a token,
both experimenters left the room.
Coding and reliability
The dependent measure was the number of irrelevant actions the children imitated. This individual
Overimitation score (OI score) delivered values from 0 to 4, where 0 indicated that children did not
imitate any of the irrelevant actions and 1, 2, 3, or 4 indicated that children performed 1, 2, 3, or 4
of the 4 possible irrelevant actions demonstrated by one of the experimenters (Fig. 1A–D). This meth-
od of coding ensured that all of the actions were weighted equally in the OI score. For the lever-push-
ing action to be coded, children needed to push the lever in at least one direction. Pushing the lever
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back and forth (once or several times) also resulted in a score of 1. Similarly, for the tapping action to
be coded, children needed to tap the rod in the palm of their hand at least once.
Children’s behavior was coded by an experimenter based on edited video-recordings showing only
the children acting on the container in the absence of any experimenter (i.e., the condition was not
discernible). An additional independent coder who was blind to the condition, phase, and hypotheses
of the study also coded all of the videos. High interrater reliability (Pearson’s r = .98) confirmed a very
good level of agreement. The experimenter’s coding was used for the analyses.
Results
The number of children showing each of the four irrelevant actions in each condition is presented
in Table 2. As expected based on previous findings (Lyons et al., 2007), the most frequently imitated
actions involved direct contact with the container and the least frequently imitated action involved no
contact with either the rod or the container (i.e., clapping hands). This was the case in all of the exper-
imental conditions.
Preliminary analyses revealed that children’s sex had no significant effect as an independent var-
iable, so this factor is not regarded further. In a first step, OI scores in each phase of the three exper-
imental conditions were compared with baseline (see Table 2 and Fig. 2 for means and standard
errors). For this purpose, six independent-samples t tests were conducted. Level of significance was
adjusted according to Bonferroni (p = .0083). In Phase 1 of each experimental condition, the mean
OI score was significantly higher than that in the baseline condition, ts(41)P !4.40, ps < .001,
dsP 1.44. Thus, irrespective of whether the experimenter who modeled the irrelevant actions acted
in a pedagogical manner or not, children initially showed overimitation.
Results regarding Phase 2 inform us how stable this behavior was after children observed the effi-
cient way of retrieving a token from the container. OI scores remained significantly higher compared
with baseline only in Phase 2 of the pedagogical-then-no-contact condition, that is, after children ob-
served a non-communicative stranger perform the efficient action, t(41) = !3.38, p = .002, d = 1.11. In
both conditions with a pedagogical experimenter performing the efficient action, overimitation
dropped to baseline level after children observed the pedagogical experimenter perform the efficient
action: no-contact-then-pedagogical, t(41) = !1.92, p = .062, d = 0.62; pedagogical-then-pedagogical,
t(41) = –0.53, p = .601, d = 0.18.
In a second step, we conducted a repeated-measures analysis of variance (ANOVA) with the be-
tween-participants factor condition (pedagogical-then-no-contact, no-contact-then-pedagogical, or
Table 2
Descriptive information on the number of children who reenacted each of the four irrelevant actions, mean Overimitation score,
and standard error in each condition.
Condition Clapping Pushing lever Tapping rod Pushing button Mean OI score (SE)
Baseline 0 5 0 1 0.40 (0.16)
(n = 14)
Pedagogical-then-no-contact
(n = 28)
Phase 1 0 16 8 22 1.64 (0.19)**
Phase 2 0 13 4 21 1.36 (0.19)*
No-contact-then-pedagogical
(n = 28)
Phase 1 0 20 5 20 1.61 (0.17)**
Phase 2 0 11 2 14 0.96 (0.20)
Pedagogical-then-pedagogical
(n = 28)
Phase 1 2 22 12 17 1.89 (0.17)**
Phase 2 0 6 2 7 0.54 (0.17)
Note. Asterisks indicate Overimitation scores (OI scores) that are significantly greater than those in the baseline condition.
* p < .0083 (corresponds to p < .05, Bonferroni-corrected).
** p < .001.
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pedagogical-then-pedagogical) and the within-participants factor phase (1 or 2). Level of significance
was set at p < .05. There was a significant main effect for the factor phase, F(78) = 55.97, p < .001,
g2 = .41, and a significant interaction between phase and condition, F(78) = 9.57, p < .001, g2 = .19.
To further explore the significant interaction between phase and condition, we examined whether
children’s OI score changed between Phase 1 and Phase 2 in each of the three conditions. Children’s
OI score dropped significantly from Phase 1 to Phase 2 in the no-contact-then-pedagogical condition,
t(27) = 4.12, p < .001, Cohen’s d = 0.66, and the pedagogical-then-pedagogical condition, t(27) = 6.18,
p < .001, Cohen’s d = 1.50. The difference between Phase 1 and Phase 2 was not significant in the ped-
agogical-then-no-contact condition, t(27) = 1.98, p = .058, Cohen’s d = 0.28. Given the rather limited
statistical power in this particular test (1 ! b = .32), a small effect may have gone unnoticed. That
is, a small decrease from Phase 1 to Phase 2 in the pedagogical-then-no-contact condition cannot
be ruled out completely considering the high b-error probability. Even if overimitation is somewhat
reduced from Phase 1 to Phase 2, it should be noted that the pedagogical-then-no-contact condition
is the only condition in which children showed overimitation above baseline level in Phase 2.
Discussion
In the current study, 5-year-olds were first shown an inefficient method, involving several irrele-
vant actions, to retrieve tokens from a container, demonstrated either by a pedagogical experimenter
or by a non-communicative experimenter. Then, children observed the efficient method to retrieve the
tokens presented by another experimenter who either acted in a pedagogical manner or did not. The
irrelevant actions were rarely performed spontaneously by a group of same-aged children in a base-
line condition. After the first demonstration, children imitated irrelevant actions in each of the exper-
imental conditions, that is, regardless of whether they were presented by a pedagogical experimenter
or a no-contact experimenter. Interesting differences in children’s behavior were observed, however,
after the subsequent presentation of the efficient way to retrieve the tokens. Only when children were
shown the efficient action by a pedagogical experimenter did their performance of irrelevant actions
drop to baseline level. This was found irrespective of whether they had initially learned the irrelevant
actions from a pedagogical experimenter or a non-communicative experimenter (i.e., in both the no-
contact-then-pedagogical and pedagogical-then-pedagogical conditions). When children were shown
the efficient action by a non-communicative experimenter (pedagogical-then-no-contact condition),
their imitation of irrelevant actions dropped only slightly and was still significantly above baseline
level.
Fig. 2. Mean Overimitation scores (OI scores) in each of the experimental conditions and in the baseline condition. Error bars
indicate standard errors. Asterisks indicate significant differences in mean OI scores (⁄⁄p < .001; n.s., not significant).
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Our findings add relevant information to the current discussion concerning the importance of com-
munication for the cultural transmission of actions that are apparently irrelevant or inefficient. Rep-
licating previous findings, preschoolers in our study imitated irrelevant actions that were presented by
an experimenter. Children may automatically encode irrelevant actions that are performed by an adult
model as causally relevant (Lyons et al., 2011), or they may reproduce these actions out of a desire to
conform to cultural norms (Kenward et al., 2011; Keupp et al., 2013) or to be liked by the model (Niel-
sen & Blank, 2011). It should be noted that in the current study the model was never present when
children acted on the container in order to minimize social pressure to act in a certain way. Children
were also encouraged to retrieve the token however they wanted. Still, it cannot be ruled out that the
intrinsic motivation to comply with social norms or to affiliate with the experimenter prompted chil-
dren to act like the model even when they were alone.
Interestingly, and in contrast to our prediction, children initially reenacted the irrelevant actions no
matter whether these actions were demonstrated by a pedagogical experimenter or by an unfamiliar
and non-communicative experimenter. This was true even though the no-contact experimenter never
interacted with children and avoided any contact before or during the experiment. The no-contact
experimenter never expressed the intention to teach or show anyone how to operate the container
and instead made it clear that he or she removed tokens from the container in order to exchange them
for stickers. This finding seems surprising given that direct communication and ostensive signals are
thought to improve the transmission of cultural knowledge (Gergely & Csibra, 2006). Our results sug-
gest that preschoolers imitate irrelevant actions even when performed by a complete stranger in the
absence of communication and instruction. The incidental observation of actions whose purpose is
opaque in relation to the goal of the action, thus, seems to be sufficient to trigger overimitation in
5-year-olds.
This result does not necessarily contradict previous findings showing that communication and
ostensive signals increase the imitation of arbitrary and inefficient means to achieve a goal in younger
children and infants (Kiraly et al., 2013). Younger children may well be more reliant than older chil-
dren on social cues to infer at what level of detail an action should be imitated, and they may resort to
goal emulation in the absence of communication. In contrast, older children with increased cognitive
resources may be able to encode more aspects of an observed action and reproduce even complex ac-
tion sequences at a high level of detail and fidelity without requiring the model to indicate which as-
pects of the action are actually relevant (see also Lyons et al., 2011, and McGuigan et al., 2011, for
similar argumentation). In accordance with this notion, 18-month-olds were more inclined to open
a box in a specific way when this was demonstrated by a model who was engaging in a social inter-
action with them (i.e., who was acting in a pedagogical manner according to Gergely & Csibra, 2006) as
compared with a model who acted disinterested and aloof, whereas 24-month-olds imitated the mod-
el’s way of opening a box equally irrespective of the model’s behavior toward them (Nielsen, 2006). At
the same age, direct interaction was even found to reduce imitation of arbitrary object-directed ac-
tions from an unfamiliar model when compared with the observation of a third-party interaction
(Shimpi et al., 2013).
Phase 2 of our experiment, however, revealed an interesting effect of communication on children’s
behavior. In all experimental conditions, children first saw the inefficient method of retrieving tokens
and then, after retrieving a token themselves, saw the efficient method demonstrated by another
experimenter. When the inefficient method was demonstrated by a pedagogical experimenter and
the efficient method was shown by a non-communicative experimenter (pedagogical-then-no-contact
condition), children’s overimitation performance did not drop significantly and these children still
performed more irrelevant actions than children in the baseline condition. When children were shown
the efficient way to retrieve tokens by a pedagogical experimenter, overimitation dropped signifi-
cantly and was no longer significantly different from baseline. This was the case irrespective of
whether they had initially learned the irrelevant actions from a no-contact experimenter (no-con-
tact-then-pedagogical condition) or a pedagogical experimenter (pedagogical-then-pedagogical
condition).
Thus, it seems that direct instruction and communication affect the reduction of overimitative
behavior more than they influence its elicitation in preschoolers. Our results show that preschoolers
are able to learn functionally irrelevant actions from a completely non-communicative model. This
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speaks to the robustness of the phenomenon and suggests that children can acquire apparently inef-
ficient action strategies through incidental observation. However, when children had already acquired
an inefficient strategy, observing a non-communicative experimenter perform the efficient action led
to only a small decline in overimitative behavior that was still significantly above baseline level. It is
possible that children in the pedagogical-then-no-contact condition would have eventually omitted
the irrelevant actions had we administered more trials or had these children observed more than
one non-communicative model retrieve the token without the irrelevant actions. In contrast, direct
communication seems to help children to adjust socially acquired inefficient action strategies quickly
even after only one pedagogical demonstration of the efficient action.
How do the current findings relate to theoretical accounts on overimitation? If overimitation is in-
deed due mostly to norm learning (Kenward, 2012; Kenward et al., 2011; Keupp et al., 2013), it makes
sense for children to initially imitate any seemingly knowledgeable adult performing an unknown ac-
tion even when the adult does not communicate with them. Similarly, they may imitate the unfamiliar
experimenter for the sake of social affiliation as long as they have not observed any other way of
retrieving tokens performed by someone else to whom they might feel more connected. In Phase 2
of the experiment, children were faced with a conflict. They needed to decide which model to follow.
After being shown two strategies, they chose to maintain the strategy or switch to the strategy em-
ployed by the pedagogical experimenter (pedagogical-then-no-contact and no-contact-then-pedagog-
ical conditions), with whom they presumably shared a stronger bond (i.e., social affiliation) and whose
normative behavior they may have been more motivated to copy. In the pedagogical-then-pedagogical
condition, both experimenters were equally familiar and pedagogical. Here, it seems that children’s
behavior was flexible and they performed the strategy they had seen last. This is in accordance with
the previous finding that children may switch strategies on how to retrieve a reward from a container
after social demonstration (Wood et al., 2013).
It would be interesting to further investigate the norm learning account using our paradigm by
manipulating group membership of the two experimenters. Children should be more motivated to
imitate a member of their own social group even if he or she performs an inefficient action sequence.
Furthermore, it might be informative to test children’s behavior when the efficient strategy is pre-
sented first and the inefficient strategy is presented second. Children might switch to the inefficient
strategy presented by a pedagogical experimenter even after having performed the efficient strategy
before if they perceive causally irrelevant actions to be potentially socially relevant.
The ACE account is also compatible with our results in Phase 1 of the experiment, but it cannot ex-
plain why overimitation was maintained after the demonstration of the efficient action by a non-com-
municative experimenter in Phase 2 of the pedagogical-then-no-contact condition. We deem it
unlikely that children simply paid less attention to the no-contact experimenter given that they ob-
served him or her closely and learned the irrelevant actions from the no-contact experimenter equally
well as from the pedagogical experimenter in Phase 1 of the experiment.
In future studies, it will be important to tease apart aspects of the model’s behavior relating to ped-
agogical behavior and ostensive signals from socially affiliative behavior. In the current study, the ped-
agogical experimenter was also the one who was more familiar than the no-contact experimenter and
who actively engaged with participants. It would be possible to present an experimenter on a stage or
through video-recording who is unfamiliar to the children but who displays ostensive signals such as
eye contact. This would inform us whether the reduction of overimitative behavior as shown in the
current study relies on pedagogical signals alone or whether a relationship with the pedagogical
experimenter (as built up in the warm-up phase of the current study) is necessary.
Furthermore, the knowledge status of the experimenter may play a role. In our study, both types of
experimenters may have appeared to be equally knowledgeable. Even though the no-contact experi-
menter displayed no pedagogical intention, he or she did not hesitate and acted on the container in an
intentional manner directly after entering the room. In a recent study, preschoolers showed more imi-
tation of irrelevant actions when the model claimed to be knowledgeable and expressed a pedagogical
intention than when the model expressed the intention to ‘‘figure out’’ how to use an unfamiliar and
causally opaque object (Buchsbaum, Gopnik, Griffiths, & Shafto, 2011). When a causally transparent
object is used (Wood, Kendal, & Flynn, 2012), 5-year-olds imitate irrelevant actions more frequently
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from an adult model than from a peer, although the model’s self-professed knowledge status had only
a weak effect in this study.
To conclude, we found no evidence that communication and direct instruction affect the imitation
of irrelevant actions on a novel and transparent container in preschoolers per se. Thus, pedagogical
cues may be more effective in guiding imitative behavior in younger children and infants (Kiraly
et al., 2013) than in older children (i.e., preschoolers). However, the reduction of overimitative behav-
ior seems to be facilitated if a pedagogical and communicative experimenter, as compared with a non-
communicative experimenter, models the efficient action. Our findings are compatible with accounts
on overimitation that stress the importance of norm learning and social affiliation (Kenward, 2012;
Kenward et al., 2011; Keupp et al., 2013; Nielsen & Blank, 2011).
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Three experiments (N = 100) examine the inﬂuence of causal information on overimitation. In Experiment 1, a
transparent reward location reveals that the reward is unaffected by nonfunctional actions. When 5-year-olds
observe an inefﬁcient and subsequently an efﬁcient strategy to retrieve a reward, they show overimitation in
both phases—even though the reward is visible. In Experiment 2, children observe ﬁrst the efﬁcient then the
inefﬁcient strategy. The latter is always demonstrated communicatively, whereas the efﬁcient strategy is pre-
sented communicatively (2a) or noncommunicatively (2b). Regardless of whether the efﬁcient strategy is
emphasized through communication or not, most children do not switch from the efﬁcient to the inefﬁcient
strategy. Depending on the situation, children base their behavior on social motivations or causal information.
Imitation is a powerful and adaptive learning strat-
egy which involves copying an action sequence per-
formed by another person. Children are enthusiastic
imitators, imitating actions that are obviously non-
functional to achieve the goal of an action sequence.
This behavior is sometimes referred to as “overimita-
tion” (e.g., Horner & Whiten, 2005; Lyons, Young, &
Keil, 2007; McGuigan, Makinson, & Whiten, 2011;
McGuigan, Whiten, Flynn, & Horner, 2007; Wood,
Kendal, & Flynn, 2012).
In a typical paradigm designed for studying
overimitation, participants ﬁrst see how an interac-
tive partner retrieves a reward from a container
using a combination of nonfunctional and functional
actions. After observing the model, children (McGui-
gan & Whiten, 2009; Nielsen & Tomaselli, 2009) as
well as adults (Flynn & Smith, 2012; McGuigan et al.,
2011) tend to copy both functional actions (e.g., open-
ing a lid to retrieve a reward) as well as nonfunc-
tional actions (e.g., tapping on the box before
opening it). Crucially, nonfunctional actions are not
performed when participants operate the container
without prior demonstration (e.g., Hoehl, Zettersten,
Schleihauf, Gr€atz, & Pauen, 2014; Lyons, Damrosch,
Lin, Macris, & Keil, 2011; Lyons et al., 2007).
Children’s tendency to overimitate is often
explained by social factors such as the desire to afﬁli-
ate with others (Nielsen & Blank, 2011), the sensitiv-
ity to teaching signals (Gergely & Csibra, 2006), or
normative or conventional pressure that might sup-
port learning of social norms and rituals (Kenward,
Karlsson, & Persson, 2011; Kenward, 2012; Keupp,
Behne, & Rakoczy, 2013; Legare & Nielsen, 2015).
For example, Kenward (2012) had found that 3- to 5-
year-olds observe an experimenter perform func-
tional as well as nonfunctional actions in the pres-
ence of a puppet. Most children protested, some of
them using normative language, when the puppet
subsequently performed the task but omitted the
nonfunctional actions. Thus, children apparently
accepted modeled nonfunctional actions as norma-
tive and, as shown previously in other contexts
(Rakoczy, Warneken, & Tomasello, 2008), protested
when experiencing violations of these social norms.
Legare and Nielsen (2015) proposed that individ-
uals adopt a ritual stance—that is, attribute a ratio-
nale of cultural convention to actions that serve no
apparent instrumental reason, resulting in high-
ﬁdelity imitation. It is stated that children interpret
behavior as instrumental if the physical causality is
knowable; if the underlying physical causality
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cannot be understood, children tend to see these
actions as socially motivated and interpret them
conventionally (e.g., Kapit"any & Nielsen, 2015;
Legare, Wen, Herrmann, & Whitehouse, 2015;
Wilks, Kapit"any, & Nielsen, 2016). Thus, actions that
are obviously noninstrumental seem more likely to
serve a social purpose than actions that have a cau-
sal effect. According to Froese and Leavens (2014),
overimitation is a highly selective activity by which
children pick out behaviors with a meaning that
seems causally unintelligible and consider them to
be determined by social conventions. Therefore, if
overimitation primarily serves a social purpose, it
should occur especially when children know that
the observed actions have no causal function, that
is, when the causal mechanism of the testing object
is fully transparent and clearly not relevant for the
demonstrated action. In a recent study by Nielsen,
Kapit"any, and Elkins (2015), preschool children
watched an adult experimenter model redundant
actions on a box (e.g., tapping the side of it with a
tool) after the box had been opened. Later, children
reproduced the nonfunctional action even though
the box had already been open at the time the
actions were performed, and it was thus obvious
that tapping it with the tool did not have any effect.
Further support for social theories to explain
overimitation is provided by the ﬁnding that chil-
dren sometimes copy nonfunctional actions selec-
tively: They reproduce them in the presence of an
inefﬁcient demonstrator who had performed them
earlier, but not in the presence of an efﬁcient demon-
strator who previously demonstrated only functional
actions (Nielsen & Blank, 2011). This has been inter-
preted as evidence that children’s overimitation
reﬂects a desire to afﬁliate with the respective model.
However, some empirical ﬁndings do not sup-
port this view: Lyons et al. (2011) found that chil-
dren refrained from imitating actions that could not
possibly have any causal effect on achieving the
action goal because they were performed on an
unconnected second container. In addition, the ﬁnd-
ings of Hoehl et al. (2014) suggested that actions not
performed directly on the testing object containing
the reward (e.g., clapping) were imitated less fre-
quently than actions performed on the container.
Thus, actions that cannot possibly have a causal effect
on the retrieval of a reward were often omitted.
Based on their results of robust overimitation
even in competitive contexts with time constraints,
Lyons et al. argued that children automatically
encode observed intentional actions as functionally
relevant as long as these actions do not violate fun-
damental principles of causality, such as physical
contact. This process has been dubbed automatic
causal encoding (Lyons et al., 2007, 2011). Others
have suggested that children cannot reliably discern
the connection between speciﬁc actions and out-
comes, and therefore imitate all actions performed
at the testing object. As a consequence, children
should ﬁrst copy faithfully, as this behavior has
proven to be useful in everyday life, but if some of
the copied actions turn out to be causally irrelevant,
they may be parsed out later on (Simpson & Riggs,
2011; Whiten, McGuigan, Marshall-Pescini, & Hop-
per, 2009). Following this view, knowledge of the
causal mechanism of the testing object or the func-
tionality of a more efﬁcient strategy should in fact
reduce overimitation.
Other theories combine causal and social factors
to explain the ﬂexibility of children’s (over)imitation
(Over & Carpenter, 2012). According to Over and
Carpenter (2012), a variety of different motives
come into play whenever children perceive another
person demonstrating a goal-directed action
sequence. The authors distinguish between: (a)
“learning goals,” which lead to emulation or selec-
tive imitation based on functional considerations; (b)
“social goals,” which motivate children to imitate
faithfully (in the case that the demonstrated actions
were nonfunctional leading to overimitation); and (c)
a combination of both, which should also focus chil-
dren’s attention on “how” something is typically
done, therefore leading to faithful or even overimita-
tion. Thus, depending on which goals are high-
lighted by a speciﬁc situational or task context,
children may imitate or omit nonfunctional actions
demonstrated by another person. It follows that cau-
sal information may have different effects depending
on whether children’s social goals or learning goals
are predominant in a given situation.
In sum, contrasting hypotheses regarding the
effects of causal information on children’s imitation
of nonfunctional actions can be derived from exist-
ing theories to explain overimitation. According to
theories focusing on social factors, imitation of non-
functional actions is more likely to occur if their
irrelevance is obvious to the children, because they
should infer that the demonstration must have a
social purpose and hence be motivated to conform
with social norms or assure afﬁliation. In contrast,
accounts focusing on children’s causal understand-
ing predict that actions that obviously do not have
any causal or functional effects (e.g., because they
are not performed on the reward container) should
lead to lower imitation rates.
In order to shed a new light onto mechanisms
underlying overimitation, the present set of
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experiments aims at testing these different theoreti-
cal accounts by manipulating causal and functional
transparency of the task. Two different approaches
are used to directly manipulate children’s causal
and functional knowledge about the task: First, the
extent of the testing container’s visual transparency
(Experiment 1) and, second, children’s prior knowl-
edge about how to retrieve the reward most efﬁ-
ciently (Experiment 2). To our knowledge, no
research has explored the inﬂuence of causal infor-
mation up to full causal transparency (complete
visual transparency of the testing object) and func-
tional transparency (providing the most efﬁcient
solution beforehand) on overimitation.
In Experiment 1, we ask whether children imitate
nonfunctional actions even when they see that the
reward is unaffected by these actions. In Experi-
ments 2a and 2b, we test whether children would
switch from an efﬁcient strategy to an inefﬁcient
strategy. Experiments 2a and 2b vary in the empha-
sis of the inefﬁcient strategy. These studies were
conducted with 5-year-old children because overim-
itation is a robust phenomenon at this age (McGui-
gan et al., 2007) and because we compare data
directly with data from a previous study with the
same age group (Hoehl et al., 2014).
Experiment 1: Do Children Overimitate Actions
That Are Clearly Irrelevant in Causal Terms?
In some previous studies on imitation, availability of
causal information was manipulated by using trans-
parent or opaque testing containers (Horner &
Whiten, 2005; McGuigan et al., 2007). Results of
these studies indicate that 3- to 5-year-olds imitate
demonstrated nonfunctional actions regardless of
whether causal information was available or not, that
is, whether the container was transparent or opaque.
However, most overimitation studies (for an
exception see, e.g., Gardiner, 2014) used an opaque
reward location to ensure that children could not
see the reward before retrieving it (e.g., Berl &
Hewlett, 2015; Hoehl et al., 2014; Horner & Whiten,
2005; McGuigan et al., 2007; Nielsen, Tomaselli,
Mushin, & Whiten, 2014). In some studies the con-
tainer itself was entirely opaque and nonfunctional
actions were performed on the outside (e.g., Nielsen
& Blank, 2011; Nielsen & Tomaselli, 2010). There-
fore, children may have inferred that the demon-
strated actions affected the reward through some
hidden mechanism. Nielsen et al. (2015) used opa-
que wooden boxes but demonstrated irrelevant
actions after the reward-containing box had already
been opened to ensure children knew that these
actions did not have any causal effect on the
reward. As the box was open, one could say the
reward location was transparent while the irrele-
vant actions were performed. The authors found
that children copied the redundant actions anyway.
However, in this study the demonstrator was pre-
sent during the child’s turn, which likely increased
social pressure to act like the model. Furthermore,
during demonstration, the relevant action was not
performed efﬁciently, because the experimenter
used a tool to open the lid of the box when he sim-
ply could have used his hands. Although Nielsen
et al. (2015) ensured that children knew that the
irrelevant actions did not affect the reward by
demonstrating them after the box was already
opened, they demonstrated only one strategy
including a relevant and an irrelevant action.
To investigate how the visibility of the reward
affects children’s imitation of nonfunctional actions,
we used a task originally introduced by Hoehl et al.
(2014) but exchanged the opaque tube containing
the rewards for a transparent tube. As long as the
tube is opaque, children cannot see the crucial
event—how the tool, that is inserted into the tube,
connects with the reward. Therefore, they cannot
know for sure that the demonstrated irrelevant
actions have no bearing for the relevant action. The
tube is the crucial part of the apparatus; as long as
it is opaque the relative impact of causal and social
information on overimitation is hard to discern.
In contrast to the study by Nielsen et al. (2015),
children in the current study observed two separate
demonstrations, the inefﬁcient and the efﬁcient
strategy, whereby the efﬁcient strategy was actually
the most efﬁcient way possible to retrieve a token.
Further we tried to minimize social pressure by
leaving the child alone during the testing phase.
Children saw a transparent apparatus with a trans-
parent tube inside, containing rewards (marbles
with a magnet attached to them). Therefore, chil-
dren saw the reward before any action on the appa-
ratus was performed (this was not the case in
Nielsen et al., 2015). As in Hoehl et al. (2014), two
different experimenters demonstrated two different
strategies to retrieve a reward from the box. Experi-
menter A demonstrated the inefﬁcient strategy,
which included a number of additional actions.
These actions were clearly nonfunctional and cau-
sally irrelevant (Figures 1A to 1D, see description
of procedure for more details). At the end of the
sequence, the only relevant action was demon-
strated: To get a reward, a magnetic rod was
inserted into the tube and made contact with a
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marble so both could be pulled out together (Fig-
ure 1E). After letting the child retrieve a marble,
Experimenter B demonstrated the efﬁcient strategy
using only the relevant action (Figure 1E). Then it
was the child’s turn again. By giving children the
opportunity to imitate following each demonstra-
tion, we reduced the impact of memory skills on
performance and gave children the chance to per-
sonally succeed with either strategy.
Pairing the irrelevant actions with a communica-
tive demonstrator represents the way that overimi-
tation is usually induced (e.g., Horner & Whiten,
2005; Nielsen & Blank, 2011). In this experiment,
the typical overimitation effect was caused by
Experimenter A demonstrating the inefﬁcient strat-
egy in a communicative way (Phase 1), thus
increasing the salience of irrelevant actions.
Experimenter B performed the efﬁcient strategy
without communication (Phase 2). We adopted this
design from Hoehl et al. (2014) who found that
children continued to overimitate even after watch-
ing a noncommunicative demonstrator performing
the efﬁcient strategy (but not after watching com-
municative demonstrations of the efﬁcient strategy).
By replicating this procedure, we were able to test
whether the initiation of overimitation and its per-
sistence despite the subsequent demonstration of
the efﬁcient strategy can be replicated with a trans-
parent reward location. Furthermore, pairing the
efﬁcient demonstration with a noncommunicative
experimenter allowed the child to merely observe
the efﬁcient demonstration, enabling evaluation of
the impact of causal and functional information
about the task with only minimal social input.
Figure 1. The container and actions performed by the experimenters. Tokens were placed in the transparent tube within the transparent
container. The inefﬁcient demonstration consisted of four nonfunctional actions (A–D) and one functional action (E). The efﬁcient
demonstration only consisted of the functional action (E).
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As the tube presented in these experiments was
fully transparent, imitation of nonfunctional actions
could not be attributed to the opaqueness of the
mechanism. We thus enhanced the potential impact
of causal knowledge compared to Hoehl et al.
(2014) who used an opaque tube in the same para-
digm. To test the effect of increasing causal trans-
parency, we compared our data directly with data
from Hoehl et al. (2014).
Theories focusing on children’s causal reasoning
(Lyons et al., 2007, 2011; Whiten et al., 2009) would
predict that—in comparison to results obtained by
Hoehl et al. (2014)—children should overimitate
less when they can see that the reward is unaf-
fected by nonfunctional actions (Phase 1) and that
they should stop overimitating after having
observed the efﬁcient strategy, that is, having seen
that there is no functional reason for performing
these nonfunctional actions in order to achieve the
reward (Phase 2). In contrast, social accounts would
predict that children overimitate even when they
can see that the reward is unaffected by nonfunc-
tional actions (Phase 1) because this should under-
score the social-normative value of the
demonstrated actions and they should continue to
do so despite having seen the efﬁcient strategy per-
formed by a noncommunicative model (Phase 2).
Experiment 1 will thus reveal to what extent causal
and social factors contribute to explaining children’s
imitative behavior.
As a dependent variable, we assessed the imita-
tion rate for nonfunctional actions following each
demonstration phase in comparison to a baseline
condition in which another group of same-aged
children operated the container without any prior
demonstration.
Method
Participants
The study was conducted in a medium-sized
German university town. Forty-four 5-year-old
preschoolers (22 male; M = 62.2 months, SD = 1.64)
participated. Data were collected between October
2013 and February 2014. In the comparison condi-
tions from Hoehl et al. (2014), forty-three 5-year-
olds (opaque tube condition: n = 28, baseline condi-
tion: n = 15, comparison data were collected in
June 2012 and July 2013) were included in data
analyses. Participants were recruited from an exist-
ing pool of children who had taken part in earlier
thematically nonrelated studies. Data from the
local’s registration ofﬁce were provided to get in
contact with the parents for the ﬁrst time shortly
after the children’s birth. The parents ﬁrst received
a letter and were contacted over phone a few
weeks later. Children were included in this pool
after their parents have expressed interest in having
their child take part in developmental research.
When the children reached the appropriate age for
the study, the parents were contacted by phone,
and those interested in volunteering brought their
children to the university for testing. The majority
of the children participating were Caucasian and
from middle-class socioeconomic backgrounds. As
in the precursor study, children were assigned to
one of two conditions: one experimental condition
(n = 28, 14 male) and one baseline condition
(n = 16, 8 male). An additional six children were
excluded from the ﬁnal sample because of experi-
menter error (n = 3) or unwillingness to participate
(n = 3).
Materials
Children were presented a magnetic rod and a
clear Plexiglas! (Evonik Performance Materials
GmbH; Essen, Germany) container revealing the
irrelevance of certain actions performed during
the modeling phase of the experiment (see Fig-
ure 1). A transparent tube was located within the
container. The tube contained tokens, that is,
golden marbles with small magnets attached to
them. The tokens could be removed by inserting
the magnetic rod into the opening of the tube at
the front of the container. A black lever was
attached to the top of the container and a button,
which could be pushed using the rod, was
attached on the right side. The lever and the but-
ton had no functions and were obviously not con-
nected to the tube containing the marbles.
Furthermore, we used two cardboard boxes to
exchange the tokens for the stickers. One was
golden and had a little hole in its lid, through
which the tokens could be inserted. The other
was heart shaped and contained the stickers.
Procedure
Children were tested individually in a quiet labo-
ratory room. Before entering the testing room,
Experimenter A welcomed the child and explained
that they were going to play some games together.
Parents stayed in a separate room. Sex of children
and experimenters was balanced across conditions.
Both experimenters were of opposite sex. Each ses-
sion was recorded on video.
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The study design is summarized in Table 1. In
Experiment 1, participants were randomly assigned
to either the transparent tube condition or to the
baseline condition. In the transparent tube condition,
the inefﬁcient strategy to reach a goal was demon-
strated in a communicative context (Experimenter
A; eye contact, talking, praising), increasing the sal-
ience of the nonfunctional actions, whereas the efﬁ-
cient strategy was presented by an unknown model
(Experimenter B) who never talked to the child nor
established eye contact. The comparison condition
from Hoehl et al. (2014) thus differed only
regarding the transparency of the reward location.
Children assigned to the baseline condition
interacted only with one experimenter, who was
communicative and did not demonstrate how to
operate the container.
Warm-Up Phase
Experiment 1 started with a warm-up phase. The
child played an unrelated competitive game with
Experimenter A (i.e., blowing a cotton ball into a
goal), who ensured that the child won some tokens
to increase motivation for the main task. They were
introduced to the concept that the tokens (golden
marbles) could be exchanged for rewards (stickers).
Experimenter A explained that sticking the golden
marbles through the opening of the golden box per-
mitted the child to choose one sticker for each mar-
ble from the heart-shaped box. The game was
played twice to make the child feel comfortable in
the experimental environment.
Introduction of the Container
In the next step, the child was introduced to
the transparent container. Experimenter A (same
as during warm-up) verbally introduced all the
conditions in the following way: “Now we are
going to play another game. This game is about
this special container. There are some more golden
marbles hidden in this container. If you get a mar-
ble out, you can exchange it for stickers.” The
following experimental setup differed between
conditions.
Baseline Condition
To establish the baseline performance of the non-
functional actions, the child was allowed to remove
a token without prior demonstration. Experimenter
A instructed the child to retrieve a token any way
he or she liked and then left the room until: (a) the
child had successfully retrieved one token, (b) the
child had stopped interacting with the container for
at least 30 s, or (c) 80 s had elapsed. Children in
the baseline condition did not get a second demon-
stration and did not get in contact with Experi-
menter B.
Transparent Tube Condition
In Phase 1, children observed Experimenter A
retrieving a token from the container in an inefﬁ-
cient way. After introducing the container, Experi-
menter A started the game (“Okay. Let’s start. It’s
my turn ﬁrst.”). If necessary, the child’s attention
was directed to the demonstration by saying
“Watch!” or “Look!” Then, Experimenter A
retrieved a token by using the following nonfunc-
tional (Figures 1A to 1D) and functional (Figure 1E)
actions: clapping his or her hands (Figure 1A),
pushing the lever attached to the top of the con-
tainer back and forth (Figure 1B), tapping the rod
on the palm of his or her hand three times while
simultaneously counting out loud to three (Fig-
ure 1C), pushing the button attached to the side of
the container with the rod (Figure 1D), and ﬁnally
lifting the ﬂap covering the opening to the tube and
removing a marble by using the magnetic rod (Fig-
ure 1E). Only the last action was functional to reach
the reward. The irrelevant actions were varied sys-
tematically regarding their relation to the container;
clapping and tapping involved no direct contact
with the container, whereas pushing the lever and
pushing the button did. Following that, Experi-
menter A instructed the child to retrieve a token
Table 1
Experimental Conditions—Experiment 1
Phase 1: Inefﬁcient demonstration Phase 2: Efﬁcient demonstration
Opaque tube
(Hoehl et al., 2014)
Communicative Test Trial 1 Noncommunicative Test Trial 2
Transparent tube Communicative Test Trial 1 Noncommunicative Test Trial 2
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any way he or she liked and then left the room
(Test Trial 1). After the child had successfully
retrieved a token, Experimenter A returned to the
room and helped to exchange the token for the
reward (i.e., stickers). Following that, he or she sat
down at a desk and pretended to write something
down facing away from the scene, not interacting
with anyone in the room. This was done to ensure
that a person familiar to the child was present
when Experimenter B entered the room.
In Phase 2, children observed how Experimenter
B entered the room without contacting the child or
Experimenter A but expressing his or her intention,
“I want stickers and am going to get me a golden
marble now,” implicating that he or she knew
about the way how a marble could be exchanged
for stickers. Next, he or she retrieved a token using
only the efﬁcient strategy (i.e., showing the func-
tional action only, see Figure 1E). Then he or she
exchanged the token for stickers without any help
of Experimenter A (who was still pretending to
write something down) and left the room. Subse-
quently, Experimenter A returned to the child, say-
ing that it was his or her turn again to retrieve a
token any way they liked. Following that, Experi-
menter A left the room, thus leaving the child alone
during testing phase (Test Trial 2). Once the child
had retrieved a token, Experimenter A returned
and helped the child exchanging it for stickers.
Coding and Reliability
The number of nonfunctional actions (see Fig-
ures 1A to 1D) children imitated during the test
phase served as dependent measure. This individ-
ual nonfunctional action score (NFA score) delivers
values from 0 (no imitated target action) to 4 (all tar-
get actions imitated). Children did get a score of 1 for
clapping if they clapped their hands at least once.
The lever pushing action was scored 1, when chil-
dren pushed the lever at least in one direction.
Pushing the lever back and forth (once or several
times) also resulted in a score of 1. Similarly, for
the tapping action to be scored 1, children had to
tap the rod in the palm of their hand at least once
or they had to count loudly from one to three. But-
ton pushing was scored 1 only when children used
the rod, not their ﬁngers. This method of coding
ensured that all of the actions were weighted
equally in the NFA score.
Children’s behavior was coded by one of the
experimenters based on edited video recordings
showing only the child acting on the container in
the absence of the experimenters (so the condition
was not discernible). An additional independent
coder who was blind to condition, phase, and
hypotheses also coded each video. High interrater
reliability (rintraclass = .99) conﬁrmed a very good
level of agreement.
Results
As previously stated, children in Experiment 1
ﬁrst saw a demonstration of the inefﬁcient strategy
performed by a communicative experimenter, fol-
lowed by a demonstration of the efﬁcient strategy
performed by a noncommunicative experimenter.
All children in the transparent tube condition man-
aged to remove a token from the container during
Phase 1 of the experiment. Thus, children’s behav-
ior was not affected by the experience of failure.
The number of children showing each of the four
nonfunctional actions in each condition as well as
the frequencies of NFA scores is presented in
Table 3.
As descriptive analyses gave reason to check the
equal distribution of the number of performed
actions involving physical contact with the testing
container and actions not involving this kind of
mechanical contact, we executed two post hoc Fish-
er’s exact tests. These tests revealed that the chil-
dren performed signiﬁcantly more actions involving
physical contact with the container (Test Trial 1:
p < .0001, Test Trial 2: p < .0001, two-tailed).
Preliminary analyses revealed that children’s sex
had no signiﬁcant impact on imitation rates, so this
variable was not included in further analyses. We
conducted three statistical tests (one analysis of
variance [ANOVA] and two t tests). Level of signif-
icance for these tests was thus adjusted according
to Bonferroni (p = .017).
In a ﬁrst step, NFA scores of the transparent
tube condition were compared with the baseline
condition (see Table 3 and Figure 2 for means and
standard errors). For this purpose, two independent
samples t tests were conducted. In Test Trial 1 as
well as in Test Trial 2, the mean NFA scores were
signiﬁcantly higher than in the baseline condition,
Test Trial 1: t(42) = !4.98, p = .000, d = 1.56; Test
Trial 2: t(40.52) = !3.71, p = .001, d = 0.96.
Although overimitation was slightly reduced from
Test Trial 1 (M = 1.96, SE = .21) to Test Trial 2
(M = 1.43, SE = .21), the NFA score was still signiﬁ-
cantly above baseline level (M = 0.50, SE = 0.13).
Children observing the inefﬁcient solution (includ-
ing nonfunctional actions) achieved signiﬁcantly
higher NFA scores than children in the baseline
condition, even though the apparatus was fully
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transparent and they saw that these actions did not
affect the tokens (Test Trial 1). After having
observed the efﬁcient solution performed by a non-
communicative model during Phase 2, children con-
tinued to perform nonfunctional actions above
baseline frequency in Test Trial 2.
In a second step, we directly compared data
from Hoehl et al. (2014) with the current experi-
ment. These two experiments only differed in the
transparency of the tube containing the reward.
Therefore, we conducted a repeated measures
ANOVA with both experimental conditions with
the between-participants factor transparency (trans-
parent, opaque) and the within-participants factor
test trial (1 or 2). This analysis revealed a signiﬁcant
main effect for the factor test trial, F(1, 54) = 11.95,
p = .001, g2 = .18. Neither the interaction between
test trial and transparency, F(1, 54) = 1.11, p = .29,
g2 = .02, nor the main effect of transparency, F(1,
54) = 0.59, p = .45, g2 = .01, was signiﬁcant. Thus,
children’s overimitative behavior was not inﬂu-
enced by the visibility of the reward.
Discussion
In Experiment 1, 5-year-olds ﬁrst observed an inef-
ﬁcient method for retrieving tokens from a container,
involving several nonfunctional actions. In a second
phase, children observed the efﬁcient method to
retrieve tokens presented by another experimenter.
In contrast to Hoehl et al. (2014), the tube containing
the tokens was transparent, so children saw that non-
functional actions did not causally affect the tokens.
After the ﬁrst demonstration, children imitated non-
functional actions just as they did when the reward
location was opaque. After the following demonstra-
tion of the efﬁcient strategy, the rate of overimitation
decreased slightly, but it was still above baseline
level, that is, children still overimitated.
Theories focusing on children’s causal reasoning
(Lyons et al., 2007, 2011; Whiten et al., 2009) would
have predicted that children overimitate less when
they can see that the reward is unaffected by non-
functional actions (Phase 1) and stop overimitating
when they know that these actions are not neces-
sary, that is, after having observed the efﬁcient
strategy (Phase 2). These predictions do not ﬁt with
our ﬁndings. Social theories would have predicted
that children overimitate even when they can see
that the tokens are unaffected by nonfunctional
actions (Phase 1), and they should continue to do
so despite having seen the efﬁcient strategy per-
formed by a noncommunicative model (Phase 2).
These predictions are more consistent with the
results of Experiment 1.
Gergely, Bekkering, and Kir"aly (2002) have
shown that even 14-month-olds are more likely to
faithfully imitate an unusual action (such as tap-
ping a touch-sensitive light with the head rather
than the hands) if they do not see any rational rea-
son for this action than if they are provided with a
corresponding reason (i.e., hands are occupied).
Figure 2. Mean nonfunctional action scores (NFA scores) of Experiment 1 compared to data from Hoehl et al. (2014).
Note. Error bars indicate standard errors. Asterisks indicate signiﬁcant differences in mean NFA scores. **p < .001. *p < .017 (p values
are Bonferroni corrected).
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Older children as in our experiment may encode
the experimenter’s demonstration of the inefﬁcient
strategy as a demonstration of a social norm rather
than the optimal strategy to attain the reward. Con-
sistent with this interpretation, we found that chil-
dren kept on performing inefﬁcient actions above
baseline level even after watching a noncommu-
nicative second experimenter who demonstrated a
more efﬁcient way to retrieve the reward.
But there are some results that challenge this
interpretation and provide indirect evidence for the
relevance of causal knowledge. Causal and social
explanatory models further differ regarding predic-
tions on which of the irrelevant actions are copied.
Only two of the four demonstrated irrelevant
actions included physical contact with the reward-
containing apparatus. Causal reasoning theories
would predict that children copy mainly actions
not violating the contact principle, that is, the rule
that mechanical interactions cannot occur at a dis-
tance (Lyons et al., 2007). Social accounts, in con-
trast, would predict that all actions are copied with
equal frequency. However, in the present study, the
actions copied most frequently were those including
contact with the testing container (see also Hoehl
et al., 2014; Lyons et al., 2007). This ﬁnding does
not ﬁt with a purely social explanatory model.
In sum, the results of Experiment 1 ﬁt better
with social accounts, but there is still no clear pic-
ture of the motivations underlying the phe-
nomenon. To further deepen our understanding of
the inﬂuence of causal and functional factors on
overimitation, Experiment 2 was conducted. In this
experiment, we enhanced children’s knowledge
about the irrelevancy of demonstrated actions by
changing the demonstration sequence. In addition
to the transparent reward location, children now
observe the efﬁcient strategy ﬁrst, before observing
the inefﬁcient method in a second phase. This pro-
cedure clariﬁes from the very beginning that the
reward can be retrieved with only one functional
action, thus providing evidence that all other
actions must be nonfunctional.
Experiment 2: How Does Prior Functional
Experience Affect Overimitation?
Although causal understanding refers to children’s
knowledge about the speciﬁc mechanism explaining
how the reward can be reached and pulled out of
the tube, functional understanding refers to chil-
dren’s experiences regarding which actions are
required to succeed in getting the reward. In the
literature, we ﬁnd several studies that explicitly
manipulate either demonstrating or experiencing
the functionality of different actions: Pinkham and
Jaswal (2011) found that 18-month-old infants did
not adopt inefﬁcient actions when they had the
chance to discover a more efﬁcient strategy on their
own beforehand. Similar results were reported for
older children by Wood, Kendal, and Flynn (2013):
Five-year-olds who had personal experience with
the test material prior to the demonstration of non-
functional actions showed less overimitation than
children without corresponding experience. These
ﬁndings suggest that children do not overimitate
blindly but rather seem to consider personally
acquired knowledge regarding the efﬁciency of dif-
ferent strategies. Hence, they speak against purely
social explanations of the phenomenon. However,
Nielsen, Moore, and Mohamedally (2012) report that
4-year-old children imitate nonfunctional actions
even when they have the chance to play with the test
material beforehand. These conﬂicting ﬁndings may
be due to the fact that Nielsen et al. (2012) did not
differentiate between self-experience and social
observation in their analysis, even though some chil-
dren opened the test apparatus efﬁciently by them-
selves, and other children only saw it being opened
efﬁciently by their parents, which may have had less
of an impact on children’s later performance.
Further research supports the idea that prior
experience through observation has less impact on
children’s imitation than prior experience through
action. Nielsen and Blank (2011) found that children
imitate nonfunctional actions even after having
observed a more efﬁcient way to reach a reward
(see also Hoehl et al., 2014). In these studies, the
inefﬁcient strategy was always demonstrated ﬁrst
and highlighted by the presence of the inefﬁcient
model during testing phase (Nielsen & Blank, 2011)
or through communication (Hoehl et al., 2014). In
sum, this pattern of results suggests that informa-
tion about efﬁciency acquired through observation
can be surpassed by the presence of an inefﬁcient
experimenter (i.e., through inducing slight social
pressure) or by a communicative demonstration of
an inefﬁcient strategy. Both of these ﬁndings are
more in line with social accounts than causal
accounts of overimitation.
As demonstrated so far, existing evidence is still
inconclusive: Studies manipulating children’s own
experience speak against purely social accounts by
highlighting the impact of children’s functional
insight. In contrast, studies manipulating the efﬁ-
cient actions’ experience only through observation
seem to support social accounts by demonstrating
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that children may overimitate even after having
seen the efﬁcient strategy.
In Experiment 2, we demonstrate the efﬁcient
strategy and let the children interact with the test-
ing container to try out this strategy on their own.
Hence, social observation and self-experience
regarding actions necessary to get the reward are
combined. Subsequently, another experimenter pre-
sents the inefﬁcient strategy before it is the child’s
turn again. Whether the efﬁcient demonstrator is
communicative or not varies between experimental
conditions. In Experiment 2a, both strategies are
demonstrated by a communicative experimenter. In
Experiment 2b, only the inefﬁcient strategy is pre-
sented by a communicative experimenter.
Causal accounts (Lyons et al., 2007, 2011; Whiten
et al., 2009) would predict that children do not imi-
tate nonfunctional actions when they are aware of a
more efﬁcient strategy (i.e., neither in Experiment
2a nor in Experiment 2b). In contrast, social
accounts (Gergely & Csibra, 2006; Kenward, 2012;
Nielsen & Blank, 2011) would predict that children
may also switch from an efﬁcient to an inefﬁcient
strategy if the latter is demonstrated by a socially
engaging partner (Experiments 2a and 2b), espe-
cially if the efﬁcient strategy is presented noncom-
municatively (Experiment 2b).
Experiment 2a: Do Children Overimitate After
Having Observed An Efﬁcient Strategy First?
Method
Participants
The experiment was again conducted in a med-
ium-sized German town with participants recruited
from a middle-class socioeconomic background.
Twenty-eight children (14 males; M = 62.45 months,
SD = 1.78) participated. Data were collected
between May 2014 and November 2014. Recruit-
ment was done in the same way as in Experiment
1. Two further children were excluded from the
ﬁnal sample because of experimenter error (n = 1)
and interference of the parents (n = 1).
Materials and Procedure
Children in this experiment were presented with
the same material as in Experiment 1. The procedure
was also similar to Experiment 1. Children observed
two different experimenters both acting communica-
tively. As a reference group, the baseline condition of
Experiment 1 was used. Experimental conditions of
Experiments 2a and 2b are summarized in Table 2.
Before entering the testing room, both experimenters
welcomed the child. Parents stayed in a separate
room. Sex of children and experimenters was bal-
anced. As in Experiment 1, both experimenters were
of opposite sex. Each session was video recorded.
This time, the child played the warm-up game (i.e.,
blowing a cotton ball into a goal) with both experi-
menters at the same time. As in Experiment 1, the
child always won tokens, which could be exchanged
for stickers. The game was played twice.
Next, the children were introduced to the trans-
parent container. Experimenter A said, “Now we are
going to play another game. This game is about this
special container.” Experimenter B then completed,
“There are some more golden marbles in this con-
tainer. If you can get a marble out, you can exchange
it for stickers.” After introducing the container,
Experimenter B said that he or she had to write some-
thing down and sat down at a nearby desk facing
away from the scene. Then, Experimenter A started
the game (“Okay. Let’s start. It’s my turn ﬁrst.”) and
focused the child’s attention by saying “Watch!” or
“Look!” Experimenter A retrieved a token by using
only the functional action: lifting the ﬂap covering
the opening to the tube and removing a marble by
using the magnetic rod (Figure 1E). Following that,
Experimenter A told the child that he or she could
retrieve a token any way he or she liked and then
left the room together with Experimenter B (Test
Trial 1). As soon as the child was successful (all
children were able to get a token), both experi-
menters returned and Experimenter A helped to
exchange the token for stickers. Following that,
Experimenter A pretended to write something
down and sat down at the desk. Then Experi-
menter B said, “Now it is my turn,” and retrieved
a token by using nonfunctional (Figures 1A to 1D)
actions as well as the functional action (Figure 1E).
After that, the child was instructed to remove a
token however he or she liked. Again, both experi-
menters left the room (Test Trial 2). As soon as
the child had retrieved a token, both experimenters
reentered and Experimenter B helped the child to
exchange the token for stickers.
Results
Coding followed the same rules as in Experiment
1. High interrater reliability (rintraclass = .98) con-
ﬁrmed a very good level of agreement. Because we
conducted a total of seven statistical tests (one
ANOVA, six t tests) using the same sample (Experi-
ments 2a and 2b combined), level of signiﬁcance for
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all tests was adjusted according to Bonferroni
(p < .007).
All children in Experiment 2a extracted a token
from the container following the ﬁrst demonstra-
tion. Thus, experience of failure did not inﬂuence
their behavior. The number of children showing
each of the four nonfunctional actions and the fre-
quencies of NFA scores in each condition is pre-
sented in Table 3. As in Experiment 1, post hoc
tests were performed to test the equal distribution
of actions involving contact with the container and
actions not involving contact with the container.
For Test Trial 1, Fisher’s exact tests revealed no sig-
niﬁcant differences in the frequency of actions
involving contact with the container or not (p = 1,
two-tailed). In Test Trial 2, however, signiﬁcantly
more contact actions were performed (Fisher’s
exact, p = .006, two-tailed).
First, we compared the NFA scores of the both
test trials of Experiment 2a with the baseline
condition (see Table 3 and Figure 3 for means and
standard errors), using two independent samples
t tests. In Test Trial 1 of Experiment 2a, the mean
NFA score was signiﬁcantly lower than that in the
baseline condition, t(17.33) = 3.47, p = .003,
d = 1.33. Children performed less irrelevant actions
when they observed the efﬁcient strategy than chil-
dren in the baseline condition. It should be noted
that 7 of the 16 children in the baseline condition
pushed the lever without having observed some-
body doing so before. This reveals that the lever
seems to be attractive to the children, so that they
exploratively operate it. In Test Trial 1 of Experi-
ment 2a, only one child performed one irrelevant
action (pushing the lever). It seems that a demon-
stration of the efﬁcient strategy decreased explo-
rative behavior. The majority of children did not
only observe but also performed the efﬁcient strat-
egy successfully before they saw the inefﬁcient way
to retrieve a reward. Results of Test Trial 2 provide
information about whether children switched to an
inefﬁcient strategy following a social demonstration
of irrelevant actions. The NFA score in Test Trial 2
did not differ signiﬁcantly from baseline level,
t(42) = 1.12, p = .27, d = 0.34. Five children
performed at least one irrelevant action.
Experiment 2b: Do Children Overimitate
Following a Noncommunicative Demonstration of
the Efﬁcient Strategy?
In Experiment 2a, children did not switch from an efﬁ-
cient to an inefﬁcient strategy, which is consistent with
causal explanatory models of overimitation (Lyons
et al., 2007, 2011; Whiten et al., 2009). Hoehl et al.
(2014) showed that the models’ communicative behav-
ior can affect whether children stick with the ﬁrst strat-
egy they observe or switch to an alternative strategy
demonstrated by a second model. To explore whether
communication plays a role in this experimental set-
ting, Experiment 2b was conducted. The key question
was whether a communicative inefﬁcient demonstra-
tion can elicit overimitation even though children
already acquired causal and functional knowledge
through observation of a different noncommunicative
model demonstrating the efﬁcient strategy.
Regarding the inﬂuence of communication on
imitative behavior, the theory of natural pedagogy
(Gergely & Csibra, 2006) seems of interest. This the-
ory assumes that ostensive signals such as eye con-
tact, calling the learner’s name, and speaking in a
child-directed manner supposedly prepares the lear-
ner to be taught relevant information that can be gen-
eralized. As demonstrated by Hoehl et al. (2014),
ostensive signals can play an important role for
switching from an inefﬁcient to an efﬁcient strategy.
Five-year-olds imitated nonfunctional actions irre-
spective of the demonstrators’ communicative
behavior, but they reduced overimitation more when
being subsequently shown the more efﬁcient way to
achieve the goal by a communicative experimenter
than by a noncommunicative experimenter.
The natural pedagogy account (Gergely & Csi-
bra, 2006) and other social accounts (Kenward,
2012; Nielsen & Blank, 2011) predict that children
switch to overimitation in Test Trial 2 when the
inefﬁcient strategy (but not the efﬁcient strategy) is
demonstrated in a communicative, socially engag-
ing context. In contrast, theories underscoring the
role of causal reasoning (Lyons et al., 2007, 2011;
Whiten et al., 2009) predict that children will not
switch to an inefﬁcient strategy in Test Trial 2 when
they already know the efﬁcient way to retrieve a
Table 2
Experimental Conditions—Experiment 2
Phase 1: Efﬁcient demonstration Phase 2: Inefﬁcient demonstration
Experiment 2a Communicative Test Trial 1 Communicative Test Trial 2
Experiment 2b Noncommunicative Test Trial 1 Communicative Test Trial 2
Causal and Functional Information and Overimitation 11
token. Experiment 2b will clarify which prediction
better ﬁts the empirical data.
Method
Participants
The experiment was conducted in the same town
as the other experiments. Twenty-eight children (14
males; M = 62.94 months, SD = 1.85) participated.
Data were collected between November 2014 and
March 2015. Recruitment was identical to the experi-
ments described above. Two further children were
excluded from the ﬁnal sample because of experimenter
error (n = 1) and interference of the parents (n = 1).
Materials and Procedure
Warm-up game was identical to Experiment 1,
with only one experimenter. The imitation task was
Table 3
Descriptive Information on the Number of Children Who Performed Each of the Four Nonfunctional Actions in Each Experimental Condition
Condition
Frequency of each nonfunctional action per-
formed Frequencies of NFA scores
Clapping
Pushing
lever
Tapping
rod
Pushing
button 0 1 2 3 4
Mean NFA
score (SE)
Baseline (N = 16) 0 7 0 1 8 8 0 0 0 0.50 (0.13)
Experiment 1—transparent tube (N = 28)
Phase 1 (inefﬁcient demonstration) 3 19 11 22 5 2 10 11 0 1.96 (0.21)**
Phase 2 (efﬁcient demonstration) 1 16 7 16 9 3 11 5 0 1.43 (0.21)*
Experiment 2a—efﬁcient demonstration communicative (N = 28)
Phase 1 (efﬁcient demonstration) 0 1 0 0 27 1 0 0 0 0.04 (0.04)*
Phase 2 (inefﬁcient demonstration) 0 4 0 4 23 2 3 0 0 0.29 (0.12)
Experiment 2b—efﬁcient demonstration noncommunicative (N = 28)
Phase 1 (efﬁcient demonstration) 0 1 0 0 27 1 0 0 0 0.04 (0.04)*
Phase 2 (inefﬁcient demonstration) 0 8 0 11 17 3 8 0 0 0.68 (0.17)
Note Asterisks indicate nonfunctional action scores (NFA scores) that are signiﬁcantly greater than those in the baseline condition.
*p < .017 (Experiment 1). *p < .007 (Experiments 2a and 2b). **p < .001 (critical p values are Bonferroni corrected).
Figure 3. Mean nonfunctional action scores (NFA scores) of Experiments 2a and 2b.
Note. Error bars indicate standard errors. Asterisks indicate signiﬁcant differences in mean NFA scores. †p < .05. *p < .007 (critical p val-
ues was adjusted to .007, Bonferroni corrected).
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similar as in Experiment 2a with one variation:
Only Experimenter A interacted with the child (i.e.,
during the warm-up phase and thereafter). The efﬁ-
cient strategy was now demonstrated in a noncom-
municative context by Experimenter B during the
ﬁrst phase, followed by the demonstration of the
inefﬁcient strategy during the second phase.
Experimenter A introduced the children to the
apparatus, but then explained that he or she had to
write something down and sat down at a nearby
table facing away from the child. Next, Experi-
menter B entered the room and expressed his or
her intention to get a sticker. Once Experimenter B
got himself or herself a token by performing the
efﬁcient action only, he or she left the room. Experi-
menter A returned to the child and told him or her
to retrieve a token however he or she liked. During
the test phase, Experimenter A also left the room.
Once the child had succeeded in retrieving a token,
Experimenter A returned and helped him or her to
exchange the token for a sticker. Then the second
demonstration began and Experimenter A said,
“Now we can start playing. It’s my turn ﬁrst.”
After insuring that the children were attentive, he
or she demonstrated the inefﬁcient strategy (Fig-
ures 1A to 1E) as described previously. In the next
step, the child was instructed to retrieve a marble
any way he or she liked and Experimenter A left
the room again until the child succeeded. Then he
or she helped the child to exchange the token for
stickers.
Results
The same coding as in Experiments 1 and 2a was
used. An interrater reliability of rintraclass = 1 con-
ﬁrmed a perfect level of agreement.
As in the previous experiment, all children
retrieved a token in Test Trial 1. As in Experiments
1 and 2a, post hoc tests were performed to tests for
equal distribution of contact versus no contact
actions. As in Experiment 2a, no signiﬁcant differ-
ences in the frequency of actions involving contact
with the container or no contact could be found in
Test Trial 1 (p = 1, two-tailed). In Test Trial 2, how-
ever, signiﬁcantly more contact actions were per-
formed (Fisher’s exact, p < .0001, two-tailed).
For further analyses level of signiﬁcance was
Bonferroni adjusted as explained in Experiment 2a
(p < .007). Imitation scores for both test trials were
compared with the baseline condition (i.e., data
from Experiment 1) using two independent samples
t test. Results revealed nearly the same pattern as
in Experiment 2a. In Test Trial 1 of Experiment 2b,
the mean NFA score was signiﬁcantly lower than
that in the baseline condition, t(17.33) = 3.47,
p = .003, d = 1.33. The NFA score in Test Trial 2
was at baseline level, t(41.99) = !0.83, p = .41,
d = 0.23. Thus, children did not switch to the com-
municatively demonstrated inefﬁcient strategy.
Integrated Analysis (Experiments 2a and 2b Combined)
We included Experiments 2a and 2b in one over-
all analysis to directly compare performance across
conditions. A repeated measures ANOVA with the
between-participants factor communicativeness of
the efﬁcient demonstration (communicative, non-
communicative) and the within-participants factor
test trial (1 or 2) revealed a signiﬁcant main effect
for test trial, F(1, 54) = 20.31, p < .0001, g2 = .27,
indicating more nonfunctional actions in Test Trial
2 compared to Test Trial 1. The interaction between
test trial and the factor communicativeness of the
efﬁcient demonstration was marginally signiﬁcant,
F(1, 54) = 3.93, p = .052, g2 = .07. To further explore
the nature of this marginal interaction, we exam-
ined whether children’s NFA score changed
between Test Trial 1 and Test Trial 2 in Experi-
ments 2a and 2b, respectively, using dependent
samples t tests. For Experiment 2a, we found a
marginal but nonsigniﬁcant difference in children’s
NFA score between Test Trial 1 and Test Trial 2, t
(27) = !2.26, p = .032, d = 0.52 (critical p values
were adjusted to .007, Bonferroni corrected). Only
ﬁve of the 28 children performed at least one non-
functional action in Test Trial 2. In Experiment 2b,
we found a signiﬁcant difference of children’s NFA
score between Test Trial 1 and Test Trial 2, t
(27) = !3.91, p = .001, d = 0.98. Eleven of 28 chil-
dren performed at least one nonfunctional action in
Test Trial 2.
Discussion of Experiments 2a and 2b
In Experiments 2a and 2b, 5-year-olds ﬁrst saw
an efﬁcient method to retrieve tokens from a con-
tainer. Afterward the children could extract a
reward on their own, thus acquiring functional
experience with the efﬁcient strategy. In a second
phase, a different experimenter showed them an
inefﬁcient strategy, including nonfunctional actions.
Following that, the children were again encouraged
to retrieve a token on their own. In Experiment 2a,
both experimenters acted equally communicatively
with the child. In Experiment 2b, only Experimenter
B, who demonstrated the inefﬁcient method, was
communicative. Following the demonstration,
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children were again encouraged to retrieve a token
on their own.
Accounts focusing on causal reasoning and the
role of functional knowledge would predict that
children should stick with the efﬁcient strategy.
Assuming that communicativeness emphasizes the
social relevance of the demonstration, the natural
pedagogy account would expect children to switch
to the inefﬁcient strategy, especially when it is the
only strategy presented in a communicative context
(Experiment 2b). However, in Experiment 2a, as
well as in Experiment 2b, children’s performance of
nonfunctional actions did not rise above baseline
level following the demonstration of the inefﬁcient
strategy. Therefore, these ﬁndings seem to support
theories highlighting the role of causal and func-
tional knowledge. It should be noted that only ﬁve
of the 28 children participating in Experiment 2a
showed at least one nonfunctional action in Test
Trial 2, whereas in Experiment 2b, 11 of the 28 chil-
dren showed a corresponding response. Although
the mean NFA score still did not exceed the base-
line level, children showed signiﬁcantly more non-
functional actions in Test Trial 2 than in Test Trial
1. Why do some children adopt an inefﬁcient
method when they already know an easier and fas-
ter way to retrieve a reward? The communicative
context seems to affect children’s imitation behav-
ior. Because the inefﬁcient model was communica-
tive in both conditions, we conclude that the ﬁrst
and efﬁcient model had a slightly reduced impact
on children’s behavior when he or she was non-
communicative. Children who adopted the inefﬁ-
cient strategy may have felt a greater need to
afﬁliate with the communicative experimenter than
the other children in Experiment 2b, whereas chil-
dren with a high need for afﬁliation may have
experienced a conﬂict in Experiment 2a, resulting in
some of them adopting the inefﬁcient strategy
(n = 5) and some of them sticking with the ﬁrst and
efﬁcient strategy. In Experiment 2b, only the chil-
dren and the inefﬁcient experimenter communi-
cated with each other, whereas the efﬁcient
experimenter was not part of this interaction. There-
fore, children may have interpreted the communica-
tive experimenter’s behavior as an introduction of
new rules relevant only for this minimal group.
Furthermore, personality variables or temperament
characteristics such as extraversion or novelty seek-
ing may inﬂuence children’s imitation behavior. By
focusing on group processes and also individual
differences, future research could shed some more
light on children’s motivation to switch to a more
inefﬁcient strategy.
We expected that social motivation would lead
to an equal distribution of all kinds of demon-
strated actions (actions with and without contact
with the container). Intriguingly however, this is
not what we observed. None of the children in
Experiments 2a and 2b completed the two actions
least likely to have a causal effect (clapping and
tapping the rod). Because children knew about the
irrelevancy of these actions, causal reasoning alone
does not serve as a convincing explanation for this
ﬁnding. What could be the reason for children
copying only contact actions if they do it for social
reasons? On the one hand, it is possible that chil-
dren have internalized the contact principle to such
an extent that it determines their actions—even
though the goal of these actions is not a causal
effect but rather a social bond between child and
experimenter. In this view, social goals and learning
goals should not be seen as one or the other alter-
natives but might be integrated by the children.
Consequently, some children adopt nonfunctional
actions in order to afﬁliate but only those that could
potentially have an effect at all. It is also possible
that through the execution of the efﬁcient action
children’s attention is focused on the box, which
leads to more precise encoding of the contact
actions during demonstration. Since 7 of the 16 chil-
dren in the baseline condition operated the lever on
the top of the box, it might also be that the features
of the apparatus used for the irrelevant actions
were really attractive to the children, thus bearing a
greater affordance than the no contact actions.
General Discussion
In two experiments, we manipulated children’s
knowledge about the causal mechanism and the
functionality of demonstrated actions. In Experi-
ment 1 we increased the transparency of the con-
tainer (more precisely the tube containing the
reward) to ensure that children could see that the
reward remained unaffected by demonstrated non-
functional actions. As revealed by a comparison
between previous ﬁndings (Hoehl et al., 2014) and
Experiment 1, causal transparency did not affect
children’s overimitative behavior. Participants per-
formed nonfunctional actions although they could
clearly see the reward and they continued doing so
even after watching a noncommunicative model
demonstrating the efﬁcient strategy. These results
contradict causal explanatory models stating that
children should stop overimitating as soon as they
know which actions are irrelevant (Lyons et al.,
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2007, 2011). Rather, Experiment 1 seems to support
social accounts suggesting that 5-year-olds are
likely to imitate nonfunctional actions presented by
a social-communicative experimenter and keep on
doing so even after having observed the efﬁcient
strategy to reach the goal. By replicating previous
ﬁndings of Hoehl et al. (2014) with an independent
sample and in a condition with increased causal
transparency, our data conﬁrm the relevance of
social factors for explaining the phenomenon of
overimitation.
However, results of Experiments 2a and 2b point
to a different conclusion. In these experiments, we
demonstrated the efﬁcient strategy ﬁrst, thus
increasing children’s functional knowledge about
the demonstrated actions. In both conditions all
children except one each used the efﬁcient strategy
following a corresponding demonstration and their
imitation rate following the subsequent inefﬁcient
demonstration did not exceed the rate observed in
the baseline group. These results point to the rele-
vance of accounts highlighting the role of causal
and functional knowledge, stating that children do
not overimitate when they have already understood
the causal mechanism and have already experi-
enced the demonstrated actions to be nonfunctional.
Social theories would have predicted an increase in
overimitation due to the enhanced obviousness of
the nonfunctionality of ineffective actions, which
was not found. Furthermore, children predomi-
nantly imitated actions performed on the container
underscoring the role of causal and functional plau-
sibility for explaining children’s overimitation.
How can this apparent contradiction be
explained? Over and Carpenter (2012) suggested
that children’s tendency to copy observed actions
depends on their goals in the speciﬁc experimental
situation. These goals could either be learning goals
(i.e., how to retrieve the token most efﬁciently),
social goals (i.e., how to establish a good relation-
ship with the experimenter), or a combination of
both. Although some experimental situations create
a context focusing the children on “how to reach a
goal,” thus emphasizing social factors, others may
highlight the goal itself, thus highlighting the rele-
vance of causal and functional information. In the
study by Nielsen and Blank (2011), 4- to 5-year-old
children imitated nonfunctional actions only if the
adult who demonstrated these irrelevant actions
was present to witness their behavior. The experi-
menter’s presence in the room may have exerted
social pressure on the children to imitate his or her
actions, thus highlighting social goals. In the study
by Wood et al. (2013), children did not overimitate
when they had personally found a more efﬁcient
strategy beforehand. Children may have focused on
the reward and how to receive it most efﬁciently,
triggering a strong learning goal. Consequently, no
overimitation occurred.
The account by Over and Carpenter (2012) ﬁts
well with our current ﬁndings. In the present study,
when children observed and carried out the efﬁ-
cient strategy in a fully transparent condition before
they observed a communicative demonstration of
the inefﬁcient method, only a few children switched
to the inefﬁcient solution. Seeing the efﬁcient strat-
egy ﬁrst may lead children to focus on the func-
tional value of the demonstrated action instead,
thus reducing the social goal and enhancing a
learning goal. As a consequence, children show less
overimitation following the second demonstration
even if this demonstration is performed by a com-
municative experimenter (Experiment 2). This also
ﬁts with the ﬁnding that children interpret behavior
instrumentally if the underlying physical causality
is potentially knowable (e.g., Kapit"any & Nielsen,
2015; Legare et al., 2015; Wilks et al., 2016).
However, some children in Experiments 2a and
2b adopted the inefﬁcient strategy anyway follow-
ing the demonstration of a communicative experi-
menter. Maybe these children have a greater need
for social recognition and are more likely to priori-
tize social goals rather than learning goals in
general.
In contrast, when the inefﬁcient strategy was
demonstrated ﬁrst, the majority of children faith-
fully imitated the nonfunctional actions even after
observing the efﬁcient action in a second trial. Cau-
sal transparency of the testing object could make it
very obvious to children that there is no functional
reason to perform these actions. When seeing the
inefﬁcient strategy ﬁrst, including clearly nonfunc-
tional actions, they might ﬁgure that these actions
do not have a causal but rather a social purpose,
namely to teach the child a social norm. This could
enhance the relevance of social goals (in addition to
a potentially weaker learning goal to retrieve the
reward), thus leading to overimitation following
the ﬁrst demonstration of the inefﬁcient strategy. If
goal choice remains stable, children still overimitate
after seeing the noncommunicative demonstration
of the efﬁcient strategy in the second phase. This is
consistent with recent ﬁndings revealing that chil-
dren interpret actions as social or conventional if
they are unable to understand physical causal pro-
cesses underlying the demonstrated actions (e.g.,
Kapit"any & Nielsen, 2015; Legare et al., 2015; Wilks
et al., 2016). In the present case, children can see
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the causal mechanism, but this may make them
wonder why the experimenter demonstrates non-
functional actions. Thus, the order of demonstrated
action strategies matters.
However, it should be noted that children do not
always simply stick with the ﬁrst strategy they
have observed. In a previous study, with a very
similar task by Hoehl et al. (2014), children did
switch from an inefﬁcient strategy to the efﬁcient
action when the latter was presented communica-
tively. Nonetheless, the sequence of both types of
demonstration may affect how children evaluate
the speciﬁc situation.
The current study suggests that both social
motives and causal understanding should be taken
into account for explaining overimitation in 5-year-
olds. As demonstrated, children’s social motivation
to comply with a communicative experimenter, as
well as the task’s causal transparency (e.g., trans-
parent reward location) and the children’s func-
tional experience (e.g., demonstrating the efﬁcient
strategy ﬁrst), had an impact on their choice to
either imitate nonfunctional actions or to copy
observed actions selectively. The sequence in which
efﬁcient and inefﬁcient strategies are introduced
may be critical to determine whether children prior-
itize social goals (i.e., to afﬁliate with the experi-
menter, thus showing overimitation) or learning
goals (i.e., to get the reward in the most efﬁcient
way).
This ﬁnding has important implications for the
design of studies exploring the phenomenon of
overimitation, and it raises interesting questions for
future research. It is important to mention that in
this study design children who observed the efﬁ-
cient strategy ﬁrst did not just see that strategy, but
most of them (except two children) experienced it
themselves by applying the efﬁcient strategy before
they saw the inefﬁcient demonstration. It should be
investigated further if only observing the efﬁcient
before the inefﬁcient strategy leads to a similar
effect. Moreover, it seems crucial to investigate the
role of social factors other than communication on
overimitation. Would children switch from an efﬁ-
cient to an inefﬁcient strategy if social pressure was
enhanced by the presence of the inefﬁcient model
during testing phase? How do other social factors
such as group membership affect the imitation of
nonfunctional actions? Furthermore, future research
may focus on individual differences such as person-
ality characteristics that may explain differences in
children’s imitative behavior.
The tendency for humans to overimitate seems
to be extremely powerful. However, the tendency
to copy irrelevant actions blindly can be overcome
when children learn and carry out a more efﬁcient
strategy beforehand.
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Abstract 
This study investigates influences of group membership on overimitation, focusing on an 
artificially formed minimal group and the pre-existing group gender. Influences of these 
groups on (i) eliciting overimitation after an inefficient demonstration and on (ii) maintaining 
overimitation after an efficient demonstration are studied. In three conditions, 5-to-6-year-old 
preschoolers (N = 28 per condition) observed a model belonging to an artificial in-group 
using an inefficient strategy including irrelevant actions to retrieve a reward (Phase 1) and 
subsequently an out-group model using only the relevant action. These three conditions varied 
in the emphasis of artificial group membership. In a fourth condition, the inefficient strategy 
was presented by an out-group model (Phase 1) and the efficient strategy by an in-group 
model. Sex of the models was counterbalanced in order to also investigate gender-group 
influences. Results revealed that even though children’s overimitation was influenced by the 
group formation process, artificial group membership itself did not affect their tendency to 
overimitate. Whether the children observed either strategy by an artificial in-group or out-
group model did not make a difference. However, gender groups had an effect on children’s 
overimitation. Children overimitated more if the irrelevant actions were demonstrated by a 
female model. This effect was mainly driven by girls not overimitating male models, whereas 
boys overimitate male and female models equally.   
 
 
 
Keywords: overimitation, preschoolers, group membership, gender, social cognition
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Imitation is a powerful learning strategy. Children quickly acquire novel actions by observing 
and copying others. Their propensity to imitate is so strong that they even reproduce actions 
with no apparent causal function. This phenomenon is referred to as “overimitation“ 
(McGuigan & Whiten, 2009; Nielsen & Tomaselli, 2010). It emerges in children from the age 
of three onwards and seems to consolidate in the transition to adulthood (Flynn & Smith, 
2012; McGuigan, Makinson, & Whiten, 2011). High-fidelity imitation, which results in 
overimitation as soon as irrelevant actions are included, is proposed to serve a crucial function 
in the transmission of human culture (Nielsen & Tomaselli, 2010). It seems to be an adaptive 
strategy enabling much faster social learning of instrumental skills than would be possible if 
copying required a full causal understanding of an event. Furthermore, overimitation enables 
social learning of conventional knowledge and rituals (Legare, 2017). The transmission of 
rituals and norms is higher within groups than between groups (Zucker, 1977). If 
overimitation is one of the driving mechanisms in the transmission of cultural knowledge, 
including social norms and rituals (Kenward, 2012; Keupp, Behne, & Rakoczy, 2013; Legare, 
2017), it should be sensitive to group membership.  Testing this hypothesis is the purpose of 
this study.  
How does group membership affect whose actions we copy? The tendency to copy 
faithfully and the meaning of group membership for children develop in parallel. Both 
increase significantly between three and five years of age (McGuigan, Whiten, Flynn, & 
Horner, 2007; Richter, Over, & Dunham, 2016). One strategy to become an accepted member 
of a group is to behave in similar ways like other group members. Similarity in behavior 
fosters group membership, facilitates group cohesion, and serves the within-group 
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transmission of culturally relevant knowledge, resulting in a decrease of intra-group 
differences and an increase of inter-group differences consequently supporting the distinction 
of in-group from out-group members (e.g. Haun & Tomasello, 2011; Henrich, 2009; Wilks, 
Collier-Baker, & Nielsen, 2015).  
Various preferences for in-group members, so called in-group biases, have been 
reported in early development. For example, it was shown that children prefer people showing 
loyal behavior to their group (Misch, Over, & Carpenter, 2014). Children were even willing to 
pay costs to behave loyally to their group themselves: Children were significantly less likely 
to reveal a secret of in-group members than one of out-group members, even if offered a 
reward for doing so (Misch, Over, & Carpenter, 2016). Another study has shown that children 
are more generous to in-group members than to out-group members (Buttelmann & Böhm, 
2014). Many studies manipulated group membership through language, comparing children’s 
behavior towards people speaking their native language vs. people speaking a foreign 
language. For example, 6-month-old children looked longer at people who talk in their native 
language and 10-month-olds showed object and information preferences for objects presented 
by someone speaking their own language (Kinzler, Corriveau, & Harris, 2011; Kinzler, 
Dupoux, & Spelke, 2007). Another study found that children are more likely to generalize 
object functions to objects following a demonstration from a linguistic in-group member 
(Oláh, Elekes, Pető, Peres, & Király, 2016). As counterpart to the in-group bias, humans try to 
contrast their behavior to that of an out-group, which is called out-group derogation. For 
instance, it was found that adults change object-preferences to demonstrate distance to out-
group (Izuma & Adolphs, 2013) and that children attribute negative characteristics to out-
group members (Aboud, 2003; Buttelmann & Böhm, 2014).  
Such in-group biases and out-group derogations also influence children’s choice of 
whom they imitate. Three-year-olds (Howard, Henderson, Carrazza, & Woodward, 2015) and 
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even 14-month olds (Buttelmann, Zmyj, Daum, & Carpenter, 2013) are more likely to imitate 
actions of linguistic in-group members than out-group members. It has been interpreted that 
they ignore behavior modeled by out-group members presumably because it is less relevant to 
them (Howard et al., 2015). In addition, it has been reported that children (Oostenbroek & 
Over, 2015) as well as adults (Ruys, Spears, Gordijn, & Vries, 2007) try to distance 
themselves from an artificially formed out-group by behaving differently. However, there are 
also contradicting findings showing that 4-year-olds do not necessarily imitate a racial in-
group model more often than an out-group model  (Krieger, Möller, Zmyj, & Aschersleben, 
2016). 
Besides focusing on who we like to imitate, some studies investigate how we perceive 
people that imitate us. For example, it has been shown that children trust people who imitated 
them more (Over, Carpenter, Spears, & Gattis, 2013). It seems that we imitate to be liked and 
to be trusted and that we like and trust those who imitate us. Imitation of actions bearing no 
causal function, i.e. overimitation, may thus be a prime example of a behavioral strategy to 
strengthen group cohesion and at the same time to distance oneself from out-group members. 
Therefore, we hypothesized that children would be particularly prone to imitating non-
functional actions from in-group members. 
As far we know, one study has investigated influences of group membership on 
overimitation (Gruber, Deschenaux, Frick, & Clément, 2017). In that study, different colored 
t-shirts were used to form artificial groups. They found that children show in-group 
preferences in their imitation of meaningless actions. However, this was only the case if the 
in-group models created a common link by behaving congruent to the child in a prior task. To 
expand the investigations of group membership and overimitation we would like to compare 
influences of different type of groups and how they might change if they are in conflict with 
children’s pursuit for efficiency.  
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In about ten years of research on overimitation, the phenomenon has typically been 
investigated using a paradigm where participants first see how a model retrieves a reward 
from a puzzle box using a combination of nonfunctional (e.g., tapping on the surface of the 
box) and functional actions (e.g., opening a lid to retrieve a reward). After observing the 
model, children (McGuigan & Whiten, 2009; Nielsen & Tomaselli, 2009) as well as adults 
(Flynn & Smith, 2012; McGuigan et al., 2011) tend to copy both functional actions as well as 
nonfunctional actions. Crucially, nonfunctional actions are not performed when participants 
operate the container without prior demonstration (e.g., Hoehl, Zettersten, Schleihauf, Grätz, 
& Pauen, 2014; Lyons, Damrosch, Lin, Macris, & Keil, 2011; Lyons et al., 2007).  
By now several explanatory models for overimitation have been discussed. Lyons et 
al. (Lyons, Damrosch, Lin, Macris, & Keil, 2011) argued that children automatically encode 
observed actions as causally relevant and, therefore, reproduce them (automatic causal 
encoding hypothesis). Others have argued that social norm learning and/or the desire to 
affiliate with the experimenter underlie the phenomenon of overimitation (Kenward, 
Karlsson, & Persson, 2011; Keupp et al., 2013; Nielsen & Blank, 2011). Others have 
combined these theories and suggested that children’s tendency to copy observed actions 
depends on their goals in specific situations (Over & Carpenter, 2012). These goals could 
either be learning goals (i.e., learning about the function of an apparatus), social goals (i.e., 
establishing a good relationship with somebody), or a combination of both (i.e. following 
rules of a game). If children have learning goals, they tend to behave more efficiently; if 
overimitation occurs anyway they might have encoded observed actions as causally relevant. 
If children have social goals, they are poised to imitate actions, even when they are not goal-
directed. Hence, activating social goals should enhance children’s overimitation. Within 
groups, members are motivated to strengthen the social bond between each other. Therefore, 
belonging to the same group as the model might activate children’s social goals and make 
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them sensitive for culturally relevant knowledge, such as rituals and norms.  
In this article we distinguish between two types of groups: (1) enduring "societal 
groups", such as groups based on gender, language, race, or nationality (Dunham, Baron, & 
Carey, 2011; Tajfel & Turner, 1986), and (2) temporary "artificial groups", such as teams in a 
competition with members of the same team wearing identical jerseys. The present study 
addresses both types of groups. More specifically, we focus on gender and team membership 
as examples. 
Gender is a highly relevant societal group. The idea that gender role development is 
depended on children's tendencies to imitate same-sex models more than opposite-sex models 
became central to many theories of sex typing in the 1960s-1980s. This idea was referred to 
as same-sex imitation (Bussey & Perry, 1982b; Fryrear & Thelen, 1969; Perloff, 1982; e.g. D. 
G. Perry & Bussey, 1979; Raskin & Israel, 1981). It was found that children attend more to a 
same-sex model, and that this effect is even increasing as children develop an understanding 
of gender constancy (Slaby & Frey, 1975), with boys showing a stronger tendency in this 
direction than girls do: Whereas girls oriented their behavior towards that of female and male 
models, boys oriented their behavior towards male models (for 3- to 5-year-olds: (Bussey & 
Bandura, 1984); for 8- to 9-year-olds: (D. G. Perry & Bussey, 1979). Furthermore, it was 
found, that boys tend to reject opposite-sex behavior more than girls do (Bussey & Perry, 
1982a). Later, only little research was devoted to the topic of same-sex imitation, although 
some studies investigated effects of maternal vs. paternal modeling on children’s expression 
of fearfulness or pain (Boerner, Chambers, McGrath, LoLordo, & Uher, 2017; Fillingim, 
Edwards, & Powell, 2000).  
In a very recent study gender effects on overimitation were found, whereby boys 
copied more irrelevant actions than girls (Frick, Clément, & Gruber, 2017). However, only 
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effects of child’s sex and not the model’s sex were investigated. Another study reported that 
children rather endorse information coming from gender in-group members (Terrier, Bernard, 
Mercier, & Clément, 2016). Conversely, in adults, women have been observed to copy more 
precisely and more rapidly irrelevant tool actions performed by a male model (McGuigan, 
Gladstone, & Cook, 2012). Since rigidity of gender roles has changed tremendously during 
the last decades (Lindsey, 2016), new research on gender effects on social learning and social 
interactions is indispensable. In the current research, we therefore explore whether children’s 
overimitation is affected by the sex of the model, and in particular, the match between the 
child’s and the model’s sex. Based on the early work on same-sex imitation, a higher degree 
of overimitation can be expected when children observe a same-sex model, especially for 
boys. However, societal changes in favor of more flexible gender roles might mitigate the 
effect compared to findings from the 1970s. 
To understand group dynamics and cultural transmission not only pre-existing cultural 
and societal groups are studied; a growing body of research also focuses on artificial groups. 
Purely arbitrary categorical groups created in the laboratory (i.e. for the purpose of the study) 
are often called "minimal groups". A minimal group is established through mechanisms such 
as preferences in abstract paintings, supposed performance in estimation tasks (Tajfel, Billig, 
Bundy, & Flament, 1971) or through drawing a colored token from a box (e.g. Dunham et al., 
2011). In the original definition of an ideal minimal group, there is “neither a conflict of 
interests nor previously existing hostility between the groups. No social interaction takes 
place between the subjects, nor is there any rational link between economic self-interest and 
the strategy of in-group favoritism. Thus, these groups are purely cognitive […]” (Tajfel & 
Turner, 1986). Experiments on minimal groups have reliably shown that such an ad hoc 
intergroup categorization is sufficient to lead to in-group favoritism and out-group 
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discrimination (e.g. Dunham et al., 2011; Spielman, 2000), already in children from three to 
four years of age (Richter et al., 2016).  
In this study, we explore how sex-group membership and/or different degrees of 
commitment to an artificial group influence children’s tendency to overimitate. Theories 
suggesting a strong role of social motives for overimitation would predict increased 
overimitation of in-group members compared to out-group members for both kinds of groups. 
However, group identification can differ for artificially formed and pre-existing groups and 
might therefore influence overimitation differently. In particular, a stronger in-group bias 
might be expected for the pre-existing group of gender. 
For artificially formed groups, we manipulated group membership in three conditions, 
whereby group formation was emphasized gradually. In the first condition, we formed groups 
by simply asking group members to wear t-shirts of the same color (Condition 1: minimal 
group). In the second condition, we added group labels and the experimenters expressed joy 
about being in a certain team (Condition 2: medium group). In the third and fourth condition, 
we further announced that both teams were competing (Condition 3 & 4: maximum group). 
To assess the effects of gender-group membership, we used one male and one female model 
for each child. This allowed us to also explore the effects of gender-group membership, 
orthogonally to our artificial group manipulation.  Since group membership is known to play 
a special role in the transmission of culturally relevant knowledge, we hypothesize that a high 
social motivation to belong to a given group should increase the likelihood to imitate 
inefficient behaviors from in-group members, but decrease the likelihood to imitate the same 
type of behavior from out-group members. In short, we assume that overimitation rates vary 
with the degree of commitment to a given group.  
To test our hypotheses, we referred to a previously introduced experimental paradigm 
(Hoehl et al., 2014), presenting one model showing an inefficient strategy to achieve a given 
Group membership and overimitation  
 
10 
goal, including nonfunctional actions to extract a reward from a puzzle box (Phase 1) and the 
other model demonstrating the most efficient strategy in the same task context, leaving out all 
unnecessary actions (Phase 2). In this situation, children experience a conflict between their 
motivation to imitate the model and their motivation to achieve a given goal in the most 
efficient way. Following each demonstration, the child was left alone to retrieve a reward. 
Hoehl et al. (2014) found that children overimitated in Phase 1, but switched to the efficient 
strategy in Phase 2, when both models were communicative and addressed the child directly. 
In the present case, both models were equally communicative, but one model belonged to the 
in-group, the other to the out-group.  
Artificial group-formation took part prior to the overimitation task and varied between 
conditions (minimum (Condition 1), medium (Condition 2), maximum (Condition 3 & 4) 
emphasis on group membership as described above). Gender as a societal group was varied 
by having one male and one female model in each phase (counterbalancing which model was 
demonstrating during Phase 1 and 2). Based on the above-reviewed findings, we expected 
overimitation rates following a demonstration of the inefficient strategy to be higher when the 
demonstration was provided by an artificial/ gender in-group member compared to an out-
group member (Phase 1). Further, we expect that children continue to overimitate after an 
efficient demonstration (Phase 2) if this is presented by an out-group member. This way 
children would match their behavior to the in-group and contrast it to the out-group. When the 
inefficient strategy was performed by an out-group member (Phase 1) and the efficient 
strategy by an in-group member, we expected that children would contrast their behavior to 
that of the out-group and consequently rarely overimitate in Phase 1 and match their behavior 
with the in-group and therefore switch to the efficient strategy in Phase 2. 
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Method 
Conditions 
Four experimental conditions were tested. In three of these conditions the inefficient 
strategy (Phase 1) was demonstrated by an artificial in-group model and the efficient strategy 
was demonstrated by an out-group model (Phase 2). These conditions only varied with respect 
to how strongly we emphasized the relevance of artificial group-membership (minimal, 
medium, maximum). In the fourth condition, the inefficient strategy (Phase 1) was 
demonstrated by an out-group model and the efficient strategy was demonstrated by an in-
group model (Phase 2). This allowed us to compare the impact of in- vs. out-group 
membership directly for Phase 1, using a between-subject comparison. The group formation 
process in that condition was the one where group membership was emphasized the most and 
was found to be most effective in the former conditions (maximum emphasis of group-
membership including mentioning a competition between groups).  
 
Participants 
The study was conducted in two medium-sized German university towns. One-
hundred-and-forty-six 5-year-old preschoolers were included in the analyses (74 females, 72 
males; M = 64,98 months, SD = 3.90). We conducted a power analysis to ensure that the 
probability of correctly rejecting a false null hypothesis was adequate (power = .80). Five-
year-olds were tested because overimitation is a robust phenomenon at this age (McGuigan et 
al., 2007) and both an in-group bias and out-group derogation have been reported for this age 
group (e.g. Howard et al., 2015; Oostenbroek & Over, 2015). For comparison, we used a 
baseline condition (n=16) from Schleihauf, Graetz, Pauen and Hoehl (2017), but recruited 12 
more children (total: n = 28) to align group sizes across conditions and to allow for parametric 
data analyses. One-hundred-and-thirty-eight children were recruited from an existing pool of 
families who previously expressed their interest in participating in developmental research. 
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Parents first received an invitation letter and were later called by phone to receive more 
information about the purpose and procedure of the study. Most children came to our lab for 
testing (accompanied by their parents), but 14 were also tested in a separate room of a daycare 
center. The majority of participants were Caucasian from middle-class socioeconomic 
backgrounds. An additional nine children were excluded from the final sample because of 
experimenter error (n = 4), children’s failure to extract a token in Phase 1 (n=2) or 
unwillingness to participate (n = 2), or participation in a topic-related study in another lab two 
weeks before testing (n=1). All participants received a small gift and certificate for 
participation. 
Materials 
A clear Plexiglas®-box was used. The transparent material revealed the irrelevance of 
certain actions performed during the modeling phase of the experiment (see Figure 1). A 
transparent tube was located within the box. This tube contained tokens, i.e. golden marbles 
with small magnets attached to them. The tokens could be removed by inserting a magnetic 
rod into the opening of the tube at the front of the box. A black lever was attached to the top 
of the box and a button, which could be pushed using the rod, was attached on the right side. 
The lever and the button had no functions and were obviously not connected to the tube 
containing the marbles. Further, we used two cardboard boxes to exchange the tokens for the 
stickers. One was golden and had a little hole in it’s lit, through which the tokens could be 
inserted. The other box was heart-shaped and contained the stickers.  
For group formation two black plastic boxes were used. One contained blue and red 
child-sized shirts, the other one contained blue and red grown-up-sized shirts. Both boxes 
were covered with black fabric. Through a narrow slit in the fabric, which you couldn’t see 
through, the shirts could be drawn out of the boxes. Therefore, it appeared to be coincidental 
whether the children drew a blue or a red shirt. 
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Procedure 
Children assigned to the baseline condition interacted with one experimenter who 
never showed them how to operate the box. Children assigned to any of the experimental 
conditions interacted with two experimenters (one male one female), both serving as models 
in the study. Before entering the testing room, the experimenter(s) welcomed the child and 
explained that they were going to play some games together. For children tested in the lab 
parents were asked to wait in a separate room during the session. For children tested in the 
daycare center, children were accompanied to the testing room by a kindergarten teacher and 
told that the teacher was waiting for them to come back.  If children refused to stay alone with 
the experimenters, the parents or kindergarten teachers were asked to sit in the corner of the 
testing room (out-of-sight of the child) and to avoid communicating with the child (n = 12).  
Before the study was conducted a randomization-scheme was generated, which 
determined if the female or male experimenter acted as the in-group or out-group model (for 
the artificially formed groups). Gender of children and experimenters was almost equally 
balanced across all conditions. For approximately half of the children the in-group 
experimenter was of the same sex, for the other half of the opposite sex. However, for five 
children (all in Condition 4: maximum group (ineff-out-group)) the assignment of the gender 
for in-and out-group experimenters went wrong. Therefore, we added four more children in 
that condition to achieve approximate counterbalancing.  
Each session was recorded on video. Experimental conditions are summarized in 
Table 1. 
Warm-up phase. Each condition started with a warm-up phase. Children played a 
competitive game (i.e., blowing a cotton ball into a goal) with the experimenter(s). This way, 
children were introduced to the concept that the tokens (i.e., golden marbles) could be 
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exchanged for rewards (i.e., stickers). The game was played only once in the baseline 
condition, but twice in experimental conditions involving two experimenters, to ensure that 
the child had some interaction with each adult involved.  
Baseline condition. Data for this condition partly originate from Schleihauf et al. 
(2017). To establish the baseline production of the irrelevant actions, children were prompted 
to attempt to remove a token without prior instruction or demonstration. The experimenter 
told the child that he/she could retrieve a token however he/she wanted. Following this 
instruction, the experimenter left the room and reentered after (a) the child successfully had 
retrieved one token, (b) the child had stopped interacting with the box for at least 30 s, or (c) 
80 s had elapsed. 
Artificial Group formation in the experimental conditions. Before the start of the 
first demonstration phase, children in the four experimental conditions participated in a 
group-formation process. Group formations were all based on minimal group manipulations 
as described above. In the following, to distinguish stage of group emphasis, we named out 
conditions minimal, medium and maximum condition. Please note, that all these conditions 
are variations of classical minimal group manipulations. 
  There were two possibilities of in-group vs. out-group membership of the inefficient 
and efficient experimenters: (a) The inefficient model became an in-group member and the 
efficient model became an out-group member. That allocation was used with the Condition 1 
(minimal group), Condition 2 (medium group) and Condition 3 (maximum group (ineff-in-
group). (b) The inefficient model became an out-group member and the efficient model 
became an in-group member. That allocation was only used with Condition 4 (maximum 
group (ineff-out-group) condition. 
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In Condition 1: minimal group, group formation was based on the definition of 
minimal groups by Dunham et al. (2011), stating that the dimension of classification upon 
which intergroup categorization rests must be value-neutral. This implies that there should be 
no between group competition or unequal status between groups, and no opportunity for 
differential interaction with in-groups or out-groups, which could indirectly lead to 
preference. To comply with that definition, the child and the experimenters in our studies both 
drew blue and red colored shirts out of black plastic boxes. No group-labels were used, no 
information about the groups’ importance or status was given, no emotions about group-
membership were expressed and no competition between the groups was announced.  To 
ensure equal interaction of both experimenters, the in-group-experimenter announced: 
“Before we play the next game, each one of us have to draw a t-shirt out of these boxes and 
put it on. There are red and blue shirts and you cannot swap the drawn color.”  Then the other 
experimenter explained: “In this box (pointing at box A) are smaller shirts for children and in 
this box (pointing at box B) are the bigger shirts for the grown-ups. You can go first.” First 
the child, and then each experimenter drew a shirt. Both experimenters accepted the drawn 
color neutrally. No further comments regarding group formation were made.  
In Condition 2: medium group, we applied findings by (Bigler, Jones, & Lobliner, 
1997; Bigler, Spears Brown, & Markell, 2001) reporting that in older children intergroup 
biases were only present when the groups were explicitly labeled. Therefore, we added group 
labels to the procedure described above. Hence, the in-group-experimenter announced: 
“Before we play the next game, we are going to form teams. Therefore, all of us have to draw 
a t-shirt out of these boxes and put them on. If you draw a red shirt, you are a member of team 
red. If you draw a blue shirt, you are a member of team blue. You cannot swap the drawn 
color”. Then the out-group experimenter said: “In this box (A) are the smaller shirts for 
children and in box (B), are the bigger shirts for adults. You can go first and find out if you 
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are in the blue or in the red team.” To further enhance the emotional involvement with the 
group (affective commitment) the in-group model expressed joy and satisfaction about the 
color of their own shirt and engaged the child into celebrating joint group membership by 
saying: “Yeah, we are in the same team together. We are team blue/red! We are team 
blue/red!”. The out-group-model also reacted positively: “Yeah, I am in team blue/red! I am 
team blue/red! I am team blue/red!”. 
In Condition 3 and 4: both maximum group conditions (ineff-in-group / ineff-out-
group), group formation was based on the study by Spielman (2000). He found that 6-year-
olds needed a background scenario in which groups were described as preparing to engage in 
competition in order to show any group-bias. In the present condition, we thus kept all 
elements from the medium group condition but added another element at the end. The out-
group model said: “And later we play again the cotton-blowing game. But this time we play 
team red against team blue.” Then the in-group model encouraged the child: “Yes! That 
means the two of us as team red/blue play against [Name of the out-group model] in team 
red/blue.”  
Please note, that all three group-formation types (Condition 1: minimal, Condition 2: 
medium, Condition 3: maximum) were realized with the inefficient strategy being presented 
by the in-group model. In addition, the maximum group formation was also realized with the 
out-group member demonstrating the inefficient strategy (Phase 1) and the in-group member 
demonstrating the efficient strategy (Phase 2). Therefore, we distinguish the maximum group 
conditions by adding ‘ineff- in-group’ (Condition 3) or ‘ineff-out-group’ (Condition 4).  
Overimitation task. Following the group-formation phase, all children in the 
experimental conditions took part in two phases of the overimitation task to be described next. 
Irrespective of group membership, the first demonstration was always performed by the 
inefficient model (Phase 1) and the second demonstration by the efficient model (Phase 2). 
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In Phase 1, the child was introduced to the transparent box by the inefficient model, 
who started the overimitation task in the following way: “Now we are going to play another 
game. This game is about a special box. There are some more golden marbles in this 
container. If you can get a marble out, you can exchange it for stickers.” After introducing the 
container, the efficient model said that he or she had to write something down and sat down at 
a nearby standing desk facing away from the scene. Then, the inefficient model started the 
game (“Okay, let’s start. It’s my turn first”). If the child was not paying attention, the model 
said “Look!” to ensure that the child saw what happened. Then, he/she retrieved a token by 
using a sequence of causally irrelevant actions (Fig. 1A–D) and a causally relevant action 
(Fig. 1E): First, the model clapped his or her hands (Fig. 1A), then pushed the lever attached 
to the top of the container back and forth once (Fig. 1B), then tapped the rod on the palm of 
his or her hand three times while simultaneously counting out loud to “three” (Fig. 1C), then 
pushed the button attached to the side of the container with the rod (Fig. 1D), and finally 
lifted the flap covering the opening to the tube and removed a marble by using the magnetic 
rod (Fig. 1E). Only the last step was causally relevant for attaining the goal. The irrelevant 
actions varied systematically regarding their relation to the container and the rod; clapping 
involved no direct contact with either of the instruments, pushing the lever involved contact 
only with the container, tapping involved contact only with the rod, and pushing the button 
involved contact with both the box and the rod. Therefore, two of the irrelevant actions 
involved physical contact with the testing box (contact-actions) and the other two irrelevant 
actions did not involve this kind of mechanical contact (no-contact-actions). No model 
exchanged tokens for stickers. Following the demonstration, the model told the participant 
that he or she could now retrieve a token on their own however they wanted. Following this 
instruction, both models left the room. After the child had successfully retrieved a token, both 
returned to the room and the inefficient model offered to exchange the token for the reward 
(i.e., stickers).  
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In Phase 2, the inefficient model sat down at the nearby desk and pretended to write 
something down, thereby turning his or her back to the scene and not communicating 
anymore. Meanwhile, the efficient model continued the game by announcing, “Now it is my 
turn.” Then, the efficient model retrieved a token using only the causally relevant action (Fig. 
1E) and subsequently instructed the participant to remove a token however he or she liked, 
then both models left the room again, reentering the room as soon as the child had retrieved a 
token and the efficient model helped the child to exchange it for stickers.  
Coding and Reliability 
An Overimitation-Score (OI-Score) was calculated for each participant by totaling the 
number of irrelevant actions performed. A score of 0 was allocated to participants who 
performed no irrelevant actions, with a score of 4 being given for reproduction of all the 
irrelevant components. Children did get a score of 1 for clapping if they clapped their hands at 
least once. The lever-pushing action was scored 1, when children pushed the lever at least in 
one direction. Pushing the lever back and forth (once or several times) also resulted in a score 
of 1. Similarly, for the tapping action to be scored 1 children had to tap the rod in the palm of 
their hand at least once or they had to count loudly from one to three. Button-pushing was 
scored 1 only when children used the rod, not their fingers. The order in which the irrelevant 
actions were performed was not taken into consideration in the scoring.  
Children’s behavior was coded by one of the experimenters based on edited video- 
recordings showing only the child acting on the container in the absence of the experimenters 
(so the condition was not discernible). An additional independent coder who was blind to 
condition, phase and hypotheses also coded each video. High interrater-reliability (rintra-class= 
.98) confirmed an excellent level of agreement between the two ratings. 
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Ethical statement  
We received ethical clearance from the local ethics committee. Furthermore, we received full 
informed consent from parents.  
 
Results 
 
All children included in the analyses of the experimental conditions managed to 
remove a token from the box during Phase 1 of the experiment. Thus, children’s behavior was 
not affected by the experience of failure. We first report results on the effect of our artificial 
group manipulation before turning to the effects of gender groups. 
First step of the analyses: Artificial group manipulations 
Eight t-tests for independent samples were used to compare each test trial of both 
phases in all four experimental conditions with the baseline condition. To avoid inflating the 
Type I error rate, a Holm-Bonferroni correction was applied for all t-tests. The adjusted 
critical alpha level for eight tests was .025. Then we performed two repeated measures 
ANOVAs. First, we compared all condition with an inefficient in-group and an efficient out-
group demonstration (minimal (1), medium (2) and maximum (ineff-in-group) (3)), to see if 
the rising emphasis of group membership had an effect. Second, we compared both conditions 
with maximum group emphasis in which the group membership of efficient and inefficient 
model was reversed (Condition 3: maximum (ineff- in-group) & Condition 4: maximum (ineff-
out-group)). 
The number of children showing each of the four non-functional actions in each 
condition as well as the frequencies of OI-Scores are presented in Table 2. These descriptive 
analyses show that actions involving physical contact with the puzzle box are performed more 
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frequently than actions not involving this kind of mechanical contact. 
Conditions 1-3: In-group model demonstrating the inefficient strategy during 
Phase 1 and out-group model demonstrating the efficient strategy during Phase 2. OI-
Scores of the artificial groups were compared with the baseline condition (see Table 2 and 
Fig. 2 for means and standard errors) to test if performance of irrelevant actions exceeds 
exploration behavior. 
Condition 1: Minimal group. When group membership was just manipulated by the 
drawing of t-shirts, children overimitated the inefficient in-group model in Phase 1, t (54) = -
6.01, p < .001, d = 1.604, but their OI-Score dropped to baseline level in Phase 2, t (41.06) = -
1.55, p = .129, d = .411. Thus, children switched to a more efficient strategy when the 
efficient strategy was presented by an out-group model. 
Condition 2: Medium group. If group membership was emphasized through group 
labels and expressions of joy, children overimitated in Phase 1, t (54) = -7.65, p < .001, d = 
2.035. The OI-Score in Phase 2 dropped, but was still significantly different from baseline 
level, thus children continued overimitating when the out-group member demonstrated the 
efficient strategy, t (41.577) = -3.01, p = .004, d = .803. 
Condition 3: Maximum group (ineff-in-group). If group membership was expressed 
by wearing a specific t-shirt, emphasized through verbal group labels, and made even more 
salient by emotion expressions and announcing a competition, the mean OI-Score in Phase 1 
was significantly higher than that in the baseline condition, thus children overimitated, t (54) 
= -7.38, p < .001, d = 1.967. The OI-Score in Phase 2 dropped, but was still significantly 
different from baseline level, thus children continued to overimitate, t (43.64) = -3.64, p = 
.001, d = .968. 
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Condition 4: Out-group model demonstrating the inefficient strategy during 
Phase 1 and in-group model demonstrating the efficient strategy during Phase 2 
(maximum group (ineff-out-group)). This condition was mainly included to check to what 
extend overimitation in Phase 1 following an inefficient demonstration, was affected by in-
group or out-group-membership of the model.  Interestingly, results revealed as similar 
pattern as before: When the inefficient strategy was demonstrated by the out-group member, 
the mean OI-Score for Phase 1 was significantly higher than that for the baseline condition. 
Thus, children overimitated even if the inefficient strategy was presented by an out-group 
model, Phase 1: t (60) = -9.63, p < .001, d = 2.445. When the efficient strategy was then 
presented by an in-group model, the OI-Score in Phase 2 dropped, but was still significantly 
different from baseline level, thus children continued to overimitate. Thus, children did not 
match their behavior to that of their in-group, Phase 2: t (52.87) = -3.12, p = .003, d = .748. 
ANOVA including Conditions 1 - 3: In-group model demonstrating the inefficient 
strategy during Phase 1 and out-group model demonstrating the efficient strategy 
during Phase 2. After performing the contrasts reported above, we ran a repeated measure 
ANOVA with all three experimental in which the in-group model demonstrated the inefficient 
strategy. We included the between-participants factor Condition (Condition 1: minimal, 
Condition 2: medium, Condition 3: maximum (ineff-in-group)) and the within-participants 
factor Phase (1 or 2). This analysis revealed a significant main effect for the factor Phase, F(1, 
81) = 46.85, p < .001, η2= .366. However, neither the interaction between Phase and 
Condition, F(1, 81) = 0.034, p = .966, η2 = .001, nor the main effect of Condition was 
significant, F(1, 114) = 1.77, p = .177, η2 = .042. Thus, conditions did not differ from each 
other. 
ANOVA to compare both conditions with maximum group emphasis (Condition 
3: Maximum group (ineff-in-group) & Condition 4: Maximum group (ineff-out-group)). 
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To test the effects of the group manipulation directly, we compared both maximum group 
conditions only differing in reversed group membership of the inefficient and efficient model. 
We ran a repeated measure ANOVA with the between-participants factor Condition 
(Condition 3: maximum (ineff-in-group), Condition 4: maximum (ineff-out-group)) and the 
within-participants factor Phase (1 or 2). This analysis revealed a significant main effect for 
the factor Phase, F(1, 60) = 38.54, p < .001, η2= .391. However, neither the interaction 
between Phase and Condition, F(1, 60) = 0.084, p = .773, η2 = .001, nor the main effect of 
Condition was significant, F(1, 60) = .218, p = .642, η2 = .004. Thus, the two maximum 
conditions did not differ from each other. 
Discussion of the first step of analyses 
First, we examined the three conditions in which the inefficient strategy was presented 
by the in-group model and the efficient strategy was presented by the out-group model 
(minimum, medium and maximum (ineff-in-group) conditions). According to comparisons 
with the baseline, group manipulations seemed to have an effect: As soon as group labels and 
the expression of joy about being in a team were included (medium group and maximum 
group conditions) children continued to perform irrelevant actions above baseline-level even 
after having just observed the most efficient way of getting a reward. The competition 
announcement (maximum group condition) did not seem to strengthen the effect additionally. 
In the medium and maximum group conditions children’s overimitation slightly decreased 
after the efficient demonstration of the out-group member, but it was still significantly above 
baseline-level. Looking at these results we were tempted to conclude that, if only emphasized 
enough, membership in an artificially formed group does indeed influence children’s 
maintenance of overimitation. However, looking at the comparison involving the two 
maximum group conditions (ineff-in-group, ineff-out-group) changed that picture. 
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Strikingly, the pattern of results in the Condition 3: maximum (ineff-in-group) looked 
highly similar to that in Condition 4: maximum (ineff-out-group). Switching group 
membership of the models did not affect children’s tendency to overimitate at all, as 
supported by ANOVA results comparing both conditions directly. Apparently, it did not 
matter whether an out-group or an in-group model demonstrated the different strategies. This 
finding contradicts our initial conclusion.  
Second step of analyses: Gender-groups 
As stated in the introduction, we also explored whether membership to the pre-existing 
groups of gender affected children’s tendency to overimitate. Since we counterbalanced 
gender of children and experimenters, we were able to test gender influences of both factors. 
As our previous analyses demonstrated no substantial effects of artificial group formation on 
results, we omitted the factor Condition from further analyses and collapsed all artificial 
group formation conditions in order to increase number of observations per cell as well as 
statistical power. 
Four gender group conditions were created based on the match/ mismatch between 
child and inefficient and efficient models. As for artificial group effects, eight t-tests for 
independent samples were used to compare each test trial of both phases in all four gender 
group conditions with the baseline condition. Again, a Holm-Bonferroni correction was 
applied for all t-tests, resulting in a critical alpha level was .025. Then we performed three 
repeated measures ANOVAs. First, we checked influences of child’s and model’s gender over 
all experimental conditions. Second, due to the results of the first ANOVA we performed two 
ANOVAs to check for the influences of model’s gender for boys and girls separately.  
Comparison with the baseline condition. OI-Scores for gender groups were 
compared with the baseline condition (see Table 3 and Fig. 3 for means and standard errors) 
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to test if the level of irrelevant action imitation exceeds exploration behavior.  
 
Inefficient model and child female. If the inefficient model and child were female, 
girls overimitated in Phase 1, t (54) = -8.79, p < .001, d = 2.34, and maintained overimitating 
after the efficient demonstration of the male model, Phase 2: t (39.67) = -3.63, p = .001, d = 
.96. 
Inefficient model and child male. If the inefficient model and child were male, boys 
overimitated in Phase 1, t (52) = -7.81, p < .001, d = 2.11, and maintained overimitating after 
the efficient demonstration of the female model, Phase 2: t (39.89) = -3.55, p = .001, d = .98. 
Inefficient model female and child male. If the inefficient model was female and the 
child was male, boys overimitated in Phase 1, t (58) = -9.31, p < .001, d = 2.41, and 
maintained overimitating after the efficient demonstration of the male model, Phase 2: t 
(51.07) = -3.57, p < .001, d = .90. 
Inefficient model male and child female. If the inefficient model was male and the 
child was female, girls overimitated in Phase 1, t (58) = -5.52, p < .001, d = 1.43. However, 
after the efficient demonstration by the female model their OI-Score dropped to baseline 
level, Phase 2: t (51.94) = -.77, p = .430, d = .20. 
 
ANOVAs for differences of gender groups. We conducted a repeated measures 
ANOVA with the between-participants factors Inefficient Model’s Gender (male/female) and 
Child’s Gender (male/female) and the within-participants factor Phase (1 or 2). This analysis 
confirmed the significant main effect for the factor Phase, F(1, 114) = 66.382, p < .001, η2= 
.368, with more irrelevant actions being performed in Phase 1 compared to Phase 2. Phase did 
not interact significantly with gender of child or inefficient model. However, we found 
significant main effects for the gender of the inefficient experimenter, F(1, 114) = 6.629, p = 
.011, η2 = .055; as well as for gender of the child, F(1, 114) = 4.127, p = .045, η2 = .035, as 
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well as a significant interaction effect for gender of child and model, F(1, 114) = 4.374, p = 
.039, η2 = .037. Thus, the gender-group membership of the model and the child both 
influenced children’s overimitation and revealed substantial interactions.  
Descriptive statistics (see Figure 4 and Table 4) revealed that boys in general had 
slightly higher OI-Scores than girls, and that children copied more irrelevant actions if they 
were presented by a female experimenter (see Figure 5 and Table 4). Descriptive statistics 
gave reason to suspect that this effect was mainly driven by girls (see Figure 3). To resolve 
the significant interaction between gender of child and model we performed two separate 
repeated measures ANOVAs, one for boys and one for girls, with the within-participant factor 
Phase (1 or 2) and the between-participants factor Inefficient Model’s Gender (male/female).  
Boys were found to overimitate male and female models equally, F(1, 56) = 325.84, p = .733, 
η2 = .002, whereas girls overimitated less when the inefficient strategy was demonstrated by a 
male model, F(1, 58) = 10.86, p = .002, η2 = .158. 
 
Discussion 
Culture is characterized by many different group-typical behavior patterns that are 
transmitted through social learning and instruction. Since overimitation is discussed to be one 
of the mechanisms allowing for cultural transmission (Nielsen & Tomaselli, 2010), we 
hypothesized this phenomenon to be sensitive to group membership of model and child. The 
current study was designed to disentangle the influence of different types of group 
membership on children’s overimitation. More specifically, we tested the influence of 
artificially formed groups and the pre-existing group gender.  
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Effects of artificial group membership on overimitation 
For the artificially formed groups we manipulated group membership with three 
different group formation processes. In the minimal group condition t-shirts were drawn for 
group formation, but no further comments were made. That did not affect children’s 
overimitation. As in the study by Hoehl et al. (2014), in which no groups were formed, 
children overimitated after the demonstration of the inefficient strategy and stopped 
overimitating after the demonstration of the efficient strategy.   
We had expected that children would continue to overimitate after an efficient 
demonstration (Phase 2) presented by an out-group member. These expected effects of 
artificial group formation could only be found for the medium and maximum group (ineff-in-
group) conditions. This finding fits with results of a study on group commitment showing 
that affective commitment is reliably correlated with displays of in-group favoritism 
(Ellemers, Kortekaas, & Ouwerkerk, 1999). When the emotional component was included, 
and children first observed an in-group experimenter performing the inefficient strategy, they 
overimitated and they continued doing so even after having observed an out-group model 
performing the efficient strategy. This differed from previous studies with two communicative 
experimenters but no group-formation process before the start of the demonstration (see 
Hoehl et al. 2014). The fact that overimitation was maintained even after the efficient strategy 
had been observed speaks against automatic causal encoding as a mechanism underlying 
overimitation in the present case. If children imitated irrelevant actions simply because they 
automatically encode observed actions as causally relevant (Lyons et al., 2011; Lyons, 
Young, & Keil, 2007), then they should have reduced their overimitation to baseline level 
following the efficient demonstration. In contrast, explanatory models highlighting the social 
motivations underlying overimitation would have predicted that children match their behavior 
to that of the in-group and contrast it to that of the out-group. Our findings partly support this 
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assumption: We found a corresponding pattern for Condition 2 (medium group) and 
Condition 3 (maximum group (ineff-in-group)). However, we observed the exact same pattern 
when the out-group experimenter performed the inefficient strategy and the in-group 
experimenter performed the efficient strategy in the maximum-group condition. Contrary to 
our expectations, children overimitated equally whether an in- or and out-group model 
demonstrated the inefficient strategy during Phase 1 and they did not switch to the efficient 
strategy even when this strategy was demonstrated by the in-group model during Phase 2. 
Therefore, we concluded that the actual membership of the inefficient model to the child’s 
group or to the out-group did not influence the child’s tendency to copy one over the other. 
We propose that the preceding group formation process, not the actual group 
membership, influenced children’s tendency to maintain overimitating. In the medium and in 
the maximum group conditions (ineff-in-group as well as ineff-out-group) the team formation 
process included wearing shirts of a certain color, using verbal group labels and the 
expression of positive emotions and excitement about joint group membership. This process 
is likely to induce a high motivation, pro-social playful atmosphere and a game-like context. 
In previous studies with adults it was found that only participants in a positive mood mimic 
the confederate’s behavior (van Baaren, Fockenberg, & Holland, 2006) and that pro-social 
priming produced a larger automatic imitation (Leighton, Bird, & Heyes, 2009). It is possible 
that our group-formation process (especially in the medium and maximum group condition) 
created a positive atmosphere and encouraged the children to maintain overimitating even 
after having seen the efficient strategy. Further, it is conceivable that the game-like context 
made children more sensitive for normative and ritualistic behavior.  
Overall, our manipulation of artificial group membership induced only minor effects 
on overimitation rates. Apparently, children did overimitate and kept on doing so in three out 
of four conditions (these three conditions had the usage of verbal group labels and the 
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expression of positive emotions in common) even after the efficient strategy has been 
demonstrated, but their overimitation rate did not vary depending on the in- or out-group 
model showing the inefficient or efficient strategy. Potential reasons related to the general 
framing of the task and the formation of group-membership will be discussed below, before 
we take a closer look at the effects of societal group membership.  
Situational framing of the task. Legare & Herrmann (2013) proposed that cultural 
learning in humans involves a “ritual stance” (i.e., trying to find a rationale for actions based 
on social convention) and an “instrumental stance” (i.e., trying to find a rationale for actions 
based on physical causation). The difference between rituals and instrumental practices 
cannot be directly inferred from behavior but is rather a matter of interpretation. “A ritual 
stance is based on the attribution that an action sequence lacks a physical causal goal and can 
be triggered by a number of cues, such as start- and end- state equivalence and normative 
language” (Legare, Wen, Herrmann, & Whitehouse, 2015). Since our overimitation task 
includes one relevant action in the end (retrieval of a reward), it is not clear whether the task 
is perceived as more instrumental or ritual. If children did interpret it as being more 
instrumental, this may explain why their performance was less sensitive to group-formation 
processes than hypothesized. Given that children participating in another study using the same 
irrelevant actions (Hoehl e al., 2014) continued to perform these actions after having observed 
a more efficient method, we doubt that participants in the present study perceived the 
demonstrated actions as purely instrumental. It was further shown that when instructions are 
instrumentally framed like stating: “I will show you one way to get the toy out”, overimitation 
rates are significantly lower than when instructions are conventionally framed by instructions 
like: "I will show you how to get the toy out” (Keupp, Bancken, Schillmöller, Rakoczy, & 
Behne, 2016). The instructions we used in the current study (“Now it is your turn. You can 
get a marble however you like.”) were neutral with respect to their ritual or instrumental 
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nature. In the development of culture, rituals can be seen as irrelevant or inefficient actions 
that are consistent over time. Hence, actions perceived as rituals might be more influenced by 
group membership than actions perceived to be instrumental. Future studies may vary this 
aspect experimentally to clarify the impact of situational framing and group membership with 
respect to overimitation in young children.   
Manipulation of artificial group membership. Our manipulation of group 
membership was an attempt to create a highly simplified simulation of group structures 
influencing human cultural transmission. When relating our laboratory setting to group 
processes in the field, limitations of our group manipulation become evident that deserve 
further exploration to improve future studies: First, it is conceivable that one person alone is 
not recognized as an out-group member. According to Tafjel’s (1982) definition of groups, 
two or more individuals need to define themselves as a group. Even small-scale human 
societies, that develop their own rituals and culture, are usually groups of hundreds to a few 
thousand. Therefore, it is possible that the groups formed in our experiment were simply too 
small to elicit an effect relevant for cultural transmission. Therefore, in future studies, it might 
be interesting to include more individuals in each group to test the relevance of group-
formation on overimitation. Second, our models were adults. According to the self-other-
control account (Sowden, 2014; Teufel, Fletcher, & Davis, 2010) it is assumed that perceived 
similarity between agents mediates the effect of group-membership on imitation. Especially 
for artificially formed groups, it might be more common for children to form such groups 
with peers than with adults. Testing whether peer-group-membership influences overimitation 
could provide important information about the role of overimitation in spreading ritual-like 
behavior within a generation rather than across generations. Third, in all three manipulations 
of artificial groups children as well as adults were randomly assigned to a given group. 
(Ellemers et al., 1999) established that, compared to an assigned group affiliation, people tend 
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to feel more committed to self-selected (or achieved) group memberships. Future research 
could investigate if self-selected group membership has a greater impact on overimitation 
than randomly assigned group membership.  It might be that membership to self-selected 
groups, assigned groups or pre-existing groups affects cultural transmission differently. 
Factors like duration of group membership and sense of belonging might also play a role.  
Overimitation in the context of societal groups 
To address the impact of enduring societal groups, we analyzed the effects of gender 
of the model and match between the child's and the model's gender on overimitation.  
“Real” (pre-existing) group categorizations are supposed to be more salient than 
artificial, laboratory-created categorizations (see Mullen et al., 1992). Furthermore, in-group 
identification tends to be higher in pre-existing groups (Ellemers et al., 1999).  According to 
the social identity theory, the extent to which people identify with a particular social group 
determines their tendency to behave similarly to in-group members (Ellemers et al., 1999). 
Hence, it is most likely that children identify themselves more with the pre-existing group 
gender than with an artificial group. Kindergartners put special emphasis on gender 
membership and often have strong feelings about being a girl or boy, respectively. In nursery 
school four-year-old children spend three times as much time playing with same-sex children 
as they do with cross-sex children. At six years of age the ratio of same-sex to opposite-sex 
play increases to 11:1 (see also La Freniere, Strayer, & Gauthier, 1984; Maccoby & Jacklin, 
1987). To test the relevance of gender group-membership on overimitation performance, we 
used models of different sex and counterbalanced the children’s and experimenter’s sex. We 
did not find the expected same-sex group effect. However, a systematic comparison of 
imitation scores for different gender combinations for child’s and inefficient experimenter’s 
gender revealed interesting findings: 
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First, we found that if irrelevant actions are demonstrated by women children are more 
likely to copy them. In Germany, most younger children are being taken care of and educated 
by females before they enter school. For example, the percentage of male kindergarten 
teachers reached a peak in 2017 with only 5.2% (Statistisches Budesamt, 2017).  In the US 
percentage of male kindergarten teachers is beneath 2.5 % (U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics, 
2016).  Therefore, boys and girls are more used to being introduced to cultural rituals and 
instrumental tools by women than by men. This may lead children of both sexes to put more 
faith in female models - especially in new situations and interactions with unfamiliar 
experimenters. 
Second, we found that overimitation rates were significantly higher for boys than for 
girls. The latter result was in line with the recent findings by Frick et al. (2017), who 
explained these finding with sex differences found in humans for tool use. Boys use more 
tools when solving a problem than girls (Gredlein & Bjorklund, 2005). Frick and colleagues 
argue that this might lead to higher attention to objects in boys than in girls thus increasing 
the likelihood to engage in actions involving these objects. If we look at our baseline 
condition, we find a slightly higher mean number of performed irrelevant actions in boys (M 
= .71, SE = .16) than in girls (M = .50, SD = .17), supporting the idea that boys felt more 
intrigued to manipulate the tools in our task than girls, which may also have led to a higher 
motivation to imitate (and overimitate) a given model.  
To fully understand these effects, one needs to also consider the significant interaction 
between gender of child and inefficient model. When looking at boys and girls separately, we 
found that boys overimitated at equal rates regardless of whether the irrelevant actions were 
demonstrated by a male or a female model. However, girls copied irrelevant actions much less 
if demonstrated by a male model. The fact that only girls show a preference for same-sex 
models does not fit with same-sex preferences reported in the earlier literature from the 
1960s-1980s, usually reporting an effect in the opposite direction: Whereas girls oriented their 
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behavior towards that of female and male models, boys oriented their behavior rather towards 
male models (Bussey & Bandura, 1984; D. G. Perry & Bussey, 1979). Previous learning 
experiences with predominantly female caregivers at home and in kindergarten combined 
with changes in the rigidity of societal gender roles might play a role in this change of results. 
The current findings have important implications for imitation research in general, because it 
highlights the necessity to carefully consider gender of model and child when designing 
studies in this field. More research is needed to investigate in more detail the effects of 
primary caregiver’s and caretaker’s gender on imitation in boys and girls. Furthermore, it 
should be investigated if other pre-existing groups have a similar effect on the transmission of 
functionally irrelevant behavior.  
Taken together, overimitation behavior of 5-year-olds was stronger influenced by 
gender group membership than by artificial group membership. We propose that the 
commitment to the pre-existing own-gender group is higher than to the artificial group, the 
latter being completely new and arbitrary. If children are confronted with the conflict between 
imitating their in-group member and achieving a given goal in the most efficient way, they 
tend to overimitate their in-group members only if their commitment to the group is quite 
strong. Group membership and group commitment or group identification is not the same 
(Gruber et al., 2017). Therefore, it might be conductive to include assessing group 
commitment/identification in further studies. 
To conclude, we found that membership to an artificially formed group did not affect 
children’s overimitation of in-group vs. out-group members. However, enthusiastic group 
formation before the overimitation task increased children’s tendency to continue to perform 
irrelevant actions even after observing a more efficient solution. We assume that the playful 
context and the emotional involvement of children might explain this effect. In contrast to 
artificial group membership, societal group-membership of the model and the child did affect 
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children’s overimitation. More specifically, boys overimitated more frequently than girls and 
female inefficient models induced more overimitation than male models. In addition, boys 
tended to overimitate female and male models equally often whereas girls copied irrelevant 
actions less often when performed by male models than female models. Our findings point to 
strong effects of both children’s and the model’s gender as well as the interaction between the 
two on children’s overimitation, which should be taken into account, e.g. through counter-
balancing, in future research on overimitation. Given recent changes in the rigidity of societal 
gender roles and the disparity between our current findings and reports on same-sex imitation 
from the 1960s-1980s we strongly suggest a renewed research effort into the effects of gender 
on imitation.
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Tables and Figures 
Table 1 
Experimental Conditions.  
 Group  formation  
Phase 1:  
Inefficient 
demonstration 
 
Phase 2:  
Efficient 
demonstration 
 
Inefficient demonstration – in-group   /   Efficient demonstration – out-group 
Condition 1: 
Minimal 
group  
• drawing colored shirts 
• not further commented 
In-group 
model 
Test  
trial 1 
Out-group 
model 
Test  
trial 2 
Condition 2: 
Medium 
group  
• drawing colored shirts 
• group labels used 
• models expressing joy about team 
membership 
In-group 
model 
Test  
trial 1 
Out-group 
model 
Test  
trial 2 
Condition 3: 
Maximum 
group  
• drawing colored shirts 
• group labels used 
• models expressing joy about team 
membership 
• announcement of competition between 
teams 
In-group 
model 
Test  
trial 1 
Out-group 
model 
Test  
trial 2 
Inefficient demonstration – out-group   /   Efficient demonstration – in-group 
Condition 4: 
Maximum 
group  
• drawing colored shirts 
• group labels used 
• models expressing joy about team 
membership 
• announcement of competition between 
teams 
Out-group 
model 
Test  
trial 1 
In-group 
model 
Test  
trial 2 
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Table 2 
Descriptive information for artificially formed groups: number of children who copied each 
of the four irrelevant actions, mean Overimitation Score and standard error in each 
condition. 
 
 
Note. Asterisks indicate OI-Scores that are significantly greater than those in the baseline 
condition. * p < .011, ** p < .001 (critical ⍺ is Holm-Bonferroni-corrected, ⍺’=.025). 
 Frequency of each non-functional action 
performed   
Frequencies of OI-Scores 
Condition Clapping Pushing 
lever 
Tapping 
rod 
Pushing 
button 0 1 2 3 4 
Mean OI- 
Score (SE) 
Baseline (N=28) 0 14 0 3 13 13 2 0 0 0.61 (0.12) 
Inefficient/In-Group – Efficient/Out-Group 
Condition 1: Minimal group (N=28) 
      
Test-trial  1  5 19 8 22 3 4 14 6 1 1.93 (0.19)** 
Test-trial  2  2 12 2 12 15 2 7 4 0 1.00 (0.22) 
Condition 2: Medium group (without competition) (N=28) 
Test-trial  1 6 20 12 27 0 7 10 9 2 2.21 (0.17)** 
Test-trial  2 2 13 5 17 9 6 7 6 0 1.36 (0.22)* 
Condition 3: Maximum group (with competition) (N=28)      
Test-trial  1  8 24 9 24 2 2 13 7 4 2.32 (0.20)** 
Test-trial  2  3 17 4 17 6 8 10 3 1 1.46 (0.20)* 
Inefficient/Out-Group – Efficient/In-Group        
Condition 4:  Maximum group (with competition) (N=34) 
Test-trial  1  5 26 15 32 0 5 15 14 0 2.26 (0.12)** 
Test-trial  2  2 16 7 19 11 8 8 7 0 1.32 (0.20)* 
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Table 3 
Descriptive information for gender groups: number of children who reenacted each of the 
four irrelevant actions, mean Overimitation Score and standard error in each condition. 
 
 
Note. Asterisks indicate OI-Scores that are significantly greater than those in the baseline 
condition. * p < .011, ** p < .001 (critical ⍺ is Holm-Bonferroni-corrected, ⍺’=.025). 
 Frequency of each non-functional action 
performed   
Frequencies of OI-Scores 
Condition Clapping Pushing 
lever 
Tapping 
rod 
Pushing 
button 0 1 2 3 4 
Mean OI- 
Score (SE) 
Baseline (N=28) 0 14 0 3 13 13 2 0 0 0.61 (0.12) 
Inefficient model and child female (N=28)       
Test-trial  1  6 21 12 26 0 4 13 9 2 2.32 (0.55)** 
Test-trial  2  4 13 7 20 8 5 7 7 1 1.57 (0.24)* 
Inefficient model and child male (N=26) 
Test-trial  1 7 21 8 23 1 3 12 8 2 2.27 (0.18)** 
Test-trial  2 4 17 1 16 0 1 2 3 0 1.46 (0.21)* 
Inefficient model female and child male (N=32)      
Test-trial  1  7 19 18 28 1 2 13 13 3 2.47 (0.16)** 
Test-trial  2  1 18 7 18 0 1 2 3 0 1.41 (0.19)* 
Inefficient model male and child female (N=28)        
Test-trial  1  4 14 6 3 3 9 14 6 0 1.72 (0.16)** 
Test-trial  2  0 10 3 11 0 1 2 3 0 0.78 (0.18) 
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Table 4 
Mean Overimitation Score and standard error across conditions, separated for child’s and 
model’s gender. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 Mean OI- 
Score (SE) 
 Phase 1 Phase 2 
Girls 2.00 (0.12) 1.15 (0.16) 
Boys 2.38 (0.12) 1.43 (0.14) 
   
Inefficient model female 2.40 (0.11) 1.48 (0.15) 
Inefficient model male 1.97 (.12) 1.09 (.14) 
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Figure 1. The container and actions performed by the experimenters. Tokens were placed in 
the transparent tube within the transparent container. The inefficient demonstration consisted 
of four non-functional actions (A-D) and one functional action (E). The efficient 
demonstration only consisted of the functional action (E). 
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Figure 2. Mean Overimitation Score (OI-Scores) for the artificially formed groups. Error bars 
indicate standard errors. Asterisks indicate significant differences to the baseline condition. 
All OI-Scores of Phase 1 were significantly different from Baseline with p < .001, therefore 
only differences between Baseline and Phase 2 are reported in this figure; * p < .011 (critical ⍺ is Holm-Bonferroni-corrected, ⍺’=.025). 
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Figure 3. Mean Overimitation Score (OI-Scores) as a function of sex-groups (model’s and 
child’s sex). Error bars indicate standard errors. Asterisks indicate significant differences to 
the baseline condition. All OI-Scores of Phase 1 were significantly different from Baseline 
with p < .001, therefore only differences between Baseline and Phase 2 are reported in this 
figure; *p < .011 (critical ⍺ is Holm-Bonferroni-corrected, ⍺’=.025). 
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Figure 4. Mean Overimitation Score (OI-Scores) as a function of child’s sex.  
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 5. Mean Overimitation Score (OI-Scores) as a function of model’s sex. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
